This paper aims to clarify how, as Fichte himself claims in a 1800 letter draft, the theory of intersubjectivity he presents in the 1800 Vocation of Man marks an improvement over the theory he presents in the 1798 System of Ethics. Taking my departure from Marco Ivaldo’s suggestion that Fichte ceases to rely on the “good” but still “rather dogmatic” Leibnizian hypothesis of preestablished harmony in the former work in the way that he does in the latter, I argue that the difference lies in his no…
Read moreThis paper aims to clarify how, as Fichte himself claims in a 1800 letter draft, the theory of intersubjectivity he presents in the 1800 Vocation of Man marks an improvement over the theory he presents in the 1798 System of Ethics. Taking my departure from Marco Ivaldo’s suggestion that Fichte ceases to rely on the “good” but still “rather dogmatic” Leibnizian hypothesis of preestablished harmony in the former work in the way that he does in the latter, I argue that the difference lies in his no longer counting on the hypothesis to secure the agreement of each of our worlds and our perception of each other’s actions in it. Fichte attempts to dispense with this last vestige of dogmatism in the Vocation of Man by employing the ethical drive in its material determinateness (in other words, each of our final end) as a transcendental ground for the agreement of our worlds, and thereby the possibility of intersubjectivity. The communal conception of our final end which Fichte develops in the last part of the System of Ethics prepares it for its role as such a ground. For it is in the demand of the “voice of conscience” in us to co-operate with others to bring about “one great free moral community” that he finds in the Vocation of Man a transcendental source and basis for our conviction that the worlds of others’ perceptions agree with the world of our perception.