-
101The irreducibility of causationDialectica 51 (1). 1997.Empiricists have sought to follow Hume in claiming that causality is a relation between events reducible to something more basic, e.g., regularities or counterfactuals. But all such attempts fail through their inability to distinguish cause from effect. The alternative is that causation is irreducible. Regularities are evidence of causation but do not constitute it. We understand what causation is through performing intentional actions which necessarily involve trying, which in turn just is exer…Read more
-
99The Resurrection of God IncarnateClarendon Press. 2003.Reasons for believing that Jesus rose from the dead.
-
98William Lane Craig God, time and eternity. The coherence of theism II: Eternity. (Dordrecht: Kluwer academic publishers, 2001). Pp. XI+321. £74.00 (hbk). ISBN 1402000111 (review)Religious Studies 38 (3): 363-369. 2002.
-
98How the divine properties fit together: Reply to gwiazdaReligious Studies 45 (4): 495-498. 2009.Jeremy Gwiazda has criticized my claim that God, understood as an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly free person is a person ’of the simplest possible kind’ on the grounds that omnipotence, etc., as spelled out by me are omnipotence, etc., of restricted kinds, and so less simple forms of these properties than maximal forms would be. However, the account which I gave of these properties in ’The Christian God’ (although not in ’The Coherence of Theism’) shows that, when they are defined in cert…Read more
-
96Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind By Paul M. Churchland Cambridge University Press, 1979, 157 pp., £8.50 (review)Philosophy 55 (212): 273-. 1980.
-
95The Existence of GodOxford University Press UK. 1979.Richard Swinburne presents a substantially rewritten and updated edition of his most celebrated book. No other work has made a more powerful case for the probability of the existence of God. Swinburne gives a rigorous and penetrating analysis of the most important arguments for theism: the cosmological argument; arguments from the existence of laws of nature and the 'fine-tuning' of the universe; from the occurrence of consciousness and moral awareness; and from miracles and religious experience…Read more
-
92Confirmability and factual meaningfulnessAnalysis 33 (3). 1973.THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE, THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION-STATEMENT, OR THERE ARE OBSERVATION STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONFIRM OR DISCONFIRM IT. THIS PRINCIPLE IS THE FINAL WEAK CLAIM OF VERIFICATIONISM. EVEN IF TRUE, IT WOULD NOT BE OF GREAT USE IN SORTING OUT THE MEANINGFUL FROM THE MEANINGFULNESS, BUT IT IS SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY TO BE FALSE. A CLAIM THAT THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THAT MEN WILL EVER HAVE …Read more
-
88Discussion. Reply to grünbaumBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (3): 481-485. 2000.
-
88Natural Theology, Its “Dwindling Probabilities” and “Lack of Rapport”Faith and Philosophy 21 (4): 533-546. 2004.This paper comments on the other papers in this special issue of ’Faith and Philosophy’ on natural theology. It claims that most people today need both bare natural theology (to show that there is a God) and ramified natural theology (to establish detailed doctrinal claims), and that Christian tradition has generally claimed that cogent arguments of natural theology (of both kinds) are available. Plantinga’s "dwindling probabilities" objection against ramified natural theology is shown to have n…Read more
-
87Tensed FactsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 27 (2). 1990.I defend the A Theory of Time that there are tensed (and other indexical) facts, e.g., about what has happened, as well as tenseless facts, e.g., about what happened in the nineteenth century. I reject arguments of McTaggart and Grunbaum, but concentrate on Mellor’s argument that tenseless truth-conditions can be given for the truth of every tensed sentence. My rebuttal of this argument depends on a distinction between the ’proposition’ and the ’statement’ expressed by a sentence. Statements hav…Read more
-
87The Argument to the Soul from Partial Brain TransplantsPhilosophia Christi 20 (1): 13-19. 2018.Suppose we transplant the left hemisphere of one person, Alexandra, into the skull of another person, Alex, from whom both cerebral hemispheres have been removed; and transplant Alexandra’s right hemisphere into the skull of another person, Sandra, both of whose cerebral hemispheres have been removed. Both of the resulting persons will then have some of Alexandra’s brain and probably almost all of her memories and character. But since at most only one of them can be Alexandra, being Alexandra mu…Read more
-
87Space and timeSt. Martin's Press. 1968.THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES SIMULTANEITY, ABSOLUTE SPACE AND TIME, THE NUMBER OF POSSIBLE DIMENSIONS, CAUSALITY, RIVAL SCIENTIFIC THEORIES OF THE SPATIO-TEMPORAL PROPERTIES OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE MEANING OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL TERMS IN ORDINARY AND SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE. (BP, EDITED)
-
82The paradoxes of confirmation - a surveyAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 8 (4). 1971.THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION ARE CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRADICTIONS ARISING FROM THE CONJUNCTION OF THREE PRINCIPLES OF CONFIRMATION - NICOD’S CRITERION, THE EQUIVALENCE CONDITION, AND WHAT THE PAPER CALLS THE SCIENTIFIC LAWS CONDITION. THE PAPER DISCUSSES IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS SOLUTIONS PROVIDED BY ABANDONING ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES. IN THE END IT FINDS NICOD’S CRITERION FALSE, BUT FINDS THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY H.G. ALEXANDER AND OTHERS OF WHY NICOD’S CRITERION IS FALSE THEMSELVES UNSATISFACTOR…Read more
-
81The impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility?In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates, Oup Usa. pp. 363. 2009.
