Patrick Bourgeois

Not only does peirce's theory of meaning as dispositional or as habit contain parallels with merleau-ponty's view of meaning in the structure of human behavior, but also both peirce and merleau-ponty alike attack reductivistic theories of perception. within this context, the present paper focuses on the use of kantian schemata in the philosophies of peirce and merleau-ponty, but to the extent that such incorporations are consistent with trends in pragmatism and phenomenology in general, it will reveal points of encounter not just between peirce and merleau-ponty but between pragmatism and phenomenology in general.

Central to Kierkegaard’s account of religious existence is his critique of speculative reason. This critique begins with the distinction between subjective and objective reflection. Its most radical aspects appear in Kierkegaard’s discussions of the paradox. In spite of Kierkegaard’s frequent comments on this notion, it is not readily understood. I want to argue against a common reading of this notion and propose an alternative reading. This alternative reading allows for a conceptually quite plausible account of the manner in which the paradox presents reason with a boundary, in virtue of its relation to objective reflection and to subjective reflection as well. Because of this boundary, reason points beyond its own achievements to a domain of contemplation and appropriation. This is a domain that reason itself identifies in connection with the paradox. It both surpasses rational achievements and integrates them into itself.

Mead and Merleau-Ponty each portray the perceptual field as a field of spatially and temporally located, ontologically "thick" or resisting objects which are essentially related to the horizon of world, which allow for the very structure of the sensing which gives access to them, and whose manner of emergence undercuts the problematics of the subject-object split. This essay surveys this perceptual field as a focus for eliciting their more fundamental shared understanding of the dimensions of human activity which underlie its emergence

Tattam's study of the work of Gabriel Marcel attempts to come to grips with Marcel's thought without a prejudice of identifying him as a Christian existentialist or as a contemporary French existentialist. It is an attempt to come to grips with Marcel's work in relation to the nature of philosophy, especially as he conceives it. This book shows that the creative work of Marcel can shed light on our culture and its future because of the renewed relevance and importance of his works to the postmodern situation. For, with his view of existence as mystery approached in a second reflection, Marcel has turned toward its fullness that eludes, and is irreducible to, first reflection, and as such manifests elements shared with the viable elements of postmodernism. Yet, the need for a renewal of his call to a sense of being becomes more acute in light of the serious danger of suppression of this very sense in postmodernity. It is clear that the loss of this sense of being today in postmodern reductionism is in a way more threatening than in Marcel's own time