Jonathan Beever

Ethical decision-making within engineering has not been broadly studied, although there is a growing body of evidence supporting the view that missteps in ethical decision-making result in changes in organizational culture and in disasters which in turn negatively impact a broad number of stakeholders. The ethical decision-making framework we propose in this paper builds on the notion of empathy as central, although not sufficient in of itself, to the ethical decision-making process. We build on work outside of engineering on the role of empathy in ethical reasoning along with an emerging model of empathy within engineering, drawing on literature in the fields of philosophy, social psychology, neuroscience, and engineering education. We first discuss what empathy is and how empathy informs ethical decision-making in general, with a specific focus on the cognitive form of empathy or what we call empathic perspective-taking. Next we explore methods through which engineers might empathically think and act in ethically challenging situations. Finally, we explore a range of engineering contexts and cases that highlight the role empathy plays in coming to an ethically justifiable decision in specific contexts. We conclude with the suggestion that engineering ethics educators need to develop effective tools for developing and assessing empathic perspective-taking to promote ethical decision-making within the practice of engineering.

Given the rapid changes in technology and the growing use of electronic media there is a need for better understanding the ethical and social implications of digital media. The effects of digital media have significant ethical implications which are easy to overlook, given the embeddedness of the digital in our everyday lives. _Understanding Digital Ethics_ offers a philosophically grounded consideration of digital ethics and: Defines and critically evaluates the impact of digital ethics on society Examines ethical concerns and issues, using sample case studies. Understanding Digital Ethics is an important resource for students and scholars in the field of philosophical ethics, digital technology and digital/moral literacy.

Jean Baudrillard, the scholar and critic of postmodernity, struggled with questions of postmodern ontology: representation of the real through the semioticprocess of signification is threatened with the rise of simulacra, the simulated real. With this rise, seductive semiotic relationships between signs replace any traditional ontological representamen. This struggle has implications for environmentalism since the problems of contemporary environmental philosophy are rooted in problems with ontology. Hence the question of postmodern ecology: can the natural survive postmodern simulation? Baudrillard’s communicative analysis of semiotic postmodernity can both support and extend ecosemiotic theses in response to these questions, questions that must be answered in order to explore our paradoxical understandings of the natural and confirm an understanding of environmentalism for postmodernity. In this paper I will argue for the merit of a semiotic understanding of postmodernity, develop the idea of ecology in this context, and then compare Baudrillard’s approach to the contemporary development of ecosemiotics.

In this book, nine thought-leaders engage with some of the hottest moral issues in science and ethics. Based on talks originally given at the annual "Purdue Lectures in Ethics, Policy, and Science," the chapters explore interconnections between the three areas in an engaging and accessible way. Addressing a mixed public audience, the authors go beyond dry theory to explore some of the difficult moral questions that face scientists and policy-makers every day. The introduction presents a theoretical framework for the book, defining the term "bioethics" as extending well beyond human well-being to wider relations between humans, nonhuman animals, the environment, and biotechnologies. Three sections then explore the complex relationship between moral value, scientific knowledge, and policy making. The first section starts with thoughts on nonhuman animal pain and moves to a discussion of animal understanding. The second section explores climate change and the impact of "green" nanotechnology on environmental concerns. The final section begins with dialog about ethical issues in nanotechnology, moves to an exploration of bio-banks (a technology with broad potential medical and environmental impact), and ends with a survey of the impact of biotechnologies on (synthetic) life itself.

Why might interdependence, the idea that we are made up of our relations, be horrifying? Philosophy, Film, and the Dark Side of Interdependence argues that philosophy can outline the contours of dark specter of interdependence and that film can shine a light on its shadowy details, together revealing a horror of relations. The contributors interrogate the question of interdependence through analyses of contemporary film, giving voice to new perspectives on its meaning. Conceived before and written during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and through a period of deep social unrest, this volume reveals a reality both perennial and timely.

