Nicholas D. Smith

Why would God make us ask for some good He might supply, and why would it be right for God to withhold that good unless and until we asked for it? We explain why present defences of petitionary prayer are insufficient, but argue that a world in which God makes us ask for some goods and then supplies them in response to our petitions adds value to the world that would not be available in worlds in which God simply supplied such goods without our asking for them. This added value, we argue, is what we call ‘partnership with God’

If God actually answers prayers that petition him for something, then it seems he is willing to withhold some good from the world unless and until someone prays for those goods. But how is this compatible with His benevolence? On the other hand, if God is dedicated to providing every good to us that we may need, it would seem that He would provide these to us even if we did not pray for them. But if so, it would appear that petitionary prayer is pointless. This discussion reviews the various contributions made by philosophers in trying to answer these questions, and in criticizing these answers

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Plato on Knowledge as a Power1Nicholas D. SmithAt 471C4 in Plato’s Republic, the argument takes a sudden turn when Glaucon becomes impatient with all of the specific prescriptions Socrates has been making, and asks to return to the issue Socrates had earlier set aside—whether or not the city he was describing could ever be brought into being. In response to Glaucon’s impatient question, Socrates articulates his “third wave of paradox” (472ag–7), namely, that the ills of the cities will never be ended until either philosophers become rulers or rulers become philosophers (473c11–d6). Glaucon immediately responds that such a view is likely to be greeted with violence and scorn (473e6–474a4), and so Socrates must hasten to explain his odd claim. His explanation, it turns out, is that true philosophers have an enormous cognitive advantage over non-philosophers—philosophers have and use knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), whereas non-philosophers have and use only opinion (δόξα).2 This distinction, between επιστήμη and δόξα, turns out: to be a distinction between two different cognitive powers (δυνάμεις—477d7–e3). And different powers, Plato clearly tells us, apply to or take as their objects (Plato says they are “ἐπί”) different things (477dl).In this paper, I shall argue that the relationship between the cognitive powers and their various objects has been fundamentally misunderstood, which has led scholars into one or more misinterpretations of important and explicit features of the text. At the heart of these misunderstandings, I claim, is [End Page 145] their shared misconception of the relation between the cognitive power and its objects as interpretable in terms of the relationship between a cognitive stale and what the content of that state is of or about.3 One consequence of the view for which I shall argue is that what has come to be known as the “two-worlds theory”4 of Plato’s epistemology is seriously mistaken, but no less mistaken than the alternatives given by its recent critics. Another consequence that I shall draw from my argument is that Plato should be understood neither as a kind of foundationalist with regard to knowledge and warrant, as some have supposed him to be,5 nor as a coherentist, as others have supposed,6 but, rather, as a kind of causal reliabilist. [End Page 146]1. KNOWLEDGE AS A POWERScholarly interpretations of Plato’s epistemology have routinely sought to understand the relationships between each cognitive power of Republic Book V and the objects of the ἐφ’ ᾦ (“what it is related to”) condition by which it is differentiated from other δυνάμεις as Plato’s way of telling us what each sort of cognition is of or aboul. 7 So, for example, we find Gail Fine using the expressions “belief [δόξα] is set over [Fine’s translation of Plato’s ἐπί] …” and “knowledge is set over …” interchangeably with “belief is of …” or “belief is about…” and “knowledge is of …” or “knowledge is about …”8 Against the “two-worlds theory,” Fine argues that, for Plato, there can be knowledge of sensibles and beliefs about Forms. Accordingly, since she assimilates the power-ἐπί-object set of relations to the cognilion-of/about-object relation, she concludes—in order to account for knowledge of sensibles and beliefs about Forms—that the objects of knowledge and opinion must be propositions. Plato’s claims that knowledge is ἐπί what is, whereas opinion is ἐπί what is and is not, Fine understands as, “One can only know true propositions; one can believe both true and false propositions.”9 We shall see later that this “veridical” understanding of what Plato means to identify as “what is,” and “what is and is not” fails to account for important and explicit elements of Plato’s exposition of the epistemological and metaphysical distinctions he is making. For now, it is enough to note that Fine understands the ἐφ’ᾦ) relation in terms of our cognition-of/about-object relation. One finds the same assimilation made by those who advance existential readings of Plato’s “is” and “is not,”10 as [End Page 147] well as those who have urged that we adopt predicative readings of “is” and “is not.”11But I think there are very serious problems with this assimilation. Plato is very...

