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Silvia Manzo

Universidad Nacional de La Plata
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    67
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    27

 More details
  • Universidad Nacional de La Plata
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
Faculty of Philosophy and Letters
PhD, 2000
Email (login required)
Homepage
La Plata, Buenos Aires Province, Argentina
0000-0002-3944-7331
Areas of Specialization
History of Western Philosophy
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Religion
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
History of Western Philosophy
1 more
  • All publications (67)
  •  609
    Experimentación, instrumentos científicos y cuantificación en el método de Francis Bacon
    Manuscrito 24 (1): 49-84. 2001.
    Hace un tiempo G. Rees señaló la importancia del razonamiento cuantitativo en el programa de la renovación del saber propuesto por F. Bacon, renovando la imagen tradicional de su método. Con la intención de proseguir el replanteo iniciado por Rees de los conceptos centrales del método baconiano, me propongo reexaminar el significado de la experimentación y de los instrumentos científicos, lo cual implica al mismo tiempo considerar la relación entre razón y sentidos. Para ello, examinaré el signi…Read more
    Hace un tiempo G. Rees señaló la importancia del razonamiento cuantitativo en el programa de la renovación del saber propuesto por F. Bacon, renovando la imagen tradicional de su método. Con la intención de proseguir el replanteo iniciado por Rees de los conceptos centrales del método baconiano, me propongo reexaminar el significado de la experimentación y de los instrumentos científicos, lo cual implica al mismo tiempo considerar la relación entre razón y sentidos. Para ello, examinaré el significado de los sentidos como fuentes del conocimiento, la función de la experimentación y de los instrumentos para superar las limitaciones de los sentidos, la inserción de datos cuantitativos en el marco experimental, el concepto de sutilidad de la naturaleza y el sentido metodológico de la anatomía baconiana. Como conclusión señalo que en el método baconiano los sentidos están subordinados a la razón, ya que tanto los experimentos como los instrumentos científicos están sujetos a la autoridad de la razón para alcanzar la verdad y evitar sus errores
    Francis Bacon
  •  70
    Études sur Francis Bacon
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2). 2013.
  •  95
    F RANCIS B ACON, The Instauratio Magna Part II: Novum Organum and Associated Texts. Edited with introduction, notes, commentaries and facing-page translations by Graham Rees with Maria Wakely. The Oxford Francis Bacon, XI. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Pp. cxxviii+634. ISBN 0-19-924792-7. £120.00 (review)
    British Journal for the History of Science 39 (2): 290-291. 2006.
  •  145
    Los usos políticos del cuerpo: los dos cuerpos del rey en la filosofía política de Francis Bacon
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 49 (117): 177-199. 2008.
    Francis BaconContinental Political Philosophy
  •  1089
    Francis Bacon: Freedom, authority and science
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (2). 2006.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Francis Bacon
  •  43
    Probability and certainty in Francis Bacon 's natural histories. A double attitude toward skepticism
    In Maia Neto, José Raimundo, Gianni Paganini & John Christian Laursen (eds.), Skepticism in the modern age: building on the work of Richard Popkin, Brill. pp. 123--138. 2009.
    Bacon’s project suggests in theory that the obtaining of absolute certain knowledge is possible but in fact such knowledge is revealed to be impossible. Th e description of the human mind on which Bacon’s account is based seems to imply that the impossibility of obtaining absolute certainty does not depend on the contingent historical situation of a preliminary stage of the scientifi c endeavor. Consequently, a gap emerges between the proposed goal of science and the ways to reach it: Bacon trie…Read more
    Bacon’s project suggests in theory that the obtaining of absolute certain knowledge is possible but in fact such knowledge is revealed to be impossible. Th e description of the human mind on which Bacon’s account is based seems to imply that the impossibility of obtaining absolute certainty does not depend on the contingent historical situation of a preliminary stage of the scientifi c endeavor. Consequently, a gap emerges between the proposed goal of science and the ways to reach it: Bacon tried to obtain absolute certainty but he only could arrive at degrees of certainty and probability both in theories and in facts. Malgrè lui, Bacon shows himself developing in fact a kind of probabilistic science instead of surpassing the limits to knowledge posed by the skeptical arguments. Th at is the reason why many of his followers could develop a mitigated skepticism in the framework of a Baconian science.
    Francis BaconHistory: SkepticismInductive Skepticism
  •  94
    Miguel Angel Granada, el debate cosmológico en 1588. Bruno, brahe, rothmann, ursus, röslin. Istituto italiano per gli studi filosofici, lezioni Della scuola di studi superiori in Napoli, bibliopolis, Napoli, 1996. Pp. 166
    British Journal for the History of Science 33 (3): 369-379. 2000.
    15th/16th Century Philosophy
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