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235Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1 (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (12). 2009.
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647Rational Imagination and Modal KnowledgeNoûs 46 (1). 2012.How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemology. When we discover what is possible or what is …Read more
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401Knowledge Norms and Acting WellThought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1): 49-55. 2012.I argue that evaluating the knowledge norm of practical reasoning is less straightforward than is often assumed in the literature. In particular, cases in which knowledge is intuitively present, but action is intuitively epistemically unwarranted, provide no traction against the knowledge norm. The knowledge norm indicates what it is appropriately to hold a particular content as a reason for action; it does not provide a theory of what reasons are sufficient for what actions. Absent a general th…Read more
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1993In Defense of a Kripkean DogmaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1): 56-68. 2011.In “Against Arguments from Reference” (Mallon et al., 2009), Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich (hereafter, MMNS) argue that recent experiments concerning reference undermine various philosophical arguments that presuppose the correctness of the causal-historical theory of reference. We will argue three things in reply. First, the experiments in question—concerning Kripke’s Gödel/Schmidt example—don’t really speak to the dispute between descriptivism and the causal-his…Read more
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307Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactualPhilosophical Studies 145 (3). 2009.I criticize Timothy Williamson's characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know
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1075Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological DisjunctivismPhilosophical Review 125 (1): 138-142. 2016.Review of Duncan Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism
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848Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fictionPhilosophical Studies 142 (2). 2009.What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments of ordinary counterfactuals. On this view, the intuition is naturalistically innocuous, but it has a contingent content and could be known at best a posteriori. We suggest an alternative to Williamson's account, according to which we apprehend thought-experiment intuitions through our grasp on truth in fict…Read more
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286Ignorance and PresuppositionsMind 124 (496): 1207-1219. 2015.I develop a class of counterexamples to Blome-Tillmann’s ‘Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism’. There are cases in which subjects are ignorant of key propositions that are inconsistent with the pragmatic presuppositions in conversational contexts in which they are discussed; in such contexts, PEC wrongly predicts the subjects to satisfy certain ‘knows’ attributions
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309Basic Knowledge and Contextualist “E = K”Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4): 282-292. 2013.Timothy Williamson (2000) makes a strong prima facie case for the identification of a subject's total evidence with the subject's total knowledge (E = K). However, as Brian Weatherson (Ms) has observed, there are intuitively problematic consequences of E = K. In this article, I'll offer a contextualist implementation of E = K that provides the resources to respond to Weatherson's argument; the result will be a novel approach to knowledge and evidence that is suggestive of an unexplored contextua…Read more
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85Dreaming, Philosophical IssuesIn Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2009.Having fascinated some of the greatest philosophers from the earliest times, dreaming figures importantly in the history of philosophy, as in Plato’s Theaetetus, Augustine’s Confessions, and, perhaps most famously, Descartes’s Mediations. By far the greatest philosophical focus on dreaming has been epistemic: Socrates suggests to Theaetetus that since he cannot tell whether he is dreaming, he cannot trust his senses to know contingent facts about the world around him. And a similar worry drives …Read more
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366Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire PsychologyAnalytic Philosophy 53 (4): 327-343. 2012.We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.
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PhilPapers Editorships
| Epistemic Contextualism |
| Contextualist Replies to Skepticism |
| Metaphilosophy |
| Epistemology of Philosophy |