Nathan Emmerich

This paper takes the philosophical notion of suberogatory acts or morally permissible moral mistakes and, via a reinterpretation of a thought experiment from the medical ethics literature, offers an initial demonstration of their relevance to the field of medical ethics. That is, at least in regards to this case, we demonstrate that the concept of morally permissible moral mistakes has a bearing on medical decision-making. We therefore suggest that these concepts may have broader importance for the discourse on medical ethics and should receive fuller consideration by those working the field. The focus of the discussion we present is on a particular thought experiment originally presented by Sulmasy and Sugarman. Their case formed the basis of an exchange about the moral equivalence of withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment. The analysis Sulmasy and Sugarman set out is significant because, contrary to common bioethical opinion, it implies that the difference between withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment holds, rather than lacks, moral significance. Following a brief discussion of rejoinders to Sulmasy and Sugarman’s article, we present a constructive reinterpretation of the thought experiment, one that draws on the idea of suberogatory acts or “morally permissible moral mistakes.” Our analysis, or so we suggest, accounts for the differing moral intuitions that the case prompts. However, it also calls into question the degree to which this thought experiment can be thought of as illustrating the moral equivalence of withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment. Rather, we conclude that it primarily illuminates something about the ethical parameters of healthcare when family members, particularly parents, are involved in decision-making.

This paper argues the case for coming to see ‘medical politics’ as a topic or subject within medical education. First, its absence is noted from the wide array of paramedical subjects (medical ethics, history of medicine, the medical humanities, etc) currently given attention in both the medical education literature and in specific curricula. Second the author suggests that ‘the political’ is implicitly recognisable in the historical roots of medical ethics education, specifically in certain of the London Medical Group's activities, and also that the medical profession, or indeed any profession, cannot be understood as an apolitical form of social organisation either in its institutional or scientific (epistemic) forms. Some brief suggestions for introductory and advanced topics in medical politics are discussed and the degree to which medical politics ought to be taken seriously and delivered as part of medical education is considered. Ultimately the author concludes that medical politics might be considered a useful subject within medical education, but it is perhaps best understood as a perspective or approach that can contribute to the development of a more expansive perspective within the extant paramedical subjects

Anti-theory is a multi-faceted critique of moral theory which, it appears, is undergoing something of reassessment. In a recent paper Hämäläinen discusses the relevance of an anti-theoretical perspective for the activity of applied ethics. This paper explores her view of anti-theory. In particular I examine its relevance for understanding the formal guidance on pandemic flu planning issues by the Department of Health in the UK and some subsequent discussions around triage and reverse triage decisions which may be considered by both Primary and Secondary Care Trusts. in setting their own policies and which may face clinicians in the eventuality of a pandemic. Following Hämäläinen in contrasting reflective equilibrium with her anti-theory inspired suggestion of an instrumental approach to moral theory in practice I demonstrate how this understanding complements the diversity of our intuitive moral judgements. Consequentially I suggest that this anti-theoretical instrumental approach is in greater accord with the conditions under which such policy planning and decision making is, or will be, made. Furthermore, on the grounds of keeping open the ethical dimensions of medical practice in conditions of uncertainty, i.e. during a pandemic, I suggest that the anti-theoretical instrumental perspective is, ethically, the preferable approach to producing such policies and guidelines.

This essay responds to an article, ‘Variation in university research ethics review’, published in this issue. It argues that the authors of that paper do not fully distinguish the usual function of university research ethics committees from that of a gatekeeper. The latter term more accurately describes the task they happen to have asked them to fulfil in the course of conducting some empirical research. Whilst they are not alone in making it, the result of this conflation is that the reflections they offer are misguided. In this short comment I briefly discuss the distinction between a REC and a gatekeeper, and indicate how it impacts on the proposals sketched by Vadeboncoeur et al.

This paper considers the disciplines of literature and history and the contributions each makes to the discourse of bioethics. In each case I note the pedagogic ends that can be enacted though the appropriate use of the each of these disciplines in the sphere of medical education, particularly in the medical ethics classroom.1 I then explore the contribution that both these disciplines and their respective methodologies can and do bring to the academic field of bioethics. I conclude with a brief consideration of the relations between literature and history with particular attention to the possibilities for a future bioethics informed by history and literature after the empirical turn

This essay comments on the British Medical Association's recent suggestion that protocols for Elective Ventilation (EV) might be revived in order to increase the number of viable organs available for transplant. I suggest that the proposed revival results, at least in part, from developments in the contemporary political landscape, notably the decreasing likelihood of an opt-out system for the UK's Organ Donor Register. I go on to suggest that EV is unavoidably situated within complex debates surrounding the epistemology and ontology of death. Such questions cannot be settled a priori by medical science, bioethics or philosophical reflection. As Radcliffe-Richards suggests, the determination of death has become a moral question, and therefore, now extends into the political arena. I argue for the conclusion that EV, and wider debates about organ donation and the constitution of the organ donation register, are matters of ‘biocitizenship’ and must, therefore, be addressed as ‘biopolitical’ questions

It is increasingly common for universities to provide cross-curricular education in bioethics as part of contemporary attempts to produce 'global citizens.' In this article I examine three perspectives drawn from research into pedagogy that has been conducted from the perspective of cognitive anthropology and consider its relevance to bioethics education. I focus on: two metaphors of learning, participation and acquisition, identified by Sfard; the psychological notion of moral development; and the distinction between socialization and enculturation. Two of these perspectives have been particularly fruitful in understanding the processes of teaching and learning in a variety of domains. The third perspective has been developed in relation to the formal ethical education of medical students. I examine their relevance for 'non-professional' bioethics education suggesting that if we take seriously the idea that it is part of 'educating for citizenship' then the distinction between 'ethics' and 'politics' is blurred as such programmes aim at the development of student's political subjectivity

This paper considers the utility of Ethnomethodology (EM) for the study of healthcare ethics as part of the empirical turn in Bioethics. I give a brief introduction to EM through its respecification of sociology, the specific view on the social world this generates and EM's posture of ‘indifference’. I then take a number of EM concepts and articulate each in the context of an EM study of healthcare ethics in professional practice. Having given an overview of the relationship and perspective EM might bring to the professional practice of healthcare ethics I consider whether and how such an approach could be deployed. Whilst an ethnographic study might be problematic I suggest a number of alternative methods through which such EM research could be accomplished. I conclude with the suggestion that, as a particular approach to sociological research, EM offers good deal of potential for the empirical study of healthcare ethics in practice which could result in an improved reflexive understanding of professional ethical practices in bioethics