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167Knowledge from ForgettingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (3): 525-540. 2017.This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.
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166Die Experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion (edited book)Suhrkamp. 2014.Philosophen berufen sich in Gedankenexperimenten oft auf Intuitionen. Doch werden diese Intuitionen auch von anderen Philosophen oder von philosophischen Laien geteilt? Und durch welche Faktoren werden sie eigentlich bestimmt? Experimentelle Philosophen gehen solchen Fragen seit einigen Jahren mit empirischen Methoden auf den Grund. Ihre Ergebnisse sind mitunter verblüffend und haben für Aufsehen gesorgt. Der vorliegende Band lässt führende Vertreter und Gegner dieser wachsenden Bewegung zu Wort…Read more
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164The Epistemology of Fake News (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2021.This book is the first sustained inquiry into the new epistemology of fake news. The chapters, authored by established and emerging names in the field, pursue three goals. First, to analyse the meaning and novelty of 'fake news' and related notions, such as 'conspiracy theory.' Second, to discuss the mechanics of fake news, exploring various practices that generate or promote fake news. Third, to investigate potential therapies for fake news.
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162Bonjour‘s Self-Defeating Argument for CoherentismErkenntnis 50 (2-3): 463-479. 1999.One of the most influential arguments for the coherence theory of empirical justification is BonJours a priori argument from the internalist regress. According to this argument, foundationalism cannot solve the problem of the internalist regress since internalism is incompatible with basic beliefs. Hence, coherentism seems to be the only option. In my article I contend that this argument is doomed to failure. It is either too strong or too weak. Too strong, since even coherentism cannot stop the…Read more
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148Perceptual Representations as Basic ReasonsIn Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, Mentis. pp. 286-303. 2003.
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132How reliabilism saves the apriori/aposteriori distinctionSynthese 192 (9): 2747-2768. 2015.Contemporary epistemologists typically define a priori justification as justification that is independent of sense experience. However, sense experience plays at least some role in the production of many paradigm cases of a priori justified belief. This raises the question of when experience is epistemically relevant to the justificatory status of the belief that is based on it. In this paper, I will outline the answers that can be given by the two currently dominant accounts of justification, i…Read more
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119Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist GuideErkenntnis 71 (1): 89-105. 2009.According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to…Read more
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118Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on WilliamsErkenntnis 61 (2-3): 345-352. 2004.In this paper I will discuss Michael Williamss inferential contextualism – a position that must be carefully distinguished from the currently more fashionable attributer contextualism. I will argue that Williamss contextualism is not stable, though it avoids some of the shortcomings of simple inferential contextualism. In particular, his criticism of epistemological realism cannot be supported on the basis of his own account. I will also argue that we need not give up epistemological realism in …Read more
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105Experimental Philosophy and its Critics (edited book)Routledge. 2012.Experimental philosophy is one of the most recent and controversial developments in philosophy. Its basic idea is rather simple: to test philosophical thought experiments and philosophers’ intuitions about them with scientific methods, mostly taken from psychology and the social sciences. The ensuing experimental results, such as the cultural relativity of certain philosophical intuitions, has engaged – and at times infuriated – many more traditionally minded "armchair" philosophers since then. …Read more
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105Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant RealizationsPhilosophical Studies 170 (3): 525-533. 2014.Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one maj…Read more
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89Die Struktur des skeptischen TraumargumentsGrazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1): 57-81. 2002.Skeptical dream-arguments are intended as general challenges to our epistemic claims concerning the world. They argue that we can never rule out the possibility of merely dreaming what we believe to perceive. In my paper I will scrutinize whether any kind of such argument is sound. On my view, many versions of this argument are defective. They are either too weak to challenge all kinds of our epistemic claims or they rely on implausibly strong epistemic principles. More plausible versions of the…Read more
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87Preface Special Issue GAP.10Erkenntnis 85 (3): 527-528. 2020.Introduction to a special issue with the keynote papers of the GAP.10 congress 2018 in Cologne.
