Richard Swinburne

The cause of an event must continue over a period at which the effect is not occurring and the whole period at which it is occurring. It follows that simultaneous causation and backward causation are metaphysically impossible. I distinguish among events said to occur at a time, ‘hard’ events which really occur solely at that time and ‘soft’ events which occur partly at another time. God’s beliefs at a time are hard events at that time. It follows that if God is a temporal being, he cannot know infallibly what either we or he will do freely at a future time; and if God is timeless, he cannot know what happens in time. Hence we must define God’s ‘omniscience’ in such a way as to exclude any knowledge of future free actions. I discuss in an Appendix how far this view is compatible with Scripture and Church tradition.

Inanimate explanation is to be analysed in terms of substances having powers and liabilities to exercise their powers under certain conditions; while personal explanation is to be analysed in terms of persons, their beliefs, powers, and purposes. A crucial criterion for an explanation being probably true is that it is (among explanations leading us to expect the data) the simplest one. Simplicity is a matter of few substances, few kinds of substances, few properties (including powers and liabilities), few kinds of properties, and mathematically simple relations between properties. Explanation of the existence of the universe by the agency of God provides the simplest kind of personal explanation there can be, and one simpler than any inanimate explanation. I defend this view more thoroughly than previously in light of recent challenges.

Bayes's theorem is a tool for assessing how probable evidence makes some hypothesis. The papers in this volume consider the worth and applicability of the theorem. Richard Swinburne sets out the philosophical issues. Elliott Sober argues that there are other criteria for assessing hypotheses. Colin Howson, Philip Dawid and John Earman consider how the theorem can be used in statistical science, in weighing evidence in criminal trials, and in assessing evidence for the occurrence of miracles. David Miller argues for the worth of the probability calculus as a tool for measuring propensities in nature rather than the strength of evidence. The volume ends with the original paper containing the theorem, presented to the Royal Society in 1763.

Richard Swinburne presents a new edition of the final volume of his acclaimed trilogy on philosophical theology. Faith and Reason is a self-standing examination of the implications for religious faith of Swinburne's famous arguments about the coherence of theism and the existence of God.By practising a particular religion, a person seeks to achieve some or all of three goals - that he worships and obeys God, gains salvation for himself, and helps others to attain their salvation. But not all religions commend worship, and different religions have different conceptions of salvation. Faced with these differences, Richard Swinburne argues that we should practice that religion which has the best goals and is more probably true than the creeds of other religions. He proposes criteria by which to determine the probabilities of different religious creeds, and he argues that, while requiring total commitment, faith does not demand fully convinced belief. While maintaining the same structure and conclusions as the original classic, this second edition has been substantially rewritten, both in order to relate its ideas more closely to those of classical theologians and philosophers and to respond to more recent views. In particular he discusses, and ultimately rejects, the view of Alvin Plantinga that the 'warrant' of a belief depends on the process which produced it, and John Hick's contention that all religions offer valid paths to salvation

ABSTRACT:Moral realism entails that there are metaphysically necessary moral principles of the form ‘all actions of nonmoral kind Z are morally good’; being discoverable a priori, these must be logically necessary. This article seeks to justify this apparently puzzling consequence. A sentence expresses a logically necessary proposition iff its negation entails a contradiction. The method of reflective equilibrium assumes that the simplest account of the apparently correct use of sentences of some type in paradigm examples is probably logically necessary. An account is simple insofar as it uses few predicates designating properties easily recognizable in many different kinds of paradigm examples. I illustrate how reflective equilibrium uses these criteria to discover logically necessary nonmoral propositions such as ‘if S remembers doing X, S believes that he did X’ and ‘if it is scarlet, it is red’. I then illustrate how exactly the same procedures can lead us from paradigm examples of apparently true sentences asserting that actions of some kind are good to discovering moral principles. I advance the contingent hypothesis that most contemporary humans, although they initially disagree about moral issues, have derived from different paradigm examples the same concept of moral goodness, which will ensure that the use of reflective equilibrium will lead to eventual agreement about moral issues. That strongly suggests that the moral principles eventually reached by reflective equilibrium are logically necessary ones.

This is the first full-length study of the doctrine of the Trinity by an analytic philosopher. It appears in a new series, “Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology,” and so reflects the growing interest within analytic philosophy of religion in the application of the tools and results of analytic philosophy to Christian doctrinal claims. Hasker is concerned almost entirely to make sense of the doctrine rather than justify it, and claims to have reached “a coherent, meaningful, scripturally adequate, and theologically orthodox” (p. 255) account of it. The classical statement of the doctrine is of course that contained in the Nicene Creed, which is in effect the common creed of all Christians: that there is “one God”; the Son is “of one substance with the Father” and the Spirit is “worshipped and glorified with the Father and the Son”; the Son was “begotten of the Father before all ages

I analyze different accounts of laws of nature: the Hume-Lewis regularity account, the Armstrong-Tooley relations between universals account, and my preferred account in terms of the powers and liabilities of individual substances. On any account it is most unlikely a priori that a universe would be governed by simple laws of nature. But if there is a God, it is quite probable that he will choose to create free agents of limited power, and to put them in a universe governed by simple laws of nature, in order that their purposes may have their intended effects. Hence, the operation of simple laws of nature confirms the existence of God.

All particular moral truths depend on necessary moral truths. Among these necessary moral truths are the duty (within limits) to conform to the commands of benefactors; hence, our duty to obey God, our supreme benefactor. In virtue of his perfect goodness, God will not issue commands beyond the limits of his right to issue them. Necessary moral truths hold in virtue of the concepts designated by expressions such as ’morally obligatory’, and so it is not logically possible for God to change the necessary moral truths. He will issue commands in order to make us very good people, coordinate our actions with each other, and give us special vocations.