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66Conventionalism about space and timeBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (3): 255-272. 1980.MANY WRITERS HAVE WISHED TO DISTINGUISH, WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS ABOUT SPACE AND TIME, BETWEEN MATTERS OF FACT AND MATTERS OF CONVENTION--TO SAY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS A MATTER OF FACT WHETHER TWO RODS AT THE SAME PLACE ARE CONGRUENT, BUT A MATTER OF CONVENTION WHETHER TWO RODS AT DIFFERENT PLACES ARE CONGRUENT. ANY ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE WHICH STATEMENTS ARE MATTERS OF CONVENTION WILL RELY ON SOME VERIFICATIONIST DOCTRINE. YET DIFFERENT VERIFICATIONIST DOCTRINES DIFFER IN PLAUSIBILITY AND YIELD …Read more
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279Personal identityProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74. 1974.EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY STATE THAT THE IDENTITY OF A PERSON OVER TIME IS A MATTER OF BODILY CONTINUITY AND/OR SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER. IN CONTRAST, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT WHILE BODILY CONTINUITY AND SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER ARE EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE IT. IT IS SOMETHING UNDEFINABLE. THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING WHAT TO SAY IN PUZZLE CASES DOES NOT SHOW THAT PERSONAL IDENTITY EXISTS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES OR THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE ARBI…Read more
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49Probability, credibility and acceptabilityAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3). 1971.THE PAPER EXAMINES WHAT IS MEANT BY ’EVIDENCE’ WHEN IT IS SAID THAT A THEORY IS PROBABLE ON CERTAIN EVIDENCE. IT CONSIDERS WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN A THEORY BEING PROBABLE ON CERTAIN EVIDENCE, A THEORY BEING BELIEVED, AND A THEORY BEING CREDIBLE. IT DISTINGUISHES VARIOUS SENSES OF ’ACCEPT’ IN WHICH SCIENTISTS ARE SAID TO ACCEPT THEORIES, ONLY ONE OF WHICH IS THE SENSE OF ’ACCEPT’ IN WHICH IT IS EQUATED WITH ’BELIEVE’. IT ANALYSES THE LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN A THEORY BEING PROBABLE ON THE E…Read more
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1In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The Cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the Teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in simple form the main points of my book ’The E…Read more
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50The argument for designIn J. Houston (ed.), Is it reasonable to believe in God?, Handsel Press. pp. 199-. 1984.The object of this paper is to show that there are no valid formal objections to the argument from design, so long as the argument is articulated with sufficient care. In particular I wish to analyse Hume's attack on the argument in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and to show that none of the formal objections made therein by Philo have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument
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7Arguments for the existence of GodIn J. Houston (ed.), Is it reasonable to believe in God?, Handsel Press. 1984.In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in a simple form the main points of my book The …Read more
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43The Christian WagerIn J. Houston (ed.), Is it reasonable to believe in God?, Handsel Press. pp. 217--228. 1984.
