Franco Trabattoni

Poiché nelle Leggi esistono dei passi un cui Platone mostra di apprezzare l'utilità della scrittura, alcuni studiosi hanno pensato che vi sia una certa contraddizione con i noti luoghi del Fedro e della VII Lettera dove Platone privilegia in modo assai netto il discorso orale. In realtà si tratta di una contraddizione solo apparente. Il contrasto oralità/scrittura rappresenta infatti in Platone il contrasto tra un discorso aperto, variabile - dunque funzionale allo scopo di persuadere - e un discorso fisso, rigido, che ripete sempre le stesse cose senza preoccuparsi di convincere chi lo riceve. Ora, tale contrasto appare anche nelle Leggi, e precisamente nel rapporto che esiste tra il proemio alla legge e la legge vera e propria. Il proemio ha infatti lo scopo di promuovere la persuasione, e Platone fa ben capire che si tratta del momento decisivo, perché la legge scritta, se non è preceduta da convinzioni consolidate, ha ben poca utilità e valore

For several decades now, and for a number of different reasons, there has been a significant reawakening of interest in Aristotle's practical philosophy. In particular it is widely held that his philosophy can work as a model for safeguarding the fundamental ethical demands without having to deny the natural essence of the human being and without having to resort to a metaphysical basis. This article sets out to question this theoretical approach. It considers in particular two main problems: the responsability of the individual and the role of the knowledge of good in ethics. The comparison between two recent publications , is directed towards demonstrating that Aristotle's ethical thought does not meet demands nowadays considered essential. As for responsability, Aristotle succeeds in justifying responsability for actions but not responsability for character: the results are hardly acceptable . With regard to the knowledge of good, it is broadly estabilished that, in his ethics, Aristotle does not consider it to be a central theme . The question is whether the lack of this particular feature is really, as many maintain, a positive characteristic. This paper aims to demonstrate that it is not the case, or at least it is not when evaluating ethical theories from a general current perspective, because nowadays the fundamental ethical problem seems indeed to be the identification of an intersubjective consent on the notions of good and evil. If, in our search for an effective model for modern reflection, we wish to turn our attention to ancient philosophy, then the Socratic/Platonic approach seems to be much more promising than that of Aristotle