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96Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind By Paul M. Churchland Cambridge University Press, 1979, 157 pp., £8.50 (review)Philosophy 55 (212): 273-. 1980.
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24The Construction of Reality By Michael A. Arbib and Mary B. Hesse Cambridge University Press, 1987, 286 pp., £25.00 (review)Philosophy 62 (242): 542-. 1987.
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52DesirePhilosophy 60 (234). 1985.DESIRES ARE INVOLUNTARY MENTAL READINESSES TO DO ACTIONS INDEPENDENTLY OF BELIEFS ABOUT THEIR WORTH. AGENTS OFTEN HAVE A CHOICE WHETHER TO DO THE ACTION BELIEVED BEST OR TO YIELD TO DESIRE TO DO AN ACTION BELIEVED LESS GOOD. ENJOYMENT CONSISTS IN THE SATISFACTION OF DESIRE. ALTHOUGH DESIRES ARE AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT INVOLUNTARY, AN AGENT CAN TAKE STEPS TO CHANGE HIS FUTURE DESIRES.
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23On What There Must Be By Ross Harrison. Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1974, 210 pp., £4.25 (review)Philosophy 50 (191): 118-. 1975.
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87Space and timeSt. Martin's Press. 1968.THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES SIMULTANEITY, ABSOLUTE SPACE AND TIME, THE NUMBER OF POSSIBLE DIMENSIONS, CAUSALITY, RIVAL SCIENTIFIC THEORIES OF THE SPATIO-TEMPORAL PROPERTIES OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE MEANING OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL TERMS IN ORDINARY AND SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE. (BP, EDITED)
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2Properties, causation, and projectibility: Reply to ShoemakerIn Laurence Jonathan Cohen & Mary Brenda Hesse (eds.), Applications of inductive logic: proceedings of a conference at the Queen's College, Oxford 21-24, August 1978, Oxford University Press. pp. 313-20. 1980.SHOEMAKER IS WRONG TO CLAIM THAT ALL THE GENUINE PROPERTIES OF THINGS ARE NOTHING BUT POTENTIALITIES FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE CAUSAL POWERS OF THINGS. FOR THE ONLY GROUNDS FOR ATTRIBUTING CAUSAL POWERS TO THINGS ARE IN TERMS OF THE EFFECTS WHICH THOSE THINGS TYPICALLY PRODUCE. BUT ALL EFFECTS ARE ULTIMATELY INSTANTIATIONS OF PROPERTIES, AND IF THESE WERE NOTHING BUT POTENTIALITIES TO PRODUCE EFFECTS, THERE WOULD BE A VICIOUS INFINITE REGRESS, AND NO ONE WOULD EVER BE JUSTIFIED IN ATTRIBUTING PROP…Read more
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66Conventionalism about space and timeBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (3): 255-272. 1980.MANY WRITERS HAVE WISHED TO DISTINGUISH, WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS ABOUT SPACE AND TIME, BETWEEN MATTERS OF FACT AND MATTERS OF CONVENTION--TO SAY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS A MATTER OF FACT WHETHER TWO RODS AT THE SAME PLACE ARE CONGRUENT, BUT A MATTER OF CONVENTION WHETHER TWO RODS AT DIFFERENT PLACES ARE CONGRUENT. ANY ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE WHICH STATEMENTS ARE MATTERS OF CONVENTION WILL RELY ON SOME VERIFICATIONIST DOCTRINE. YET DIFFERENT VERIFICATIONIST DOCTRINES DIFFER IN PLAUSIBILITY AND YIELD …Read more
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263Personal identityProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74. 1974.EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY STATE THAT THE IDENTITY OF A PERSON OVER TIME IS A MATTER OF BODILY CONTINUITY AND/OR SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER. IN CONTRAST, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT WHILE BODILY CONTINUITY AND SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER ARE EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE IT. IT IS SOMETHING UNDEFINABLE. THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING WHAT TO SAY IN PUZZLE CASES DOES NOT SHOW THAT PERSONAL IDENTITY EXISTS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES OR THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE ARBI…Read more
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48Probability, credibility and acceptabilityAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3). 1971.THE PAPER EXAMINES WHAT IS MEANT BY ’EVIDENCE’ WHEN IT IS SAID THAT A THEORY IS PROBABLE ON CERTAIN EVIDENCE. IT CONSIDERS WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN A THEORY BEING PROBABLE ON CERTAIN EVIDENCE, A THEORY BEING BELIEVED, AND A THEORY BEING CREDIBLE. IT DISTINGUISHES VARIOUS SENSES OF ’ACCEPT’ IN WHICH SCIENTISTS ARE SAID TO ACCEPT THEORIES, ONLY ONE OF WHICH IS THE SENSE OF ’ACCEPT’ IN WHICH IT IS EQUATED WITH ’BELIEVE’. IT ANALYSES THE LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN A THEORY BEING PROBABLE ON THE E…Read more
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1In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The Cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the Teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in simple form the main points of my book ’The E…Read more
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43The Christian WagerIn J. Houston (ed.), Is it reasonable to believe in God?, Handsel Press. pp. 217--228. 1984.