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55The probability of particular eventsPhilosophy of Science 38 (3): 327-343. 1971.The paper investigates what are the proper procedures for calculating the probability on certain evidence of a particular object e having a property, Q, e.g. of Eclipse winning the Derby. Let `α ' denote the conjunction of properties known to be possessed by e, and P(Q)/α the probability of an object which is α being Q. One view is that the probability of e being Q is given by the best confirmed value of P(Q)/α . This view is shown not to be generally true, but to provide a useful approximation …Read more
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56Popper's account of acceptabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2). 1971.ACCORDING TO POPPER, SCIENTIFIC THEORIES ARE TO BE ACCEPTED IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE FALSIFIABLE AND IN SO FAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN CORROBORATED. THE CONCEPTS OF FALSIFIABILITY AND CORROBORATION ARE SUBMITTED TO DETAILED ANALYSIS. THE POINT OF ACCEPTING THEORIES, ACCORDING TO POPPER, IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH VERISIMILITUDE. HOWEVER THE BEST WE CAN DO IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE. POPPER’S CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING THEORIES WILL ONLY LEAD TO THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMI…Read more
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304MiraclesPhilosophical Quarterly 18 (73): 320-328. 1968.(I UNDERSTAND BY A MIRACLE, A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE BY A GOD.) A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A NON-REPEATABLE COUNTER-INSTANCE TO IT. CONTRARY TO HUME’S VIEW, THERE COULD BE GOOD HISTORICAL EVIDENCE BOTH THAT A VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED AND THAT IT WAS DUE TO THE ACT OF A GOD
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76Choosing between confirmation theoriesPhilosophy of Science 37 (4): 602-613. 1970.ON WHAT GROUNDS OUGHT WE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN COMPETING CONFIRMATION THEORIES? THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONFIRMATION THEORIES AND OTHER THEORIES WHICH MIGHT BE CONFUSED WITH THEM, SUCH AS THEORIES OF ACCEPTABILITY. IT THEN ARGUES THAT A CONFIRMATION THEORY OUGHT TO ANALYSE RATHER THAN EXPLICATE OUR ORDINARY STANDARDS OF CONFIRMATION. IT WILL DO THIS IN SO FAR AS IT IS COHERENT AND DOES NOT YIELD COUNTERINTUITIVE JUDGMENTS
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35Cohen on evidential supportMind 81 (322): 244-248. 1972.CENTRAL TO COHEN’S NEW THEORY OF INDUCTION IS THE CLAIM THAT THE SUPPORT GIVEN BY EVIDENCE TO A HYPOTHESIS IS NOT A FUNCTION WHICH OBEYS THE AXIOMS OF THE PROBABILITY CALCULUS. THIS CLAIM DEPENDS ON THE TRUTH OF COHEN’S INSTANTIAL COMPARABILITY PRINCIPLE. UNDER NATURAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ’SUPPORT’, THIS PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. EVEN IF IT IS TRUE UNDER OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF ’SUPPORT’, THAT DOES NOT SHOW THAT CONFIRMATION IN CARNAP’S SENSE DOES NOT OBEY THE AXIOMS
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154Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious ExperienceIn Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 322-338. 2018.
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38Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks By Nicholas Wolterstorff Cambridge University Press, 1995, 326 pp., £37.50 hb, £12.95 pb (review)Philosophy 71 (277): 465-. 1996.
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34Could God Become Man?Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 25 53-70. 1989.The central doctrine of Christianity is that God intervened in human history in the person of Jesus Christ in a unique way; and that quickly became understood as the doctrine that in Jesus Christ God became man. In AD 451 the Council of Chalcedon formulated that doctrine in a precise way utilizing the current philosophical terminology, which provided a standard for the orthodoxy of subsequent thought on this issue. It affirmed its belief in ‘our Lord Jesus Christ, … truly God and truly man, … in…Read more
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54Richard Swinburne: Christian Philosophy in a Modern World (edited book)Ontos Verlag. 2008.Richard Swinburne is one of the most influential contemporaryproponents of the analytical philosophy of religion.
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156What kind of necessary being could God be?In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today, Ontos Verlag. pp. 345. 2012.
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Review of Clark N. Glymour: Theory and Evidence (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (3): 314-318. 1981.
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264The Argument to God from Fine-TuningIn Melville Y. Stewart (ed.), Science and Religion in Dialogue, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 223--233. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: * Fine-Tuning * Notes
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727Bayes' TheoremRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 194 (2): 250-251. 2004.Richard Swinburne: Introduction Elliott Sober: Bayesianism - its scopes and limits Colin Howson: Bayesianism in Statistics A P Dawid: Bayes's Theorem and Weighing Evidence by Juries John Earman: Bayes, Hume, Price, and Miracles David Miller: Propensities May Satisfy Bayes's Theorem 'An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances' by Thomas Bayes, presented to the Royal Society by Richard Price. Preceded by a historical introduction by G A Barnard
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184Relations between universals,or divine laws?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2). 2006.Armstrong's theory of laws of nature as relations between universals gives an initially plausible account of why the causal powers of substances are bound together only in certain ways, so that the world is a very regular place. But its resulting theory of causation cannot account for intentional causation, since this involves an agent trying to do something, and trying is causing. This kind of causation is thus a state of an agent and does not involve the operation of a law. It is simpler to su…Read more