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35Review of Michael Smith, Ethics and the a Priori (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (4). 2005.
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225Moral particularism: An introductionJournal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1): 8-15. 2007.Moral particularism is a contentious position at present and seems likely to be so for the foreseeable future. In this Introduction, I outline and detail its essential claim, which I take to be, roughly, that what can be a reason that helps to make one action right need not be a reason that always helps to make actions right. This claim challenges a central assumption on which most, if not all, normative ethical theories are supposedly based. We owe this way of characterizing moral particularism…Read more
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157Arguing About Metaethics (edited book)Routledge. 2006._Arguing about Metaethics_ collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics: Do moral properties exist? If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it? If they don’t exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language? What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation? As well as these questions, this volume di…Read more
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135The normative web: An argument for moral realism • by Terence Cuneo (review)Analysis 69 (1): 189-190. 2009.In this excellent, clearly written, and clear sighted book, Terence Cuneo defends moral realism from a variety of different attacks. Cuneo is particularly interested in the charge that the moral facts that realists posit are suspect because they are unnatural and queer. He addresses a number of arguments against realism, not least Mackie's Argument from Queerness. What makes the book distinctive is its strategy. Cuneo is keen to show that moral facts and epistemic facts are very similar, if not …Read more
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194Quasi-realism, sensibility theory, and ethical relativismInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (4). 2000.This paper is a reply to Simon Blackburn's 'Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?' Inquiry 42, pp. 213-28. Blackburn attempts to show how his version of non-cognitivism - quasi-realist projectivism - can evade the threat of ethical relativism, the thought that all ways of living are as ethically good as each other and every ethical judgment is as ethically true as any other. He further attempts to show that his position is superior in this respect to, amongst o…Read more
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16Reading Parfit: On What Matters (edited book)Routledge. 2017.Derek Parfit was one of the world’s leading philosophers. His _On What Matters_ was the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy for many years. _Reading Parfit: On What Matters _is an essential overview and assessment of volumes 1 and 2 of Parfit’s monumental work by a team of international contributors, and includes responses by Parfit himself. It discusses central features of Parfit’s book, including the structure and nature of reasons; the ideas underlying moral principles; Parfit’s discussio…Read more
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83Particularism and default valencyJournal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1): 16-32. 2007.In this paper, I concentrate on the notion of default valency, drawing on some of the distinctions made and thoughts given in my Introduction. I motivate why the notion is important for particularists to have up their sleeves by outlining a recent debate between particularists and generalists. I then move to the main aim of the piece which is to discuss how anyone, particularist and generalist alike, might seek to distinguish reason-generating features into different types. My main aim is not to…Read more
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66A Tension in the Moral Error TheoryIn Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory, . 2010.I highlight a tension within the moral error theoretic stance. Although I do not show that it is fatal, I believe the tension is problematic. In stating the tension I outline a conception of the common moral background against which it arises. I also discuss aspects of the similar error theories developed by John Mackie and Richard Joyce in order to show the tension at work
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48What is Intuitionism and Why be an Intuitionist?Social Theory and Practice 31 (4): 581-606. 2005.This paper examines the advantages and disadvantages of ethical intuitionism and is an extended critical discussion of an edited collection Rethinking Intutionism (ed.) Stratton-Lake (OUP) that has been much discussed. (My piece is one of the first discussions of it.) Along other matters, I argue for the original and fairly controversial claim that in order for intuitionism to hold water, we must allow that what is involved in full moral understanding can differ from person to person, rather tha…Read more
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29Reviews contextuality in practical reason . By A.W. Price. Oxford: Clarendon press, 2008 pp. 208, £37.50 (hbk)Philosophy 84 (2): 295-299. 2009.
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135II—Simon Kirchin: Evaluation, Normativity and GroundingAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1): 179-198. 2013.I consider the ‘normative relevance’ argument and the idea of grounding. I diagnose why there appears to be a tension between the conclusion that we are tempted to reach and the intuition that the normative is grounded in or by the non‐normative. Much of what I say turns on the idea of the normative itself. In short, I think that concentrating on this idea can help us see how the tension arises. My aim is to encourage people to reconceptualize the debate so as to begin to offer additional insigh…Read more
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141A World without ValuesSpringer. 2009.Taking as its point of departure the work of moral philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981), A World Without Values is a collection of essays on moral skepticism by leading contemporary philosophers, some of whom are sympathetic to Mackie s ...
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