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80Dependent reliability: Why And How Conditional Reliability Should Be Replaced By ItPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1): 144-159. 2021.According to Alvin Goldman, reliabilists need to distinguish between unconditionally and conditionally reliable processes. The latter category is used to account for processes such as reasoning or memory. In this paper, I will argue that Goldman’s account of conditional reliability needs substantial revision in two respects. First, conditional reliability must be reinterpreted in terms of dependent reliability to avoid serious problems. Second, we need a more liberal account that allows dependen…Read more
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52Transcendental Arguments and RealismIn Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant, Oxford University Press. pp. 205--218. 2003.
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51Justification and the Truth-Connection, by Clayton Littlejohn: Cambridge: Routledge, 2012, pp. vii + 269, $42.95 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3): 622-624. 2015.
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44Egoismus, Altruismus und die Furcht vor dem eigenen Tod. Ein Beitrag zur analytischen ExistenzphilosophieZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (4): 465-491. 2018.In this paper I will argue that Bernard William’s theory of frustrated desires is superior to Tom Nagel's theory of deprivation in explaining when and why death is harmful to oneself. The model of frustrated desires will then be applied contrastively to the altruist and the egoist. Contrary to what one might expect, death is not a misfortune only to the egoist. The truth is more nuanced. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between what death means to the altruist and what it means to…Read more
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37Warum wir Wissen als einen wichtigen Begriff der Erkenntnistheorie betrachten sollten: Eine Antwort auf Ansgar BeckermannZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1). 2002.
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35Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-DefeatEpisteme 18 (2): 224-241. 2021.
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32Das erkenntnistheoretische RegreßargumentZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (2). 2001.Wenn von dem epistemischen Regreßargument die Rede ist, dann denkt man gewöhnlich an ein Argument für den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus: Um einen drohenden Begründungsregreß zu vermeiden, muß man annehmen, daß es sogenannte basale Meinungen gibt, die nicht durch andere Meinungen (oder propositionale Zustände inferentiell gerechtfertigt werden, sondern unmittelbar gerechtfertigt sind. Das fundamentalistische Regreßargument ist jedoch nur eine mögliche Reaktion auf das zugrundeliegende …Read more
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29Gibt es ein subjektives Fundament unseres Wissens?Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50 (3). 1996.
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23Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism RevisitedIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 2--65. 2004.
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22Die Grenzen des erkenntnistheoretischen KontextualismusDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 51 (6): 993. 2003.
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20Review: Neuere Tendenzen in der Analytischen Erkenntnistheorie (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 51 (4). 1997.
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16XVI. Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie. "Neue Realitäten: Herausforderung der Philosophie" 20.-24. September 1993 an der TU Berlin (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 48 (2). 1994.
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15Analytische Einführung in Die ErkenntnistheorieWalter de Gruyter. 2008.Diese Analytische Einführung behandelt die wichtigsten Grundfragen und -probleme der Erkenntnistheorie und enthält eine ausführliche Darstellung von Positionen und Argumenten aus der gegenwärtigen Diskussion. Sie richtet sich an Studierende der Philosophie und anderer Fachgebiete, bietet aber auch für philosophische Kenner eine gewinnbringende kritische Orientierung. Für die zweite Auflage wurde der Text vollständig überarbeitet, um die jüngsten Entwicklungen im Themenfeld zu berücksichtigen. Am…Read more
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13Die Bedingungen des Verstehens als Bedingungen der Gegenstände des VerstehensIn Julian Nida-Rümelin & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen 2, Volume I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, De Gruyter. pp. 232-245. 1997.
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117. Quellen des WissensIn Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 337-404. 2008.
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96. SkeptizismusIn Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 253-336. 2008.
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8Stellungnahmen: Zur Verbesserung des PhilosophieunterrichtsInformation Philosophie 2014 (4): 42-54. 2014.