• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Jake Quilty-Dunn

Rutgers - New Brunswick
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    33
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    1
  •  Events
    9
  •  News and Updates
    34

 More details
  • Rutgers - New Brunswick
    Department of Philosophy
    Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science
    Assistant Professor
CUNY Graduate Center
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2017
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Psychology
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Aesthetics
  • All publications (33)
  •  137
    Was Reid a Direct Realist?
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2). 2013.
    There are issues in Reid scholarship as well as the primary texts that seem to suggest that Reid is not a direct realist about visual perception. In this paper, I examine two key issues ? colour perception and visible figure ? and attempt to defend the direct realism of Reid's theory through an interpretation of ?directness? as well as what Reid calls ?acquired perception?, which is ?mediate? in that it requires prior perception of signs, but nonetheless constitutes direct perception
    Direct and Indirect PerceptionThomas Reid
  •  758
    Iconicity and the Format of Perception
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4): 255-263. 2016.
    According to one important proposal, the difference between perception and cognition consists in the representational formats used in the two systems (Carey, 2009; Burge, 2010; Block, 2014). In particular, it is claimed that perceptual representations are iconic, or image-like, while cognitive representations are discursive, or language-like. Taking object perception as a test case, this paper argues on empirical grounds that it requires discursive label-like representations. These representatio…Read more
    According to one important proposal, the difference between perception and cognition consists in the representational formats used in the two systems (Carey, 2009; Burge, 2010; Block, 2014). In particular, it is claimed that perceptual representations are iconic, or image-like, while cognitive representations are discursive, or language-like. Taking object perception as a test case, this paper argues on empirical grounds that it requires discursive label-like representations. These representations segment the perceptual field, continuously pick out objects despite changes in their features, and abstractly represent high-level features, none of which appears possible for purely iconic representations.
    Mental ImageryRepresentation in Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Perception, GeneralPerception and Tho…Read more
    Mental ImageryRepresentation in Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Perception, GeneralPerception and ThoughtDepictionVarieties of RepresentationMental Files
  •  3360
    Believing without Reason, or: Why Liberals Shouldn’t Watch Fox News
    with Eric Mandelbaum
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22 42-52. 2015.
    The Nature of BeliefRationality and Cognitive ScienceBelief, MiscBelief Revision, MiscIrrationality
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback