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Peter Unger

New York University
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  •  Publications
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 More details
  • New York University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1966
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
Normative Ethics
  • All publications (101)
  •  84
    Toward a Psychology of Common Sense
    American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2). 1982.
    The Nature of Folk Psychology
  • Philosophical Papers: Volume 2
    Oxford Up. 2006.
    While well-known for his longer book-length work, philosopher Peter Unger's shorter articles have, until now, been less accessible. Collected in two volumes, Philosophical Papers includes articles spanning over 40 years of Unger's long and fruitful career. Volume two focuses on Unger's important work in metaphysics.
    20th Century Analytic Philosophy
  •  61
    Living High and Letting Die
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 195-201. 1999.
  •  316
    Empty ideas
    The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57): 31-41. 2012.
  •  557
    An analysis of factual knowledge
    Journal of Philosophy 65 (6): 157-170. 1968.
    Epistemology of Specific DomainsThe Gettier Problem
  •  94
    The Survival of the Sentient
    Noûs 34 (s14): 325-348. 2000.
    Personal Identity and Values
  •  254
    Reply to Stephen Mumford
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 484-490. 2010.
    Value Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  2
    Our Knowledge of the Material World,'
    American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph 4. 1970.
  •  469
    Identity, Consciousness, and Value
    Oxford University Press. 1990.
    The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Pe…Read more
    The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his discussion of our identity itself, Unger produces a novel but commonsensical theory of the relations between identity and some of our deepest concerns. In a conservative but flexible spirit, he explores the implications of his theory for questions of value and of the good life
    Personal Identity, MiscVague IdentityWhat Matters in Survival
  •  138
    Causing and preventing serious harm
    Philosophical Studies 65 (3). 1992.
    General Issues in Applied EthicsHarm in Applied Ethics
  •  73
    What Is Knowledge? (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 69 (15): 448-456. 1972.
    Self-KnowledgeKnowledge
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