In Part I of this paper, I argue that the arguments Plato offers for the tripartition of the soul are founded upon an equivocation, and that each of the valid options by which Plato might remove the equivocation will not produce a tripartite soul. In Part II, I argue that Plato is not wholly committed to an analogy of soul and state that would require either a tripartite state or a tripartite soul for the analogy to hold. It follows that the heart of the analogy is not to be found in the comparison of the Kallipolis and its three parts to the soul conceived as tripartite, but rather must be supposed to reside in some other connection between the ways in which justice characterizes states and souls, and I will suggest what this other connection consists in.

The philosophy of Plato, universally acknowledged as the most important thinker of the Ancient World, is a major focus of contemporary attention - not only among philosophers, but also classicists and literary and political theorists. This set selects the best and most influential examples of Platonic scholarship published in English over the last fifty years, and adds translations of outstanding works published in other languages. It represents radically different scholarly approaches, and illuminates the key issues in the most hotly debated topics, including Plato's theory of the Forms and Platonic Erotics. It is especially concerned with the interpretations and major debates of philosophers of the Anglo-American schools over the last three decades

In this paper, I will attempt to interpret Plato's concept of knowledge as he presents it in the very end of Book V of the Republic. An adequate interpretation of Plato's concept of knowledge must be able to account coherently for the following, According to Plato, knowledge is not a state of mind, but an ability or power of the mind and is therefore, formally analogous to sight. This analogy is presented explicitly and in great detail in the famous ‘similes of light,’ the Sun, Divided Line, and Cave passages of Books VI and VII. Cognition, for Plato, comes in degrees from clearer to less clear. Finally, knowledge is related in a special way to being.

In this paper, I consider Plato's persistent and ubiquitous uses of imagery in the Republic, and compare his uses of images with what he says about the uses (and abuses) of imagery in the curricula he proposes for the kallipolis. I show how the dialogue itself might be suited to different levels of the proposed curricula--especially for those at the level of thought (dianoia)--but conclude that the dialogue was not intended to fit into the educational schemes of the 'kallipolis', but was intended, instead, as educational for would-be lawgivers

My interpretation of the argument, then, fully generalized, is this:To do one's own is to act in such a way as to aim for each having his own.For each to have his own is justice(h) and to act in such a way as to aim for justice(h) is justice(d).Therefore, the having of one's own is justice(h) and the doing of one's own is justice(d).The advantage of this view is that it, unlike that of Vlastos, does not need to supply problematic premisses, such as (S2), in order to render Plato's argument valid. Moreover, I have argued that there is good reason to suppose that a proper reading of Plato's first premiss contains a notion that Vlastos' interpretation had to supply in an additional premiss (S1). One aspect of what I have argued is the correct understanding of Plato's argument does need to be supplied, however, namely, that for one to do one's own one must accomplish one's beneficent aims. Although it is true that Plato only talks of the rulers' aims in the law courts, I think there is good reason to supply the accomplishment condition, for without it, Plato leaves open two possibilities that would embarass his view. First, without this added condition, we could have a case where A did his own with reference to B and C, yet B and C did not have their own as a result of A 's action. Secondly, there could be a case where A did his own, and B and C had their own as a result of A's doing something, yet B and C would not have their own as a result of A's doing his own with reference to B and C.The reason Plato does not consider these problems, I think, is because he would not have considered cases in which his rulers had beneficent aims, but were ineffective in achieving them purposefully. The guarantee of justice in Plato's just state is that it would be administrated by rulers who are both utterly beneficent and utterly efficient. Under these conditions, all will have their own, for all will do their own. This implication, I have argued, is all we need to protect Plato's utopian state from the potential for πλεoνεξία, and it is all we need to provide a valid reading of the argument from 433E6–434A1

_Philosophy Through Science Fiction_ offers a fun, challenging, and accessible way in to the issues of philosophy through the genre of science fiction. Tackling problems such as the possibility of time travel, or what makes someone the same person over time, the authors take a four-pronged approach to each issue, providing · a clear and concise introduction to each subject · a science fiction story that exemplifies a feature of the philosophical discussion · historical and contemporary philosophical texts that investigate the issue with rigor, and · glossary, plot profiles of pertinent science fiction stories and films, and questions for further reflection. _Philosophy Through Science Fiction_ includes stories from contemporary science fiction writers including Greg Egan and Mike Resnick, as well as from classic authors like Philip K. Dick and Robert Heinlein. Philosophy readings include historical pieces by René Descartes and David Hume, and contemporary pieces by John Searle and Mary Midgley.