Baruch Brody

(1943 - 2018)

Public statements by various international groups emphasize that decisions to undergo genetic screening, either for disease-carrier status or for predisposition-to-disease status, and decisions about the use of the resulting information should be made voluntarily by the party to be screened. For example, the World Medical Association, in its Declaration on the Human Genome Project, says, “One should respect the will of persons screened and their right to decide about participation and about the use of the information obtained.” Giving this principle a name, “voluntarism,” the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, in its Declaration of Inuyama, announced that “voluntarism should be the guiding principle in the provision of genetic services.

One of the founding principles of research ethics is that subjects should be treated equally. In the words of the Belmont Report, “equals ought to be treated equally.” This principle does not imply that all subjects should be treated exactly the same. Rather, subjects who are similar in relevant respects should receive similar treatment. Clinical status is clearly relevant to determining how subjects should be treated. Greater resources should be devoted to subjects who have worse diseases. In contrast, fame is irrelevant. Subjects should not receive greater resources simply because they are famous. A more challenging question, one that pervades clinical research yet has received almost no attention in the literature, is whether subjects' level of scientific importance is relevant to determining how much support they should receive.

: The European patent system allows for the introduction of moral issues into decisions about the granting of patents. This feature has greatly impacted European debates about the patenting of biotechnology. This essay explores the European experience, in both the European Union and the European Patent Organization. It argues that there has been great confusion surrounding these issues primarily because the Europeans have not developed a general theory about when exclusion from patentability is the best social mechanism for dealing with morally offensive technologies.

Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of philosophical discussion about such concrete moral issues as just war, distribution of food aid, euthanasia, reverse discrimination, etc. Much of this discussion implicitly assumes that there are true and false positions on these issues, valid or invalid arguments for these positions, etc. Recent years have not witnessed, however, a proliferation of philosophical defenses of these assumptions. With the decline of metaethical discussions, these assumptions have remained just assumptions rather than the conclusions of a philosophical argument.