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169Erratum to: Thought experiments and the problem of deviant realizationsPhilosophical Studies 170 (3): 535-536. 2014.Erratum to: Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0226-3Dear Reader, due to production systems the following changes could not be made to this article:In the paragraph immediately preceding the case description (ford-iii), the sentenceHere we explicitly state that Smith’s inference is based only on his belief that Jones owns a Ford, and that this logical inference provides Smith’s only justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford (to make things fully precise, we also add a ti…Read more
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162Bonjour‘s Self-Defeating Argument for CoherentismErkenntnis 50 (2-3): 463-479. 1999.One of the most influential arguments for the coherence theory of empirical justification is BonJours a priori argument from the internalist regress. According to this argument, foundationalism cannot solve the problem of the internalist regress since internalism is incompatible with basic beliefs. Hence, coherentism seems to be the only option. In my article I contend that this argument is doomed to failure. It is either too strong or too weak. Too strong, since even coherentism cannot stop the…Read more
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105Experimental Philosophy and its Critics (edited book)Routledge. 2012.Experimental philosophy is one of the most recent and controversial developments in philosophy. Its basic idea is rather simple: to test philosophical thought experiments and philosophers’ intuitions about them with scientific methods, mostly taken from psychology and the social sciences. The ensuing experimental results, such as the cultural relativity of certain philosophical intuitions, has engaged – and at times infuriated – many more traditionally minded "armchair" philosophers since then. …Read more
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Transcendental Arguments. Problems and Prospects; Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism. Answering the Question of Justification (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (2). 2002.
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118Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on WilliamsErkenntnis 61 (2-3): 345-352. 2004.In this paper I will discuss Michael Williamss inferential contextualism – a position that must be carefully distinguished from the currently more fashionable attributer contextualism. I will argue that Williamss contextualism is not stable, though it avoids some of the shortcomings of simple inferential contextualism. In particular, his criticism of epistemological realism cannot be supported on the basis of his own account. I will also argue that we need not give up epistemological realism in …Read more
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32Das erkenntnistheoretische RegreßargumentZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (2). 2001.Wenn von dem epistemischen Regreßargument die Rede ist, dann denkt man gewöhnlich an ein Argument für den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus: Um einen drohenden Begründungsregreß zu vermeiden, muß man annehmen, daß es sogenannte basale Meinungen gibt, die nicht durch andere Meinungen (oder propositionale Zustände inferentiell gerechtfertigt werden, sondern unmittelbar gerechtfertigt sind. Das fundamentalistische Regreßargument ist jedoch nur eine mögliche Reaktion auf das zugrundeliegende …Read more
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771Doubts about Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge from DisagreementIn Tim Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, Routledge. pp. 72-98. 2013.In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains, stable disagreement among peers is a widespread and well-known phenomenon. Our intuitions about paradigm cases, e.g. Christensen's Restaurant Case, suggest that in such controversies suspension of judgment is rationally required. This would prima facie suggest a robust suspension of judgment in philosophy. But we are still lacking a deeper theoretical explanation of why and under what conditions suspension is rationally mandatory. In the f…Read more
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37Warum wir Wissen als einen wichtigen Begriff der Erkenntnistheorie betrachten sollten: Eine Antwort auf Ansgar BeckermannZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1). 2002.
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20Review: Neuere Tendenzen in der Analytischen Erkenntnistheorie (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 51 (4). 1997.
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29Gibt es ein subjektives Fundament unseres Wissens?Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50 (3). 1996.
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23Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism RevisitedIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 2--65. 2004.
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191Introduction: Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics, Parts 1 and 2Philosophical Psychology 23 (3): 283-292. 2010.In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology ( 23.3 and 23.4 ) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers
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105Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant RealizationsPhilosophical Studies 170 (3): 525-533. 2014.Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one maj…Read more