Simo Knuuttila

(? - 2022)

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Originally published in 1993, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy looks at the idea of modality as multiplicity of reference with respect to alternative domains. The book examines how this emerged in early medieval discussions and addresses how it was originally influenced by the theological conception of God acting by choice. After a discussion of ancient modal paradigms, the author traces the interplay of old and new modal views in medieval logic and semantics, philosophy and theology. A detailed account is given of late medieval discussions of the new modal logic, epistemic logic, and the logic norms. These theories show striking similarities to some basic tenets of contemporary approaches to modal matters. This work will be of considerable interest to historians of philosophy and ideas and philosophers of logic and metaphysics.

Studies in modal notions, such as necessity, possibility or impossibility, have always played an important role in philosophical analysis. The history of these conceptions is a fascinating story of a variety of assumptions which have given shape to one part of rational discourse. A typical modern approach to modality is codified in what is generally known as possible worlds semantics. According to this view, necessity refers to what is actual in any alternative state of affairs, possibility to what is actual in some, and impossibility to what is not actual in any alternative domain. The idea of spelling out the meaning of modal terms with the synchronic alternatives hardly occurred at all in ancient thinkers. They did not draw any sharp distinction between conceptual and real modalities and they were inclined to think that all generic possibilities must prove their mettle through actualization. Why and when did ancient modal conceptions and the modes of thought based on them lose their dominance? The main thesis of this book is that the idea of modality as multiplicity of reference with respect to alternative domains emerged in early medieval discussions and that it was originally influenced by the theological conception of God acting by choice. After a discussion of ancient modal paradigms, the author traces the interplay of old and new modal views in medieval logic and semantics, philosophy and theology. A detailed account is given of late medieval discussions of the new modal paradigms and attempts to apply them to modal logic, epistemic logic, and the logic of norms. These theories show striking similarities to some basic tenets of contemporary approaches to modal matters. This work will thus be of considerable interest to historians of philosophy and ideas, and philosophers of intensional logic and metaphysics.

In his book Knowledge and Belief, Jaakko Hintikka uses a model-theoretic approach of modal semantics as a theoretical basis for investigating the principles of epistemic logic. I shall first summarize the main points of Hintikka’s classic work and then address the most disputed themes raised by it in the 60s and later, such as logical omniscience and the KK-thesis, as well as Hintikka’s modifying his views on the basis of criticism. The last part of the book treats quantified epistemic logic, particularly quantifying into “intensional” or “referentially opaque” epistemic contexts defended against Quine’s objections. I deal with this topic in Sect. 17.3 and add some relevant comparisons with John Buridan’s medieval approach in Sect. 17.4. A survey of Hintikka’s later theory of modelling knowledge acquisition is presented in Sect. 17.5; this includes the semantics of questions and inquiry in terms of game-theoretical semantics and their application to the logic of epistemology and scientific reasoning in the interrogative model of inquiry. Combining these results with the theory of independence friendly logic provides, Hintikka argues, a promising improvement of general epistemology which he calls a second-generation epistemic logic. The subject of the last section is “knowing who” in the sense of a basic epistemic attitude associated with identification which is the key notion in Hintikka’s epistemic theory of questions and answers, reference, and quantification. A central issue in this context is Hintikka’s discovery of the duality of cross-identification methods, the public or descriptive and the perspective ones.

This paper discusses the main lines of medieval Latin approaches to future contingents with some remarks on Marcin Tkaczyk’s paper “The antinomy of future contingent events.” Tkaczyk’s theory shows some similarity with the general frame of the views of Ockham and Scotus, the difference being that while medieval authors argued for the temporal necessity of the past, Tkaczyk is sceptical of the general validity of this necessity. Ockham’s theological view was that God eternally has an intuitive and immutable knowledge of all possibilities as well as whether they are ever actualized or not (PANACCIO & PICHÉ 2010). The content of God’s past knowledge attitude remains contingent before the free choice takes place because God’s knowledge could be different similarly as the truth-value of the proposition. While Ockham held that no past or present thing follows from future things as an effect follows from its cause, this causal link is defended by Tkaczyk. Later thinkers thought that the doctrine of the scientia media sheds light on this question; perhaps it is easier to understand than the retroactive model which is not contradictory but difficult to imagine, as Tkaczyk concludes his paper.

Hugh of Novocastro, Landolfo Caracciolo, John Baconthorpe, and some other medieval authors argued that there are real contradictions in nature. The background of this early fourteenth-century theory was the Aristotelian question of how to determine the instant of change between p and ~p. The argument was that these are simultaneously true at the temporal instant of change if it is an instant of changing. The author’s aim is to discuss the background of this view in Henry of Ghent’s theory of instantaneous change from potentiality to actuality at that very instant.