The immanent and empirical foundation of zoosemiotics grounds a theory of moral value. According to this theory, semiosis is a morally relevant and natural property of all animals, human and nonhuman. A consequence of this semiotic theory is that all individual animals are accorded inherent moral value based on their natural ability to signify. This paper argues that such a theory of moral value offers a justificatory strategy for our contemporary moral intuitions concerning our semiotic and moral relationships with nonhuman animals while also productively pushing our normative ethical boundaries.

In this paper I argue that, instead of standing as an exemplar of contemporary environmentalism, North American Indian voices on the environment offer insights concerning ecological relationships that can be brought to bear on theories of environmental value and the politics of environmentalism. I argue that environmentally orthodox representations of Native views are further complicated by the metaphysics of local ecological knowledge. I then argue that moral ecologism, a normative view focused on inter­dependence throughout the living world and evidenced by contemporary American Indian voices, can help align traditional environmentalism with the contemporary scientific understanding of ecological relationships.

Little scholarly attention has been given to the ethics of public commenting as part of the online federal rule‐making process. This essay argues the process of public commenting on federal regulations in the digital era threatens both the integrity of those regulations and the integrity of the individuals they are meant to protect. The ongoing risk is anonymous public commenting is open to manipulation. This risk is particularly salient for eRulemaking with implications for human subjects as was shown in the completed revision process to the Common Rule. Guarding against physical and informational harms requires at least some verification of the identities of public commenters. The burdens of verification access are outweighed by the benefits to authentic participation in e‐Rulemaking.

This paper argues that the practical reach and ethical impact of the One Health paradigm is conditional on satisfactorily distinguishing between interconnected and interdependent factors among human, non-human, and environmental health. Interconnection does not entail interdependence. Offering examples of interconnections and interdependence in the context of existing One Health literature, we demonstrate that the conversations about One Health do not yet sufficiently differentiate between those concepts. They tend to either ignore such distinctions or embrace bioethically untenable positions. We conclude that careful conceptual differentiation can prevent One Health stakeholders either from overreaching or under-reaching the practical and ethical boundaries of this developing paradigm.

Uexküll’s 1917 critique of what he calls the “English morality”, written during World War I, points the contemporary reader toward important implications of the translation of descriptive scientific models to normative ethical theories. A key figure motivating biosemiotics, Uexküll presents here a darker side: one where his Umwelt theory seems to motivate a bio-cultural hierarchy of value and worth, where some human beings are worth more than others precisely because of the constraints of their Umwelten. The first English translation of this essay, introduced here, gives scholars access to Uexküll’s lines of thought, historical context, and normative interpretations. It is particularly pertinent for contemporary attempts to develop a biosemiotic ethics based, among other things, on the Umwelt theory.

Professional and applied ethicists have evidenced the importance and efficacy of professional ethics education in universities, with some arguing that, in addition to advancing the development of professional ethics standards and individual moral responsibility, professional ethics education should itself be undertaken in an ethical fashion. This paper argues that theorizing ethics enculturation as a multidimensional and dialectical process allows educators and theorists to identify, examine, and redress morally objectionable forms of ethics education. To remain ethical, professional ethics enculturation must identify and avoid morally impermissible approaches that negatively impact those who undergo ethics enculturation and/or those whom the profession serves. Impermissible approaches include moral indoctrination, neglect, corruption, and injury, among others, and operate implicitly and explicitly in professional and educational contexts. Moreover, professional ethics enculturation must remain sufficiently bidirectional to ensure that both developing professionals become properly enculturated within the profession and that the profession is responsive to the needs and concerns of future generations of professionals.

Beneath important ethical questions about the impacts of de-extinct species on ecosystems and the potential harms to individual organisms lies a more fundamental assumption; namely, that the thing being "de-extinct-ed" is indeed a member of previously existing species. This is the ontological assumption: that genetic make-up of the individual is both a necessary and sufficient condition for species membership. Questioning this ontological assumption poses an even more critical challenge for de-extinction. Genes a member of a species do not make. They represent a mere necessary condition. Sufficiency entails a broad set of ecological connections, inside and out. In this commentary on Kasperbauer’s target article, I argue for the primacy of ontology in the ethical analysis of de-extinction.

