Filip Buekens

Social constructivist approaches to science have often been dismissed as inaccurate accounts of scientific knowledge. In this article, we take the claims of robust social constructivism (SC) seriously and attempt to find a theory which does instantiate the epistemic predicament as described by SC. We argue that Freudian psychoanalysis, in virtue of some of its well-known epistemic complications and conceptual confusions, provides a perfect illustration of what SC claims is actually going on in science. In other words, the features SC mistakenly ascribes to science in general correctly characterize the epistemic status of Freudian psychoanalysis. This sheds some light on the internal disputes in the field of psychoanalysis, on the sociology of psychoanalytic movement, and on the “war” that has been waged over Freud's legacy with his critics. In addition, our analysis offers an indirect and independent argument against SC as an account of bona fide science, by illustrating what science would look like if it were to function as SC claims it does.

Lacan's conceptual surrealism. Many scholars working in the field of cultural studies, continental philosophy of language and psychoanalysis still believe that Jacques Lacan had something interesting to say about 'the science of the subject'. After Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont exposed Lacan's 'mathematical' excursions as utter nonsence, it was often argued that one could indeed reject these phantastic excursions and still retain an interesting theory about the subject, language, metaphors, et cetera. In this paper, I show that Lacan's conceptual surrealism goes a lot deeper as it affects the core of his thinking. His theory of metaphors (the exemple this paper focuses on) is founded on a series of surrealistic moves, which makes him immune for criticism and the result of which does not even capture the core idea of what a metaphor is. The paper ends with a sketch of some of the dilemma's readers of Lacan must confront of they want to understand Lacan.