Franco Trabattoni

Nos mais recentes debates críticos acerca da filosofia de Platão, a doutrina da reminiscência tem suscitado um interesse comparativamente menor em relação aos outros temas tratados na obra do pensador ateniense. Grande parte dos estudiosos modernos tende a considerar a reminiscência um método de pesquisa, bem como a marginalizar a referência a dois mundos e o trânsito da alma entre eles. O que pretendo demonstrar neste artigo é que não só a teoria da reminiscência é a condição de possibilidade necessária das nossas operações cognitivas, como também o é apenas e só em virtude da sua valência metafísica.

This work aims to querying what are the limits of philosophical argumentation established by Plato and the distance of those limits in relation to Aristotle’s and later thinkers’ thoughts. The supposition here defended concerns to the fact that, for Plato, what really changes in the argumentations is that the definition becomes delimitation, that the logic replaces rethoric, that the demonstration becomes persuasion, if assumed the hermeneutical links that the thought and the language are subjected to.

For Plato, the basic tool of philosophical knowledge is logos, not only in the general sense of "reason," but also in the specific sense of knowledge attained by means of "discourse", namely a reason that has a fundamentally linguistic character. This seems to imply that the logos is entirely transparent to itself; and consequently, as we can deduce from the analysis consecrated in the Theaetetus to the so called "theory of the dream", that the elements of which the logos is composed are fully intelligible and devoid of any opacity. However, this claim seems to fail in the Cratylus, where the attempt to show the intelligibility of the elements of language, i.e. letters and syllables, does not succeed. A possible solution to this problem lies in the fact that the elements of language, unlike the natural elements, exhaust their nature in the role they play within the language itself; and therefore the knowledge of this role, just as in the case of the pieces of chess, coincides with the knowledge of the element as a whole.

Pour Platon l'instrument principal de la connaissance philosophique est le logos, non seulement dans le sens général de « raison », mais aussi dans le sens spécifique de connaissance qui se réalise au moyen du « discours », c'est à dire d'une raison qui possède un caractère foncièrement linguistique. Cela semble impliquer que le logos a une nature entièrement transparente à soi même, et par conséquent, comme on peut le déduire de l'analyse consacrée dans le Théétète à la théorie du songe, que les éléments dont le logos est composé sont pleinement intelligibles et dépourvus de toute opacité. Cependant cette prétention semble échouer dans le Cratyle, où la tentative de montrer l'intelligibilité des éléments du langage, c'est à dire lettres et syllabes, n'est pas couronnée de succès. Une possible solution à ce problème repose sur le fait que les éléments du langage, à la différence des éléments naturels, épuisent entièrement leur nature dans le rôle qu'ils jouent à l'intérieur du langage lui-même ; et donc la connaissance de ce rôle, exactement comme il en est des pièces des échecs, coïncide avec la connaissance de l'objet dans son entier.

Dans un travail anterieur j’ai essaye de montrer que Heidegger a finalement refuse de faire place, dans sa philosophie, a la notion platonicienne d’idee, bien qu’elle semblait, selon un certain point de vue, etre une figure capable de representer l’ouverture originelle de l’être qui était au coeur des recherches de Heidegger dans les annees qui entourent Etre et Temps. La raison de cela, a mon avis, est que l’approche aristotelicienne de la philosophie de Platon par Heidegger explicitement adoptee conduisait au bout du compte a interpreter l’idee de Platon comme une substance. Mais qu’en est‑il de l’idee du bien, qui pour sa determination teleologique et pour sa collocation au‑dela de l’ousia d’un cote semblait repondre aux besoins propres a la pensee heideggerienne, et d’un autre cote etait plus refractaire a la substantialisation aristotelicienne? La these que je soutiens est que Heidegger, tout en ayant cultive pour longtemps le projet d’utiliser l’idee du bien comme un precedent important de son ontologie, a finalement decide que ce projet n’etait pas possible, parce que la connotation ethique de cette idee etait largement dominante sur l’aspect ontologique.

For several decades now, and for a number of different reasons, there has been a significant reawakening of interest in Aristotle's practical philosophy. In particular it is widely held that his philosophy can work as a model for safeguarding the fundamental ethical demands without having to deny the natural essence of the human being and without having to resort to a metaphysical basis. This article sets out to question this theoretical approach. It considers in particular two main problems: the responsability of the individual and the role of the knowledge of good in ethics. The comparison between two recent publications , is directed towards demonstrating that Aristotle's ethical thought does not meet demands nowadays considered essential. As for responsability, Aristotle succeeds in justifying responsability for actions but not responsability for character: the results are hardly acceptable . With regard to the knowledge of good, it is broadly estabilished that, in his ethics, Aristotle does not consider it to be a central theme . The question is whether the lack of this particular feature is really, as many maintain, a positive characteristic. This paper aims to demonstrate that it is not the case, or at least it is not when evaluating ethical theories from a general current perspective, because nowadays the fundamental ethical problem seems indeed to be the identification of an intersubjective consent on the notions of good and evil. If, in our search for an effective model for modern reflection, we wish to turn our attention to ancient philosophy, then the Socratic/Platonic approach seems to be much more promising than that of Aristotle