Arnaud Dewalque

It is sometimes pointed out that one typically comes to distinguish between attitude types (supposing, wishing, hoping, and the like) by directing one’s attention at intentional objects. Call this the Transparency of Attitudes (TA). Assuming this is correct, how is TA possible? This paper aims to create a presumption in favor of an experiential account of attitude-type discrimination. To begin, the following argument by elimination is offered, and briefly discussed: (1) there are only three ways of explaining TA, namely in terms of (i) inference, (ii) rationality, or (iii) awareness; (2) (i) does not work; (3) (ii) does not work; therefore, (4) the only way of explaining TA is in terms of awareness. Drawing on insights from Brentano, I then proceed to sketch an experiential account of attitude awareness. The account has two main elements. First, attitudes are experienced ‘on the side’ (side awareness). Next, they are experienced more or less confusedly (confusedness). Each element is briefly presented and motivated.

This paper contrasts two views of consciousness I call the narrow view and the inclusive view. Although this distinction bears on many contemporary issues, my main goal is historical. I want to argue that the inclusive view of consciousness (IC) was overarching in late 19th and early 20th century and was replaced at some point by the narrow conception, which later became the default view in philosophy of mind. The paper has four sections. Section 1 introduces the distinction between the narrow and the inclusive view of consciousness. Section 2 traces the origins of IC back to a significant debate internal to Scottish philosophy. Section 3 offers textual evidence that IC was shared by early phenomenologists and early analytic philosophers alike. And Section 4 briefly addresses the sources of the narrow conception of consciousness in C.I. Lewis and the Vienna Circle.

Let 'outer awareness' (OA) be the awareness of something extramental, 'inner awareness' (IA) the awareness of one’s own occurent mental states, and 'self-awareness' (SA) the awareness of oneself as a subject of experience. Besides, let us call 'Ubiquity Thesis' the claim that IA and SA are ubiquitous, indeed are always concomitant with OA even in the case of an absent-minded experience. The goal of this paper is to vindicate the Ubiquity Thesis: the key idea is that, before any act of reflection or introspection, IA and SA are implicit in OA, in a sense to be explained. What emerges is a picture of SA (and IA) which departs from some current theories and, especially, from self-representational accounts of SA and IA.

This paper defends a Brentanian account of the subject’s awareness of her own experiences—or inner awareness for short. The proposed account expands on Brentano’s claim that inner awareness, like outer awareness, comes in two forms, implicit and explicit. This distinction, it is argued, makes the account far more objection-resistant than usually believed. Especially, it makes the latter compatible with (i) the existence of unnoticed mental phenomena, (ii) the non-objectifying character of pre-reflective inner awareness, and (iii) the possibility of improving or correcting one’s descriptions of one’s own experiences. Section 1 argues that compatibility with (i)-(iii) is a desideratum that should be met by any satisfying theory of inner awareness. Section 2 introduces the notion of implicit awareness, argues for its existence, and gives many examples thereof. Section 3 addresses the question as to how to make implicit awareness explicit and argues that the explicitness of inner awareness does not result from any inward-looking process but goes hand-in-hand with the explicitness of outer awareness. Eventually, Section 4 shows that the resulting picture is compatible with (i)-(iii) and offers a promising alternative to so-called inner-sense theories.

Intentionalism about mentality is the view that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. Experientialism about mentality is the view that mental phenomena are experienced by, or given to, the subject in a way physical phenomena are not. Put differently, the idea advocated by experientialists is this: there is a distinctive way mental phenomena manifest themselves in subjective experience—there is a distinctive ‘phenomenology’ of mentality. It is usually held that Brentano is intentionalist across the board rather than experientialist. In this paper I argue for two claims: (i) the idea of several, mutually reinforcing ‘marks of the mental’ is central to Brentano’s conception of mentality, and (ii) inner perception, which is one of Brentano’s marks, is best understood as a distinctive way mental phenomena appear to the subject or are given to her, viz. in experientialist rather than intentionalist terms. The upshot is that Brentano’s conception of mentality is much more subtle than usually believed.

I argue that Brentano’s analysis of knowledge is *phenomenological* in a sense yet to be clarified. The primary goal of my paper just is to provide such a clarification. The key idea reads as follows: Brentano’s criticism rests upon a substantial claim about what it is like, for the subject, to know that p (or to know o). I therefore suggest that Brentano’s anti-Kantianism is best reconstructed in terms of what would be called today ‘the phenomenology of knowing that p.’ I believe that this way of putting the argument has several advantages. First, it helps us understand what makes Brentano’s criticism a distinctive variety of anti-Kantianism, which contrasts with the versions of Bolzano and other Austrian philosophers. Next, it also shows that Brentano’s conception of knowledge involves an original contribution to current debates in analytic philosophy of mind about the existence and character of cognitive phenomenology.

