Silvia Manzo

Bacon’s project suggests in theory that the obtaining of absolute certain knowledge is possible but in fact such knowledge is revealed to be impossible. Th e description of the human mind on which Bacon’s account is based seems to imply that the impossibility of obtaining absolute certainty does not depend on the contingent historical situation of a preliminary stage of the scientifi c endeavor. Consequently, a gap emerges between the proposed goal of science and the ways to reach it: Bacon tried to obtain absolute certainty but he only could arrive at degrees of certainty and probability both in theories and in facts. Malgrè lui, Bacon shows himself developing in fact a kind of probabilistic science instead of surpassing the limits to knowledge posed by the skeptical arguments. Th at is the reason why many of his followers could develop a mitigated skepticism in the framework of a Baconian science.

The aim of this paper is to offer a comparative survey of Bacon's theory and practice of natural history and of civil history, particularly centered on their relationship to natural philosophy and human philosophy. I will try to show that the obvious differences concerning their subject matter encompass a number of less obvious methodological and philosophical assumptions which reveal a significant practical and con ceptual convergence of the two fields. Causes or axioms are prescribed as the theoretical end-products of natural history, whereas precepts are envisaged as the speculative outcomes derived from perfect civil history. In spite of this difference, causes and precepts are thought to enable effective action in order to change the state of nature and of man, respectively. For that reason a number of common patterns are to be found in Bacon's theory and practice of natural and civil history.

Este artículo se propone estudiar elementos claves de la teoría de la historia y de la práctica de la historia civil de Francis Bacon en lo que concierne a la verdad y la certeza de la narrativa histórica. Compara sus teorías de la historia y de la poesía, así como la relación que ellas tienen con la certeza, la verdad y la ficción. Para eso principalmente analiza dos clases de escritos. Por un lado, los textos programáticos en los que el autor presenta sus ideas sobre la historia y la poesía. Por otro lado, analiza sus textos completos e incompletos de historia civil en los que actuó como historiador. Además, este artículo considerará la obra baconiana teniendo en cuenta como marco de referencia la historiografía inglesa renacentista y moderna. Concluye que aunque la historia y la poesía constituyen dos ramas distintas en la clasificación baconiana del saber, tienen importantes elementos en común, en consonancia con la teoría de la poesía desarrollada por su contemporáneo Philip Sidney. Así es como Bacon incorporó elementos ficcionales en su narrativa histórica y adoptó un particular modo de distinguir en ella lo cierto de lo conjetural. Esta posición con respecto a la historia civil contrasta fuertemente con la metodología que Bacon propuso para historia natural, la cual para alcanzar la certeza recomienda enfáticamente excluir cualquier tipo de relato ficcional al reportar los hechos de la naturaleza.

The exact nature of the relation between science and Scripture in the thought of Francis Bacon is a well-studied but controversial field. In this paper, it is shown that Bacon, though convinced that there exists no enmity between the book of God's wisdom and the book of God's power, usually tries to separate knowledge acquired by reason from knowledge acquired by faith. In his exposition of the principle of the conservation of matter, however, Bacon seems to find himself constrained to invoke Scriptural truths in a manner that he usually disapproves of. In order to establish this principle, which is so essential to his overall scientific program, he appeals both to the Bible and Greek mythology in a way that points to certain conceptual tensions within his natural philosophy.