Benedict de Spinoza, C.S. Peirce, and Gilles Deleuze delineate a trajectory through the history of ideas in the dialogue about the potentials and limitations of panpsychism, the view that world is fundamentally made up of mind. As a parallel trajectory to the panpsychism debate in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology, this approach can inform and enrich the discussion of the role and scope of mind in the natural world. The philosophies of mind developed by Deleuze and Peirce are Spinozistic in their natural monism but move beyond Spinoza to explain mind as a part of the natural world in semiotic terms.

In this essay I propose that ethics centers should take leadership roles in clarifying uses of normatively thick and complex concepts. Using the concept of integrity as an example, I build a case for increased focus on thick concepts at work in ethics. Integrity is a special case, given its conceptual complexity and the diversity of contexts in which it is utilized. I argue that failure to focus on conceptual clarification leaves the door open to misuse or manipulation of ethical concepts and to contextual siloing, each of which limits the work that ethics and ethics centers can do in support of institutional cultures. Ethics centers stand, or—as I make clear—should stand, as conceptual stewards for articulation of the importance of such concepts in balancing external ethics visibility and personal ethics engagement.

The spaces between the modernist categories of human and nonhuman, or nature and culture, are collapsing in the Anthropocene. As human technological influence continues become evidenced as a global geologic force, ‘liminal spaces’ expand. Liminal spaces are spaces at the intersections and aggregations of human- and nonhuman-animal umwelten mediated by technology. Soundscapes, the collection of human and nonhuman created sounds of a particular place and time, give us unique access to the semiotic exchanges that constitute those spaces. Soundscape ecology, the study of ecosystemic relations through sound, is a method by which to engage and understand those liminal spaces. Understanding liminal spaces in this context of soundscape ecology offers insights into new ways in which organisms relate to and within their environments through sign exchange; or, new ways animals engage complex worlds of experience. In this paper I articulate this argument and define ‘sonic liminality’ as a biosemiotic process of the creation and engagement in hybrid natures. I examine umwelt engagement through a specific case study: analysis of soundscapes at a local zoological park in the southeastern United States. I argue that the digital technology-driven empirical work of soundscape ecology gives semioticians access to informational ecosystems, and therefore to the ways in which information transforms the boundaries between individual organisms and their built and natural environments.

If the central problem in philosophical ethics is determining and defining the scope of moral value, our normative ethical theories must be able to explain on what basis and to what extent entities have value. The scientific foundation of contemporary biosemiotic theory grounds a theory of moral value capable of addressing this problem. Namely, it suggests that what is morally relevant is semiosis. Within this framework, semiosis is a morally relevant and natural property of all living things thereby offering us an ecological, as opposed to merely environmental, ethic. A consequence of this semiotic theory is that living things are accorded inherent moral value based on their natural relational properties—their ability to signify. This consequence establishes a hierarchy of inherent moral value based on the scope of signification: the larger the Umwelten, the greater the value. This paper argues that a robust semiotic moral theory can take into account a much wider scope of inherent value.. These consequences have positive ramifications for environmental ethics in their recognition of the natural ecological networks in which each organism is bound. This presentation of a biosemiotic model of value offers a justificatory strategy for our contemporary moral intuitions concerning our semiotic/moral relationships with living things while also productively pushing our normative ethical boundaries.

Narrative based real world case examples are powerful tools by which to help learners more empathetically engage the complexity of ethical conflicts and interactions, enabling clearer analysis of ecological ethical issues and overcoming apathy toward real-world responses. In this paper, I develop ecological ethical inquiry as a means by which to use narrative-based case studies to help ethicists connect to and empathize with other morally relevant individuals. I argue that ecological issues not only benefit from but also require a narrative approach because of ethical and epistemic complexity. I first describe the problem of apathy toward motivation given the ethical and epistemic complexity in ecological ethics contexts; then, I offer a case study in ecological ethics that draws out this complexity; and finally, I point out several caveats concerning the conclusions I have drawn.