-
78Response to my commentatorsReligious Studies 38 (3): 301-315. 2002.This is my response to the critical commentaries by Hasker, McNaughton and Schellenberg on my tetralogy on Christian doctrine. I dispute the moral principles invoked by McNaughton and Schellenberg in criticism of my theodicy and theory of atonement. I claim, contrary to Hasker, that I have taken proper account of the ‘existential dimension' of Christianity. I agree that whether it is rational to pursue the Christian way depends not only on how probable it is that the Christian creed is true and …Read more
-
78What does the Old Testament mean?In M. Bergmann, M. Murray & M. Rae (eds.), Divine Evil?: The Moral Character of the God of Abraham, Oxford Up. 2010.
-
76Analytic/syntheticAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1). 1984.THERE IS A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC SENTENCES IF WE DEFINE AN ANALYTIC SENTENCE AS ONE WHICH ENTAILS A SELF-CONTRADICTION. THE PAPER SHOWS THAT ALTHOUGH THIS DEFINES "ANALYTIC" BY TERMS WHICH ARE THEMSELVES ALSO MODAL TERMS, THESE LATTER TERMS CAN BE EXPLAINED BY DEFINITIONS USING LESS TECHNICAL TERMS AND BY EXAMPLES, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GIVE "ANALYTIC" AS CLEAR A MEANING AS IS POSSESSED BY MOST OTHER TERMS OF OUR LANGUAGE. THE FACT THAT THERE ARE BORDER-LINE CASES OF ANA…Read more
-
75What Makes a Scientific Theory Probably TrueIn Melville Y. Stewart (ed.), Science and Religion in Dialogue, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 203--212. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: * Notes
-
74Choosing between confirmation theoriesPhilosophy of Science 37 (4): 602-613. 1970.ON WHAT GROUNDS OUGHT WE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN COMPETING CONFIRMATION THEORIES? THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONFIRMATION THEORIES AND OTHER THEORIES WHICH MIGHT BE CONFUSED WITH THEM, SUCH AS THEORIES OF ACCEPTABILITY. IT THEN ARGUES THAT A CONFIRMATION THEORY OUGHT TO ANALYSE RATHER THAN EXPLICATE OUR ORDINARY STANDARDS OF CONFIRMATION. IT WILL DO THIS IN SO FAR AS IT IS COHERENT AND DOES NOT YIELD COUNTERINTUITIVE JUDGMENTS
-
74Faith and ReasonOxford University Press UK. 1981.Richard Swinburne presents a new edition of the final volume of his acclaimed trilogy on philosophical theology. Faith and Reason is a self-standing examination of the implications for religious faith of Swinburne's famous arguments about the coherence of theism and the existence of God.By practising a particular religion, a person seeks to achieve some or all of three goals - that he worships and obeys God, gains salvation for himself, and helps others to attain their salvation. But not all rel…Read more
-
73The Modal Argument is Not CircularFaith and Philosophy 15 (3): 371-372. 1998.Hasker’s claim that my modal argument for substance dualism is epistemically circular is implausible. Someone can accept Premise 2 (which, Hasker claims, is the premise which generates the circularity) without ever understanding the conclusion, or without accepting Premise 3.
-
73Could anyone justifiably believe epiphenomenalism?Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4): 196--216. 2011.Epiphenomenalism claims that all conscious events are caused immediately by brain events, and no conscious events cause brain events. In order to have a justified belief in a theory someone needs a justified belief that it or some higher-level theory predicts certain events and those events occurred. To have either of the latter beliefs we depend ultimately on the evidence of apparent experience, memory, and testimony, which is credible in the absence of defeaters; it is an undermining defeater …Read more
-
73Swinburne and Plantinga on internal rationalityReligious Studies 37 (3): 357-358. 2001.Plantinga defines S's belief as ‘privately rational if and only if it is probable on S's evidence’, and ‘publicly rational if and only if it is probable with respect to public evidence’, and he claims that ‘it is an immediate consequence of these definitions that all my basic beliefs are privately rational’. I made it explicitly clear in my review that on my account of a person's evidence (quoted and used by Plantinga) as ‘the content of his basic beliefs (weighted by his degree of confidence in…Read more
-
72Meaningfulness without Confirmability: A ReplyAnalysis 35 (1): 22. 1974.IN THE COURSE OF "CONFIRMABILITY AND FACTUAL MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 33) I ARGUED THAT THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION STATEMENT OR CONFIRMABLE BY OBSERVATION STATEMENTS. MY ARGUMENT CONSISTED IN PRODUCING EXAMPLES OF FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL STATEMENTS WHICH FAIL TO SATISFY THE PRINCIPLE. IN "CONFIRMABILITY AND MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 34) R I SIKORA ARGUED THAT MY EXAMPLES DO…Read more