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149Objects of MemoryIn Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind, Sage Publications. 2015.Jordi Fernández
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107Epistemic Generation in MemoryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2): 620-644. 2016.Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For tha…Read more
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129Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science) (edited book)Psychology Press. 2008.This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.
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108Explanation by computer simulation in cognitive scienceMinds and Machines 13 (2): 269-284. 2003.My purpose in this essay is to clarify the notion of explanation by computer simulation in artificial intelligence and cognitive science. My contention is that computer simulation may be understood as providing two different kinds of explanation, which makes the notion of explanation by computer simulation ambiguous. In order to show this, I shall draw a distinction between two possible ways of understanding the notion of simulation, depending on how one views the relation in which a computing s…Read more
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136Schopenhauer’s PessimismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3). 2006.My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer's grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer's grounds for other premises in the argument. I shall then propose a way o…Read more
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48Mental Causation, by Anthony DardisMind 119 (474): 468-471. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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1Don Ross, Andrew Brook and David Thompson, eds., Dennett's Philosophy. A Comprehensive Assessment Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 21 (3): 208-210. 2001.
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204The intentionality of memoryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1): 39-57. 2006.The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, and I shall a…Read more
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260Privileged access naturalizedPhilosophical Quarterly 53 (212): 352-372. 2003.The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does not posit any mysterious faculty of intros…Read more
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28MemoryIn Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Blackwell. 2013.This chapter discusses interesting connections that hold between time and memory. It helps to pull temporal aspects of memory apart, and to tries to clarify them. Discussions in the chapter focus on memory for events, concentrating on a specific kind of memory for events, the “episodic” memory. The chapter first addresses a question on the metaphysics of memory. Then, it tries to specify which conditions an experience must fulfill in order to count as a memory experience. Next, the chapter tries…Read more
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83Causal Inheritance and Second-order PropertiesAbstracta 4 (2): 74-95. 2008.We defend Jaegwon Kim’s ‘causal inheritance’ principle from an objection raised by Jurgen Schröder. The objection is that the principle is inconsistent with a view about mental properties assumed by Kim, namely, that they are second-order properties. We argue that Schröder misconstrues the notion of second-order property. We distinguish three notions of second-order property and highlight their problems and virtues. Finally, we examine the consequence of Kim’s principle and discuss the issue of …Read more
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216Desire and self-knowledgeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4). 2007.In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account to two other similar accounts…Read more
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64Schopenhauer’s PessimismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3): 646-664. 2006.My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer's grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer's grounds for other premises in the argument. I shall then propose a way o…Read more
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24Mental Causation, by Anthony Dardis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008 (review)Mind 119 468-471. 2010.Jordi Fernández, Suzanne Bliss
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92Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensionsEuropean Journal of Philosophy 12 (1): 17-37. 2004.The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
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65Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-KnowledgeOxford University Press. 2013.How do we know our current states of mind--what we want, and believe in? Jordi Fernández proposes a new theory of self-knowledge, challenging the traditional view that it is a matter of introspection. He argues that we know what we believe and desire by 'looking outward', towards the states of affairs which those beliefs and desires are about
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105Privileged Access RevisitedPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (218). 2005.Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.
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152Memory and Immunity to Error through MisidentificationReview of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3): 373-390. 2014.The aim of this paper is to defend the view that judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification. I will put forward a proposal about the contents of episodic memories according to which a memory represents a perception of a past event. I will also offer a proposal about the contents of perceptual experiences according to which a perceptual experience represents some relations that its subject bears to events in the external world. The combination of the two view…Read more
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116Does the supervenience argument generalize?Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4): 321-346. 2011.We evaluate the scope of Jaegwon Kim's “supervenience argument” for reduction. Does its conclusion apply only to psychology, or does it generalize to all the special sciences? The claim that the supervenience argument generalizes to all the special sciences if it goes through for psychology is often raised as an objection to the supervenience argument. We argue that this objection is ambiguous. We distinguish three readings of it and suggest that some of them make it a plausible claim, whereas o…Read more
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187Self‐Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's ParadoxPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3): 533-556. 2007.I offer a model of self‐knowledge that provides a solution to Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self‐knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher‐order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first‐order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of …Read more
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294Memory, past and selfSynthese 160 (1). 2008.The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next, I di…Read more
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20The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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78What are the benefits of memory distortion?Consciousness and Cognition 33 536-547. 2015.Jordi Fernández