-
776Doubts about Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge from DisagreementIn Tim Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, Routledge. pp. 72-98. 2013.In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains, stable disagreement among peers is a widespread and well-known phenomenon. Our intuitions about paradigm cases, e.g. Christensen's Restaurant Case, suggest that in such controversies suspension of judgment is rationally required. This would prima facie suggest a robust suspension of judgment in philosophy. But we are still lacking a deeper theoretical explanation of why and under what conditions suspension is rationally mandatory. In the f…Read more
-
37Warum wir Wissen als einen wichtigen Begriff der Erkenntnistheorie betrachten sollten: Eine Antwort auf Ansgar BeckermannZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1). 2002.
-
20Review: Neuere Tendenzen in der Analytischen Erkenntnistheorie (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 51 (4). 1997.
-
29Gibt es ein subjektives Fundament unseres Wissens?Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50 (3). 1996.
-
23Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism RevisitedIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 2--65. 2004.
-
193Introduction: Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics, Parts 1 and 2Philosophical Psychology 23 (3): 283-292. 2010.In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology ( 23.3 and 23.4 ) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers
-
106Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant RealizationsPhilosophical Studies 170 (3): 525-533. 2014.Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one maj…Read more
-
119Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist GuideErkenntnis 71 (1): 89-105. 2009.According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to…Read more
-
22Die Grenzen des erkenntnistheoretischen KontextualismusDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 51 (6): 993. 2003.
-
3Defeasibility TheoryIn Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 156-166. 2011.This is a survey article about epistemic defeaters: what is defeated, how defeaters work, different kinds of defeaters, indefeasibility and how defeaters fit into epistemic internalism and externalism.
-
16XVI. Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie. "Neue Realitäten: Herausforderung der Philosophie" 20.-24. September 1993 an der TU Berlin (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 48 (2). 1994.
-
192Some hope for intuitions: A reply to WeinbergPhilosophical Psychology 23 (4): 481-509. 2010.In a recent paper Weinberg (2007) claims that there is an essential mark of trustworthiness which typical sources of evidence as perception or memory have, but philosophical intuitions lack, namely that we are able to detect and correct errors produced by these “hopeful” sources. In my paper I will argue that being a hopeful source isn't necessary for providing us with evidence. I then will show that, given some plausible background assumptions, intuitions at least come close to being hopeful, i…Read more
-
Geert-lueke Lueken: Inkommensurabilität AlS problem rationalen argumentierens (review)Philosophische Rundschau 40 (4): 325. 1993.