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63Imagining oneself being someone elseEuropean Journal of Philosophy 31 (4): 1030-1044. 2023.Sometimes, one can imagine, in virtue of having some experience, that one is someone else having some property. This is puzzling if imagination is a guide to possibility, since it seems impossible for one to be someone else. In this paper, I offer a way of dissolving the puzzle. When one claims that, by having some experience, one imagines that one is someone else having some property, what one imagines, I suggest, is that if the other person had the property in question, then having it would be…Read more
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62IntrospectionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 385-406This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other.…Read more
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57The Lovász Extension of Market GamesTheory and Decision 56 (1-2): 229-238. 2004.The multilinear extension of a cooperative game was introduced by Owen in 1972. In this contribution we study the Lovász extension for cooperative games by using the marginal worth vectors and the dividends. First, we prove a formula for the marginal worth vectors with respect to compatible orderings. Next, we consider the direct market generated by a game. This model of utility function, proposed by Shapley and Shubik in 1969, is the concave biconjugate extension of the game. Then we obtain the…Read more
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48Mental Causation, by Anthony DardisMind 119 (474): 468-471. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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33Externalism, self-knowledge and memoryIn S. Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 197-213. 2015.Jordi Fernandez.
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30Replies to CriticsTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (1): 149-160. 2015.Jordi Fernández.
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28MemoryIn Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Blackwell. 2013.This chapter discusses interesting connections that hold between time and memory. It helps to pull temporal aspects of memory apart, and to tries to clarify them. Discussions in the chapter focus on memory for events, concentrating on a specific kind of memory for events, the “episodic” memory. The chapter first addresses a question on the metaphysics of memory. Then, it tries to specify which conditions an experience must fulfill in order to count as a memory experience. Next, the chapter tries…Read more
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28Defending functionalism and self-reference in memoryEstudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 64 223-236. 2021.In recent work, Sarah Robins, Gerardo Viera and Steven James have provided some insightful objections to the ideas offered in my book, Memory: A Self-Referential Account. In this paper, I put forward some responses to those objections. Robins challenges the idea that being a memory could be a matter of having a particular functional role within the subject’s cognitive economy. Viera challenges the idea that the content of a memory could explain some of its phenomenological properties. And James …Read more
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24Mental Causation, by Anthony Dardis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008 (review)Mind 119 468-471. 2010.Jordi Fernández, Suzanne Bliss
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24The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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21Memory and Perception: Remembering SnowflakeTheoria 21 (2): 147-164. 2010.Memories have the power to elicit certain beliefs in us. These are beliefs about time and beliefs about perception. The aim of this paper is to propose a notion of mnemonic content that can account for the rationality of forming those beliefs on the basis of our memories.
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21Memory and Self-ReferenceInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 32 (1): 59-77. 2024.Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are ‘token-reflexives’, in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able to provide us with evidence for the two …Read more
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20The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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17Epistemic Generation in MemoryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3): 620-644. 2015.Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For tha…Read more
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16Measuring Perceived Research Competence of Junior ResearchersFrontiers in Psychology 13. 2022.Graduates of doctoral programs are expected to be competent at designing and conducting research independently. Given the level of research competence needed to successfully conduct research, it is important that assessors of doctoral programs have a reliable and validated tool for measuring and tracking perceived research competence among their students and graduates. A high level of research competence is expected for all Ph.D. graduates worldwide, in addition to in all disciplines/fields. Mor…Read more
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15Memory in two dimensionsSynthese 203 (2): 1-20. 2024.Memories can be accurate or inaccurate. They have, then, accuracy conditions. A reasonable picture of the accuracy conditions of a memory is that a memory is accurate just in case the reference of a memory satisfies the information provided by the memory. But how are the references of our memories determined exactly? And what are the accuracy conditions of memories, given their references? In this paper, I argue that the notion of accuracy conditions for memories is ambiguous. There are two type…Read more
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14Memory and PerceptionTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (2): 147-164. 2006.If I remember something, I tend to believe that I have perceived it. Similarly, if I remember something, I tend to believe that it happened in the past. My aim here is to propose a notion of mnemonic contentaccounts for these facts. Certain proposals build perceptual experiences into the content of memories. I argue that they Have trouble with the second belief. Other proposals build references to temporal locations into mnemonic content. I argue that they have trouble with the second one. I pro…Read more
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13Theoretical, and epistemological challenges in scientific investigations of complex emotional states in animalsConsciousness and Cognition 84 (C): 103003. 2020.
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1Don Ross, Andrew Brook and David Thompson, eds., Dennett's Philosophy. A Comprehensive Assessment Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 21 (3): 208-210. 2001.