The Covid‐19 crisis has underscored the importance of the collection and analysis of clinical and research data and specimens for ongoing work. The federal government recently completed a related revision of the human subjects research regulations, founded in the traditional principles of research ethics, but in this commentary, we argue that the analysis underpinning this revision overemphasized the importance of informed consent, given the low risks of secondary research. Governing the interests of a community is different from governing the interests of individuals, and here we suggest that, moving forward, the analyses of the risks of secondary research protocols be assessed from the perspective of the former.

An important goal of teaching ethics to engineering students is to enhance their ability to make well-reasoned ethical decisions in their engineering practice: a goal in line with the stated ethical codes of professional engineering organizations. While engineering educators have explored a wide range of methodologies for teaching ethics, a satisfying model for developing ethical reasoning skills has not been adopted broadly. In this paper we argue that a principlist-based approach to ethical reasoning is uniquely suited to engineering ethics education. Reflexive Principlism is an approach to ethical decision-making that focuses on internalizing a reflective and iterative process of specification, balancing, and justification of four core ethical principles in the context of specific cases. In engineering, that approach provides structure to ethical reasoning while allowing the flexibility for adaptation to varying contexts through specification. Reflexive Principlism integrates well with the prevalent and familiar methodologies of reasoning within the engineering disciplines as well as with the goals of engineering ethics education.

The goal of this project is to argue for ethics as a necessary component of the institutional health. The authors offer an epidemiology of ethics for a large, metropolitan, very-high-research-activity university in the U.S. Where epidemiology of a pandemic looks at quantifiable data on infection and exposure rates, control, and broad implications for public health, an epidemiology of ethics looks to parallel data on those same themes. Their hypothesis is that knowing more about how undergraduates are exposed to ethics will help us understand to what extent they are infected with interest in ethics literacy, and potentially what immunity they develop against unethical and unprofessional conduct. These data also tell a story about the ethical health of institutions: to what extent its members are empowered to cultivate a culture of ethics and inoculated against ethical missteps. The authors argue that pro-ethics inoculation at research institutions is shaped by issues of complexity, connotation, and collaboration. These issues make assessment of where ethics is taught all the more difficult. The methodology used in this project can readily be taken up by other institutions, with much to be learned from inter-institutional comparisons about the distribution of ethics across the curriculum and within the disciplines.

Despite the increase in ethics education offerings of the past few decades, universities struggle to foster desirable ethical dispositions among developing professionals. Part of the reason is that the values implicit in the enculturation of students in higher education cut against the aims of explicit ethics education. To accomplish desirable ethical dispositions among future professionals we ought to broaden our understanding of what the cultivation of ethical professionals entails from a narrow focus on ethics education to a broad focus on ethics enculturation. This paper offers a framework for theorizing ethics enculturation, using examples from recent engineering ethics education literature to demonstrate how the framework captures elements about the development of ethical dispositions and decision-making skills that literature with a narrow focus on ethics education overlooks.

Questions of individuality are traditionally predicated upon recognizing discrete entities whose behavior can be measured and whose value and agency can be meaningfully ascribed. We consider a series of challenges to the metaphysical concept of individuality as the ground of the self. We argue that an ecological conception of individuality renders ascriptions of autonomy to selves highly improbable. We find conceptual resources in the work of environmental philosopher Arne Naess, whose distinction between shallow and deep responses helps us rethink the notion of individuality and, thus, assess whether the conceptual and normative coherence of human autonomy could, at least partially, be salvaged.

The nature and role of the patient in biomedicine comprise issues central to bioethical inquiry. Given its developmental history grounded firmly in a backlash against 20th-century cases of egregious human subjects abuse, contemporary medical bioethics has come to rely on a fundamental assumption: the unit of care is the autonomous self-directing patient. In this article we examine first the structure of the feminist social critique of autonomy. Then we show that a parallel argument can be made against relational autonomy as well, demonstrating how this second concept of autonomy fails to take sufficiently into account an array of biological determinants, particularly those from microbial biology. Finally, in light of this biological critique, we question whether or to what extent any relevant and meaningful view of autonomy can be recovered in the contemporary landscape of bioethics.