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Peter Unger

New York University
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  •  Publications
    101
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 More details
  • New York University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1966
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
Normative Ethics
  • All publications (101)
  •  135
    Two types of scepticism
    Philosophical Studies 25 (2). 1974.
    Metaphilosophical Skepticism
  •  171
    Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence
    with F. M. Kamm
    Philosophical Review 108 (2): 300. 1999.
    Peter Unger’s book has both substantive and methodological aims. Substantively, it aims to prove the following four claims in the following order: we must, in general, suffer great losses of property to prevent suffering and death; we may, in general, impose such losses on others for the same goals; we may, in general, kill others to prevent more deaths; and we must, in general, kill ourself to prevent more deaths. Methodologically, it aims to show that intuitive judgments about cases that would…Read more
    Peter Unger’s book has both substantive and methodological aims. Substantively, it aims to prove the following four claims in the following order: we must, in general, suffer great losses of property to prevent suffering and death; we may, in general, impose such losses on others for the same goals; we may, in general, kill others to prevent more deaths; and we must, in general, kill ourself to prevent more deaths. Methodologically, it aims to show that intuitive judgments about cases that would be presented as evidence against the four substantive claims—the standard technique of nonconsequentialists arguing against consequentialists—are worthless because we can construct cases that generate the opposite intuitive judgment; further, we can show that the factors that distinguish the cases yielding such different intuitions are not morally significant; and hence, we must decide which judgments are correct by consulting such general moral values as the importance of reducing suffering and death. Thus, Unger offers an error theory of nonconsequentialist restrictions on harming others and prerogatives not to make large sacrifices to aid. This error theory is based on the psychological effects of morally insignificant factors.
    Philosophy of MindEthics
  •  271
    Skepticism and nihilism
    Noûs 14 (4): 517-545. 1980.
    Metaphilosophical Skepticism
  •  154
    Précis of all the power in the world (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 455-456. 2010.
    No Abstract
    Mental States and Processes
  •  1060
    I do not exist
    In A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Perception and identity: essays presented to A. J. Ayer, with his replies, Cornell University Press. 1979.
    Persons, MiscOntology
  •  116
    Conscious beings in a gradual world
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1): 287-333. 1988.
    Persons, MiscTheories of Personal Identity
  •  439
    Why there are no people
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1): 177-222. 1979.
    Persons, Misc
  •  800
    The Problem of the Many
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1): 411-468. 1980.
    Problem of the Many
  •  300
    The causal theory of reference
    Philosophical Studies 43 (1). 1983.
    Causal Theories of Reference
  •  164
    Propositional Verbs and Knowledge
    Journal of Philosophy 69 (11): 301-312. 1972.
    Verbs
  •  91
    On being given more than skepticism
    Journal of Philosophy 70 (18): 628-630. 1973.
    Metaphilosophical Skepticism
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