The last twenty years have seen remarkable developments in our understanding of how the ancient Greek thinkers handled the general concept of being and its several varieties. The most general examination of the meaning of the Greek verb 'esti'/'einai'/'on' both in common usage and in the philosophical literature has been presented by Charles H. Kahn, most extensively in his 1973 book The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek. These discussions are summarized in Kahn's contribution to this volume. By and large, they show that conceptual schemes by means of which philosophers have recently approached Greek thought have not been very well suited to the way the concept of being was actually used by the ancients. For one thing, being in the sense of existence played a very small role in Greek thinking according to Kahn. Even more importantly, Kahn has argued that Frege and Russell's thesis that verbs for being, such as 'esti', are multiply ambiguous is ill suited for the purpose of appreciating the actual conceptual assumptions of the Greek thinkers. Frege and Russell claimed that a verb like 'is' or'esti' is ambiguous between the 'is' of identity, the 'is' of existence, the copulative 'is', and the generic 'is' (the 'is' of class-inclusion). At least a couple of generations of scholars have relied on this thesis and fre quently criticized sundry ancients for confusing these different senses of 'esti' with each other.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.4 (2001) 587-589 [Access article in PDF] Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen and Paul J. J. M. Bakker, editors. Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters: Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit. Leiden: Brill, 2000. Pp. x + 322. Cloth, $98.00. Albert of Saxony, Nicholas Oresme, and Marsilius of Inghen were among the fourteenth-century Parisian masters of arts who were influenced by Buridan's philosophy and, while continuing as master of arts, simultaneously pursued a degree in theology. Marsilius, born around 1340, was a very popular master in Paris from 1362. In 1366 he began the study of theology. He did not finish his theological studies in Paris, but later at the new university of Heidelberg (1393-4), where he held a chair of theology until his death in 1396.Marsilius wrote a number of treatises on logic, commentaries on Aristotle's works, commentaries on the Bible, a commentary on the Sentences and some tracts on ecclesiastical politics. His works were widely read and he was regarded as a representative of the via moderna and nominalist philosophy in the fifteenth century. Several scholars are currently studying and editing Marsilius's works. The collection of essays Philosophy and Theology in late Middle Ages, edited by Hoenen and Bakker, is a report on this ongoing work. It has been preceded by two similar research reports, Marsilius of Inghen, edited by H. Braakhuis and M. Hoenen (1992), and Marsilius von Inghen, Werk und Wirkung, edited by S. Wielgus (1993). Most of the articles in the present volume deal with special historical and doxographical questions. In this sense the title of the book is somewhat misleading, though the contributions themselves are of high scholarly quality and contain lots of interesting historical details and new research results.The first part involves four papers on late medieval conceptions of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Hoenen describes the increasing separation of theology from logic and philosophy as the context of Marsilius's theological work, using as examples his treatment of the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and creation from nothing. Sigrid Müller argues that those fourteenth-century theologians who were called representatives of nominalistic theology in the fifteenth century, such as William [End Page 587] of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, and Marsilius Inghen, had a similar view of the relationship between language and reality, though their theological sources and solutions to particular questions varied. Manfred Schulze sheds light on Marsilius's theology by comparing his views on predestination, grace, and the freedom of the will with those of Gregory of Rimini and Gabriel Biel. These papers are preceded by William Courtenay's historically illuminating study of the teachers of theology in Paris during 1362-77.The papers on the relationship between philosophy and theology are learned and useful but somewhat general. What does it mean that philosophy and theology were increasingly separated by authors who after all were keen to make logical and semantic distinctions? Further light might have been shed on this question by concentrating more on the widely discussed controversies about logic and the Trinity which have recently been considered by many scholars. One position was to criticize the special logic of faith and to show that the alleged logical problems in theological doctrines are mainly based on incorrect interpretations of revealed truths. Showing this demanded discussions of logic and semantics in theology, as can also be seen in question nine of the first book of Marsilius of Inghen's Questions on the Sentences.The second part involves papers on specific themes in the works of Marsilius and attempts to identify some anonymous works. Henk Braakhuis deals with Marsilius's view on the question of the different senses of a proposition, which was mentioned in the famous prohibition statute of the Faculty of Arts in Paris in 1340 and was found interesting in many contexts, one of them being Aristotle's theory of sophistic refutations. Braakhuis's paper, which is a valuable contribution to the history of logic, contains...