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50The argument for designIn J. Houston (ed.), Is it reasonable to believe in God?, Handsel Press. pp. 199-. 1984.The object of this paper is to show that there are no valid formal objections to the argument from design, so long as the argument is articulated with sufficient care. In particular I wish to analyse Hume's attack on the argument in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and to show that none of the formal objections made therein by Philo have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument
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7Arguments for the existence of GodIn J. Houston (ed.), Is it reasonable to believe in God?, Handsel Press. 1984.In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in a simple form the main points of my book The …Read more
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56Popper's account of acceptabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2). 1971.ACCORDING TO POPPER, SCIENTIFIC THEORIES ARE TO BE ACCEPTED IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE FALSIFIABLE AND IN SO FAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN CORROBORATED. THE CONCEPTS OF FALSIFIABILITY AND CORROBORATION ARE SUBMITTED TO DETAILED ANALYSIS. THE POINT OF ACCEPTING THEORIES, ACCORDING TO POPPER, IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH VERISIMILITUDE. HOWEVER THE BEST WE CAN DO IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE. POPPER’S CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING THEORIES WILL ONLY LEAD TO THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMI…Read more
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52The probability of particular eventsPhilosophy of Science 38 (3): 327-343. 1971.The paper investigates what are the proper procedures for calculating the probability on certain evidence of a particular object e having a property, Q, e.g. of Eclipse winning the Derby. Let `α ' denote the conjunction of properties known to be possessed by e, and P(Q)/α the probability of an object which is α being Q. One view is that the probability of e being Q is given by the best confirmed value of P(Q)/α . This view is shown not to be generally true, but to provide a useful approximation …Read more
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299MiraclesPhilosophical Quarterly 18 (73): 320-328. 1968.(I UNDERSTAND BY A MIRACLE, A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE BY A GOD.) A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A NON-REPEATABLE COUNTER-INSTANCE TO IT. CONTRARY TO HUME’S VIEW, THERE COULD BE GOOD HISTORICAL EVIDENCE BOTH THAT A VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED AND THAT IT WAS DUE TO THE ACT OF A GOD
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74Choosing between confirmation theoriesPhilosophy of Science 37 (4): 602-613. 1970.ON WHAT GROUNDS OUGHT WE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN COMPETING CONFIRMATION THEORIES? THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONFIRMATION THEORIES AND OTHER THEORIES WHICH MIGHT BE CONFUSED WITH THEM, SUCH AS THEORIES OF ACCEPTABILITY. IT THEN ARGUES THAT A CONFIRMATION THEORY OUGHT TO ANALYSE RATHER THAN EXPLICATE OUR ORDINARY STANDARDS OF CONFIRMATION. IT WILL DO THIS IN SO FAR AS IT IS COHERENT AND DOES NOT YIELD COUNTERINTUITIVE JUDGMENTS
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35Cohen on evidential supportMind 81 (322): 244-248. 1972.CENTRAL TO COHEN’S NEW THEORY OF INDUCTION IS THE CLAIM THAT THE SUPPORT GIVEN BY EVIDENCE TO A HYPOTHESIS IS NOT A FUNCTION WHICH OBEYS THE AXIOMS OF THE PROBABILITY CALCULUS. THIS CLAIM DEPENDS ON THE TRUTH OF COHEN’S INSTANTIAL COMPARABILITY PRINCIPLE. UNDER NATURAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ’SUPPORT’, THIS PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. EVEN IF IT IS TRUE UNDER OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF ’SUPPORT’, THAT DOES NOT SHOW THAT CONFIRMATION IN CARNAP’S SENSE DOES NOT OBEY THE AXIOMS
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153Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious ExperienceIn Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 322-338. 2018.
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98William Lane Craig God, time and eternity. The coherence of theism II: Eternity. (Dordrecht: Kluwer academic publishers, 2001). Pp. XI+321. £74.00 (hbk). ISBN 1402000111 (review)Religious Studies 38 (3): 363-369. 2002.
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193Body and soul: Swinburne Body and soulThink 2 (5): 31-36. 2003.Richard Swinburne here defends the view that mind and body are distinct substances capable of independent existence. For a very different approach to the question of how mind and body are related contrast Rowland Stout's ‘Behaviourism’, which follows this article.
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44Reply: A Further Defence of Christian RevelationReligious Studies 29 (3). 1993.In response to Peter Byrne’s critical notice of my book "Revelation", I argue that if God is to put us in a position freely to choose to seek Him, we need some propositional revelation (about what he is like and how to worship him), but also some scope for sorting out the implications of that revelation. Both of these aims are satisfied if the Christian Bible with the normal tradition of how to interpret it are the vehicle of revelation.
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2From mental/physical identity to substance dualismIn Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine, Clarendon Press. 2007.
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1The Dark TideOxford University Press UK. 1993.The author investigates what it means, and whether it is coherent, to say that there is a God, concluding that, despite philosophical objections, the claims which religious believers make about God are generally coherent. Sometimes the words by which this is expressed are used in a stretched sense, but theologians acknowledge the fact.