Arkadiusz Chrudzimski

In his last work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology Edmund Husserl stresses the significance of a certain constitutional layer. In Husserl’s language it is called Lebenswelt, which can be translated as the lifeworld. Every theory, no matter whether scientific or philosophical, is bound to start at this level. It is pregiven to each of us as an indispensable foundation for our entire theoretical and practical life. This conception is often compared to the Heideggerian idea of being in the world, and the affinities are strengthened by the fact that the language used by the late Husserl in order to describe the acting of transcendental consciousness within the lifeworld sometimes resembles Heidegger’s formulations. However in this paper I show that these analogies are rather superficial. When we take a closer look on the Husserlian and Heideggerian being in the world, we realize that we have here quite different theoretical structures integrated into different patterns of philosophical explanation.

In this article we undertake a diagnosis of the state of ontology as it is currently practiced in Poland. We point to the strengths of Polish ontology and the aspects that should be improved in order for Polish ontology to flourish further.We cover different styles of thinking in Polish ontology, as well as different methodologies. We address threads influencing Polish ontology, both substantive, as well as those of an organizational, cultural and institutional nature. Apart from the ontologists, this paper also includes the opinions of scholars from the hard sciences, which allows us to shed light on Polish ontology from outside the philosophical community. The article presents concrete steps that could improve and strengthen Polish ontology in the future.We also present here thirty examples of important contributions to ontology by Polish ontologists.

It is often claimed that Brentano’s rediscovery of intentionality has been strongly influenced by Aristotle. Brentano himself stressed repeatedly his affinity to Aristotle and this self-interpretation was by no means restricted to the theory of intentionality. In fact, Brentano seemed to believe that almost all of what he had discovered during his most influential years (1874–1895) has its more or less remote roots in the philosophy of Aristotle. Yet if we carefully compare the picture of intentionality that is to be found in Aristotle’s De Anima with Brentano’s theory of immanent objects, we find more differences than similarities. The truth is that Brentano developed a quite different ontology of intentionality, and his references to Aristotle should be seen as a conventional homage to his master rather than as something of substance that could help us to understand better Brentano’s own theory. What Brentano in fact took from Aristotle was rather his way of doing philosophy and certain isolated ideas, but certainly not theories in their entirety.

It is often claimed that the beginnings of Brentano’s ontology were Aristotelian in nature; but this claim is only partially true. Certainly the young Brentano adopted many elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and he was deeply influenced by the Aristotelian way of doing philosophy. But he always interpreted Aristotle’s ideas in his own fashion. He accepted them selectively, and he used them in the service of ends that would not have been welcomed by Aristotle himself. The present paper is an exposition of the development of Brentano’s ontology, beginning with the Lectures on Metaphysics first delivered by Brentano in Würzburg in 1867 and concluding with his late work from 1904–1917.