•  28
    Toward a Psychology of Common Sense
    American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2). 1982.
  •  107
    Philosophical relativity
    Oxford University Press. 1984.
    In this short but meaty book, Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to central problems in philosophy. As Unger hypothesizes, many of these problems are unanswerable, including the problems of knowledge and scepticism, the problems of free will, and problems of causation and explanation. In each case, he argues, we arrive at one answer only relative to an assumption about the meaning of key terms, terms like "know" and like "cause," even while we arrive at an opposite …Read more
  •  46
    On being given more than skepticism
    Journal of Philosophy 70 (18): 628-630. 1973.
  •  121
    Free will and scientifiphicalism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 1-25. 2002.
    It’s been agreed for decades that not only does Determinism pose a big problem for our choosing from available alternatives, but its denial seems to pose a bit of a problem, too. It’s argued here that only Determinism, and not its denial, means no real choice for us.But, what explains the appeal of the thought that, where things aren’t fully determined, to that extent they’re just a matter of chance? It's the dominance of metaphysical suppositions that, together, comprise Scientiphicalism: Wholl…Read more
  •  16
    Contextual Analysis in Ethics
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1): 1-26. 1995.
  •  31
  •  107
    Reply to Stephen Mumford (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 484-490. 2010.
  •  95
    Philosophical papers
    Oxford University Press. 2006.
    While well-known for his book-length work, philosopher Peter Unger's articles have been less widely accessible. These two volumes of Unger's Philosophical Papers include articles spanning more than 35 years of Unger's long and fruitful career. Dividing the articles thematically, this first volume collects work in epistemology and ethics, among other topics, while the second volume focuses on metaphysics. Unger's work has advanced the full spectrum of topics at the heart of philosophy, including …Read more
  •  240
    By contributing a few hundred dollars to a charity like UNICEF, a prosperous person can ensure that fewer poor children die, and that more will live reasonably long, worthwhile lives. Even when knowing this, however, most people send nothing, and almost all of the rest send little. What is the moral status of this behavior? To such common cases of letting die, our untutored response is that, while it is not very good, neither is the conduct wrong. What is the source of this lenient assessment? I…Read more
  •  218
    Empty ideas
    The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57): 31-41. 2012.
  •  28
    What Is Knowledge? (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 69 (15): 448-456. 1972.
  •  83
    The Cone Model of Knowledge
    Philosophical Topics 14 (1): 125-178. 1986.
  •  46
    Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence
    with F. M. Kamm
    Philosophical Review 108 (2): 300. 1999.
    Peter Unger’s book has both substantive and methodological aims. Substantively, it aims to prove the following four claims in the following order: we must, in general, suffer great losses of property to prevent suffering and death; we may, in general, impose such losses on others for the same goals; we may, in general, kill others to prevent more deaths; and we must, in general, kill ourself to prevent more deaths. Methodologically, it aims to show that intuitive judgments about cases that would…Read more
  •  69
    Propositional Verbs and Knowledge
    Journal of Philosophy 69 (11): 301-312. 1972.
  •  643
    Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism
    Oxford University Press. 1975.
    In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is the case.