-
29XIII*—Personal IdentityProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1): 231-247. 1974.R. G. Swinburne; XIII*—Personal Identity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 74, Issue 1, 1 June 1974, Pages 231–247, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.
-
29Original SinfulnessNeue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 27 (1): 235-250. 1985.
-
28Physical DeterminismRoyal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 3 155-168. 1969.The object of this paper is to examine what evidence we can have for or against the truth of determinism, a doctrine often set forward by the proposition ‘every event has a cause’. I understand in this context by the cause of an event a set of prior conditions jointly sufficient for the occurrence of the event. Since the determinist is concerned with all physical states and not merely with changes of states, which are most naturally termed events, we may phrase this claim more precisely as follo…Read more
-
28Anselmian Explorations, Essays in Philosophical Theology (review)Faith and Philosophy 6 (3): 339-342. 1989.
-
28Does Theism Need a Theodicy?Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (2): 287-311. 1988.To many atheists the existence of evil seems to provide a conclusive argument against the existence of God. God is by definition omnipotent and perfectly good; a perfectly good being will remove evil in so far as he can, an omnipotent being can remove any evil he chooses, so if there is a God there will be no evil, but there is evil, hence there is no God. Theists normally challenge this argument by challenging the premiss that a perfectly good being will remove evil in so far as he can. The the…Read more
-
28Response to WarrantWarrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper FunctionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 415. 1995.
-
27Discussion of Peter Unger's Identity, Consciousness and ValuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1). 1992.
-
27Cartesian Substance DualismIn Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, Wiley-blackwell. 2018.Rene Descartes's argument begins from one obviously true premise that (at the time when he was considering this argument) Descartes is thinking. It then proceeds by means of two principles about what is “conceivable” to the conclusion that Descartes is essentially “a thinking substance distinct from his body, which he calls his 'soul'”. This chapter looks in more detail at Descartes's argument. It explains some of the terminology which Descartes uses. Descartes consists of two parts ‐ an essenti…Read more
-
27Summary of Are We Bodies or Souls?Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1): 7-10. 2021.This book is about the nature of human beings, defending a version of substance dualism, similar to that of Descartes, that each of us living on earth consists of two distinct substances—body and soul. Bodies keep us alive and by enabling us to interact with each other and the world they make our lives greatly worth living; but our soul is the one essential part of each of us.
-
26Whole and Part in Cosmological ArgumentsPhilosophy 44 (170). 1969.IF WE CAN EXPLAIN CAUSALLY EACH EVENT OF A SERIES, CAN WE THEREBY EXPLAIN CAUSALLY THE WHOLE SERIES? THE PRINCIPLES DEVELOPED IN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION ENTAIL THAT EVEN IF WE CAN EXPLAIN CAUSALLY THE OCCURRENCE OF THE STATE OF THE UNIVERSE AT EACH TEMPORAL INSTANT, THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE CAN EXPLAIN CAUSALLY THE OCCURRENCE OF ALL THOSE STATES
-
24The Construction of Reality By Michael A. Arbib and Mary B. Hesse Cambridge University Press, 1987, 286 pp., £25.00 (review)Philosophy 62 (242): 542-. 1987.
-
24God and MoralityJournal of Chinese Philosophy 41 (S1): 553-566. 2014.I'm not going to discuss whether or not there is a God, but simply whether if there is a God, that makes any difference to morality. I shall argue first that the existence and actions of God would make no difference to the fact that there are moral truths—and on this you may already agree with me. But I shall go on to argue that the existence and actions of God would make a great difference to the content of morality, to the seriousness of morality, and our knowledge of morality—and on all that …Read more
-
23Pourquoi Hume et Kant ont eu tort de rejeter la théologie naturelleThéoRèmes 2 (1). 2012.La théologie naturelle faisait partie de la tradition philosophique occidentale jusqu’à ce que Hume et Kant affirment qu’il y a des limites fondamentales à l’intelligibilité, ou au moins au savoir possible, de ce qui dépasse l’expérience ; et donc qu’il ne peut exister d’arguments solides partant du monde naturel et concluant à l’existence de Dieu. Je défends que, bien que nos concepts doivent en effet être dérivés de notre expérience, ils peuvent avoir une application bien au-delà de notre expé…Read more
-
23On What There Must Be By Ross Harrison. Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1974, 210 pp., £4.25 (review)Philosophy 50 (191): 118-. 1975.
-
22Reply: A further defence of Christian revelation: Richard SwinburneReligious Studies 29 (3): 395-400. 1993.
-
22Bayes's Theorem (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2002.Bayes's theorem is a tool for assessing how probable evidence makes some hypothesis. The papers in this volume consider the worth and applicability of the theorem. Richard Swinburne sets out the philosophical issues. Elliott Sober argues that there are other criteria for assessing hypotheses. Colin Howson, Philip Dawid and John Earman consider how the theorem can be used in statistical science, in weighing evidence in criminal trials, and in assessing evidence for the occurrence of miracles. Dav…Read more
-
20Language and TimePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 486-489. 1996.Part I of Language and Time is a defence of the tensed theory of time, the view that assertions about events happening now or being past or future are irreducible to tenseless assertions about the dates at which events happen or about their occurrence before or after other events. It claims that tensed sentences are not translatable by tenseless sentences, nor do they have the same truth conditions as tenseless sentences. They are reducible in neither of these senses either to tenseless date sen…Read more
-
20Faith and the Existence of God: Arguments for the Existence of GodRoyal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 24 121-133. 1988.Arguments move from premises to conclusions. The premises state things taken temporally for granted; if the argument works, the premises provide grounds for affirming the conclusion. A valid deductive argument is one in which the premises necessitate, that is, entail, the conclusion. What I shall call a ‘correct’ inductive argument is one in which the premises in some degree probabilify the conclusion, but do not necessitate it. More precisely, in what I shall call a correct P-inductive argument…Read more
-
20Christianity and the Discourse of the World ReligionsIn Peter Koslowski (ed.), Philosophy Bridging the World Religions, Kluwer Academic. pp. 7--20. 2003.
-
20Jesus and the Total Available EvidencePhilosophia Christi 16 (2): 419-422. 2014.Cavin and Colombetti correctly affirm that in judging the probability of a hypothesis we should take into account “the total available evidence.” However, they neglect their own affirmation when they claim that I make an unwarranted assumption that God would not massively deceive the human race, when they claim that I do not take into account any evidence favoring hypotheses incompatible with the traditional account of what happened to the body of Jesus, and when they claim that I do not take in…Read more
-
19How the divine properties fit together: Reply to gwiazda: Richard SwinburneReligious Studies 45 (4): 495-498. 2009.Jeremy Gwiazda has criticized my claim that God, understood as an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly free person is a person ‘of the simplest possible kind’ on the grounds that omnipotence etc. as spelled out by me are omnipotence etc. of restricted kinds, and so less simple forms of these properties than maximal forms would be. However the account which I gave of these properties in The Christian God shows that, when they are defined in certain ways, they all follow from one property of ‘pur…Read more
-
18Thesim, Atheism, and Big Bang CosmologyInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 37 (2): 123-125. 1995.Was the Big Bang with which the universe began created by God, or did it occur without cause? In this book two philosophers of opposite viewpoints debate the question.
-
18