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32Erwin Rogler und Gerhard Preyer: Materialismus, anomaler monismus und mentale kausalität. Frankfurt: Humanities online, 2001Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1): 251-255. 2002.
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Willenshandlungen: Zur Natur und Kultur der Selbststeuerung (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 63 (1). 2009.
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175Belief integration in action: A defense of extended beliefsPhilosophical Psychology 24 (2): 245-260. 2011.Daniel Weiskopf has recently raised an apparently powerful objection against the so-called “extended mind thesis” with regard to beliefs. His argument is that since alleged cases of “extended beliefs” lack a characteristic feature of beliefs properly so called (newly acquired beliefs are usually integrated with already existing beliefs rapidly, automatically and unconsciously), they do not count as genuine beliefs properly so called. We defend the extended mind thesis by arguing that Weiskopf is…Read more
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65Supersizing the MindPhilosophical Psychology 22 (6): 803-807. 2009.This Article does not have an abstract
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129Program explanations and causal relevanceActa Analytica 20 (36): 32-47. 2005.Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves…Read more
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52Ist der Epiphänomenalismus absurd? Ein frischer Blick auf eine tot geglaubte PositionZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 62 (3): 415-432. 2008.Der Epiphänomenalismus ist eine Position in der Philosophie des Geistes, wonach mentale Ereignisse zwar vollständige physikalische Ursachen haben, selbst aber keine Ursachen oder Teilursachen anderer Ereignisse sind. Entgegen einer weit verbreiteten Meinung tritt die vorliegende Arbeit dafür ein, dass der Epiphänomenalismus keineswegs vollkommen absurd und unhaltbar ist. Es wird zunächst dafür argumentiert, dass er einige der gegen ihn üblicherweise erhobenen Einwände zwar sehr leicht entkräften…Read more
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183Determinables, determinates, and causal relevanceCanadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2): 217-244. 2007.Mental causation, our mind's ability to causally affect the course of the world, is part and parcel of our ‘manifest image’ of the world. That there is mental causation is denied by virtually no one. How there can be such a thing as mental causation, however, is far from obvious. In recent years, discussions about the problem of mental causation have focused on Jaegwon Kim's so-called Causal Exclusion Argument, according to which mental events are ‘screened off’ or ‘preempted’ by physical events…Read more
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80Terry, Terry, quite contraryGrazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1): 103-22. 2002.In 'Jackson on physical information and qualia' Terry Horgan defended physicalism against Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument by raising what later has been called the 'mode of presentation reply'- arguingthatthe Knowledge Argumentis fallacious because itsubtly equivocates on two different readings of 'physical information'. In 'Mary, Mary, quite contrary' however, George Graham and Terry Horgan maintain that none of the replies against Jackson has yet been successful, not even Horgan's own 1984 …Read more
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114Review: Robert C. Richardson: Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology (review)Mind 118 (470): 523-527. 2009.
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149Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action (edited book)Imprint Academic. 2003.This book presents a range of essays on the conceptual foundations of physicalism, mental causation and human agency, written by established and leading authors ...
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57Zombies, Dualismus und PhysikalismusZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (2): 241-254. 2011.In der Debatte zwischen Dualisten und Physikalisten spielen Zombies seit geraumer Zeit eine entscheidende Rolle – physikalische Duplikate phänomenal bewusster Lebewesen, die selbst nicht phänomenal bewusst sind. Die Vorstellbarkeit bzw. Möglichkeit von Zombies bringt, so die Standardauffassung, den Physikalismus in Schwierigkeiten: Wenn die physikalische Ausstattung der Welt die Welt in ihrer Gesamtheit determiniert, wie vom Physikalismus gefordert, dann kann es keine physikalischen Duplikate ph…Read more
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2Causal exclusion as an argument against non-reductive physicalismJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2): 67-83. 2006.
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485Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2006.What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few…Read more
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87The epistemological approach to mental causationErkenntnis 67 (2). 2007.Epistemological approaches to mental causation argue that the notorious problem of mental causation as captured in the question “How can irreducible, physically realized, and potentially relational mental properties be causally efficacious in the production of physical effects?” has a very simple solution: One merely has to abandon any metaphysical considerations in favor of epistemological considerations and accept that our explanatory practice is a much better guide to causal relevance than th…Read more
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20Program explanations and causal relevanceActa Analytica 20 (3): 32-47. 2005.Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves…Read more
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257Locked-in syndrome, bci, and a confusion about embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted cognitionNeuroethics 3 (1): 61-72. 2009.In a recent contribution to this journal, Andrew Fenton and Sheri Alpert have argued that the so-called “extended mind hypothesis” allows us to understand why Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) have the potential to change the self of patients suffering from Locked-in syndrome (LIS) by extending their minds beyond their bodies. I deny that this can shed any light on the theoretical, or philosophical, underpinnings of BCIs as a tool for enabling communication with, or bodily action by, patients wit…Read more
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31Determinables, Determinates, And Causal RelevanceCanadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2): 217-243. 2007.Mental causation, our mind's ability to causally affect the course of the world, is part and parcel of our ‘manifest image’ of the world. That there is mental causation is denied by virtually no one. How there can be such a thing as mental causation, however, is far from obvious. In recent years, discussions about the problem of mental causation have focused on Jaegwon Kim's so-called Causal Exclusion Argument, according to which mental events are ‘screened off’ or ‘preempted’ by physical events…Read more
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171Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious willSynthese 191 (10): 2215-2238. 2014.While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epipheno…Read more
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69Realisierung und mentale VerursachungDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (5): 689-708. 2009.The realization relation that allegedly holds between mental and physical properties plays a crucial role for so-called 'non-reductive physicalism' because it is supposed to secure both the ontological autonomy of mental properties and their ability to make a causal difference to the course of the causally closed physical world. For a long time however, the nature of the realization relation has largely been ignored in the philosophy of mind. It has only been a couple of years since accounts wer…Read more
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101Cognitive extension: the parity argument, functionalism, and the mark of the cognitiveSynthese 177 (2): 285-300. 2010.During the past decade, the so-called “hypothesis of cognitive extension,” according to which the material vehicles of some cognitive processes are spatially distributed over the brain and the extracranial parts of the body and the world, has received lots of attention, both favourable and unfavourable. The debate has largely focussed on three related issues: (1) the role of parity considerations, (2) the role of functionalism, and (3) the importance of a mark of the cognitive. This paper critic…Read more
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161Taking realization seriously: no cure for epiphobia (review)Philosophical Studies 151 (2). 2010.The realization relation that allegedly holds between mental and physical properties plays a crucial role for so-called non-reductive physicalism because it is supposed to secure both the ontological autonomy of mental properties and, despite their irreducibility, their ability to make a causal difference to the course of the causally closed physical world. For a long time however, the nature of realization has largely been ignored in the philosophy of mind until a couple of years ago authors li…Read more
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59Physicalism, or something near enough, by Jaegwon KimEuropean Journal of Philosophy 16 (1). 2008.
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111Multiple realizability and reduction: A defense of the disjunctive moveMetaphysica 7 (1): 43-65. 2006.
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Philosophy of Biology |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
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Mental Causation |