Call 'synchronic unity' the kind of unity that is displayed by simultaneously existing mental phenomena—as when a subject sees, hears, judges, and desires at the same time. How are we to account for synchronic unity? I explore the view that several mental phenomena occurring at a time are unified in virtue of being parts of one overall mental phenomenon. One reason why this view seems to me to be attractive is that it is desirably neutral as regards the existence of a substantial Self. Being experienced as parts of one overall phenomenon is a necessary and sufficient condition for the unity of consciousness. Nothing more is required.

My goal, in this paper, is to answer the following question: should we understand inner consciousness in terms of intentionality? I argue the answer is *no.* My reason for rejecting an intentionalist (or representationalist) account of inner consciousness goes like this: if we understand inner consciousness in terms of intentionality, then the theory of inner consciousness is open to three influential objections, namely: the Transparency objection, the Extrinsicness objection, and the No Inner Appearance Objection. If, on the contrary, we understand inner consciousness as a sui generis, non-intentional kind of apprehension, then the theory of inner perception is immune to these objections.

Do you perceive what is going on into your own mind? Is pre-reflective self-consciousness a kind of perception—inner perception¬—analogous to sense perception? According to a respectable tradition, which goes back to Descartes, Locke and Brentano, the answer is yes: self-consciousness is analogous to sense perception. Other people, however, think the answer is no. In this paper, I argue that the analogy claim do capture some relevant features of self-consciousness. Relying on insights from Brentano, I offer a case for inner perception, push the analogy further, and draw some lessons as to what extent inner perception is a reliable source of knowledge.

In this paper I critically discuss Franz Brentano’s tripartite classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments and love-and-hate phenomena. While I contend that Brentano is right in adopting intentional modes or attitudes as phenomenological division principle, I argue that a further criterion is needed when it comes to demonstrating that two mental states exhibit a fundamentally different intentional mode or attitude, hence belong to two distinct ‘fundamental classes.’ I then review some candidate criteria before concluding that Brentano’s overall classification is inconsistent with them and presumably is motivated in part by historical, non-phenomenological rationales.

This chapter offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano’s view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano’s theory of inner perception. Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is, in phenomenological terms. Section 1 addresses Brentano’s claim that IP is one mark of the mental alongside intentionality. Sections 2 and 3 present support for a phenomenological interpretation of IP. And Section 4 briefly discusses two objections.

How do the phenomenal character and the intentional content of a mental state relate to one another? I discuss here the view recently supported under the label "inseparatism". My claim is that the two main suggestions made by supporters of inseparatism, namely the supervenience of the intentional upon the phenomenal and the intentional-phenomenal identity, are not compatible with a Brentanian approach. I then suggest that, for Brentano, the relationship between the phenomenal and the intentional should rather be construed as a mereological relation.

In this talk I discuss a significant objection that has been raised against the view of historical sciences held by Heinrich Rickert: the accusation of “fruitless formalism”. This accusation has been expressed by a large number of thinkers, including for instance Wilhelm Wundt, Edmund Husserl, Max Frischeisen-Köhler and Eduard Spranger. As one knows, Rickert answered the objection in the last editions of his major book, "The Limits of the Concept Formation in Natural Sciences". His strategy was, first, to distance himself from a certain interpretation I will call the “formal view”, and, second, to argue for the fruitfulness of his own, more sophisticated view. However, as suggested by other representatives of the Bade School (like Richard Kroner), it is doubtful that the Rickert view perfectly succeeded in resorbing the shortcomings of the formal view. - In the first, introductive section I will put the formalism-problem in connection with a definite sub-set of issues within the broader framework of the philosophy of history (1). In the second and third sections I will address two questions related, respectively, to the nature of historical form (2) and to the nature of historical material (3). I will then contrast the formal view with the Rickert view on the one hand and with Kroner’s contentual view on the other hand. In the last, conclusive section I will try to draw some general implications of the formalism-controversy (4).

My intention is to put the problem of objectivity under examination from a very specific viewpoint, namely by focusing on the theory of judgement, which has been defended in the so-called South-Western School of neo-Kantianism. As one knows, the main representatives of this School are Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask and Bruno Bauch. Those authors are known, first and foremost, for having supported the view that valuation and assumption of values play a basic role in almost all the domains of our life, including our scientific life. This view forms the basis of their theory of knowledge or epistemology, which is prior to any methodological distinction between natural and cultural sciences (so it would be misleading to say that they confine that view to their foundation of cultural sciences and humanities). What, then, does such an ‘axiological’ theory of knowledge exactly mean? What does it imply for the construction of a theory of objectivity? And how is it related to Kant’s foundational program?

What exactly do you do when you introspect? Do you shift your attention from the world to your ongoing conscious states qua objects of experience, as empiricists say? Or do you exercise your rational capacities to ascribe mental states to yourself, as rationalists say? In this chapter, we explore a middle path between empiricism and rationalism. We propose that introspection involves experiencing or living through your ongoing conscious states in a distinctive manner, namely “introspectively”. We call this view introspective adverbialism. Drawing on insights from C.D. Broad, G.F. Stout and G. Dawes Hicks, we set the stage for introspective adverbialism (Sections 1-2), provide indirect phenomenological support for it (Section 3), and briefly explain what it means for you to experience your conscious states introspectively (Section 4).