Baruch Brody

(1943 - 2018)

In a recent article (Brody 2010), I analyzed the debates surrounding charges of biopiracy, that is, charges that developed countries use biotechnology patents to expropriate the biological/genetic heritage of less developed countries. Such charges often are accompanied by the additional charge that biotechnology patents are used to expropriate the traditional knowledge about the use of these resources possessed by indigenous communities in less developed countries. It is this second charge that is the focus of this essay, which will develop both narrative and normative claims. The narrative claim is that various context specific principles about justice relating to traditional knowledge were adopted during the..

Empirical research can aid ethical reflection in bioethics by identifying issues, by seeing how they are currently resolved, and by assessing the consequences of these current resolutions. This potential can be misused when the ethical issues in question are fundamentally non-consequentialist or when they are consequentialist but the empirical research fails to address the important consequences. An example of the former problem is some recent studies about bad consequences resulting from commercialized living kidney donor programs. These consequences could be avoided, but the crucial non-consequentialist ethical issues about exploitation and commercialization would still remain. Examples of the latter problem are provided by recent studies of the allocation of ICU beds and of physician deception, where important consequences were not adequately studied.

This essay challenges the view that the provision of health care must take place within a competitive-free system. The author argues that, presuming that there is a requirement to meet the demands of those who cannot pay for health care, a competitive market provides a good way to deal with injustices within the health care system. The author concludes that the demands for justice are best met when indigent individuals use some portion of the funds they receive from the government to purchase one of the many competing forms of health care. This scheme requires a competitive market in the delivery of health care.

Public statements by various international groups emphasize that decisions to undergo genetic screening, either for disease-carrier status or for predisposition-to-disease status, and decisions about the use of the resulting information should be made voluntarily by the party to be screened. For example, the World Medical Association, in its Declaration on the Human Genome Project, says, “One should respect the will of persons screened and their right to decide about participation and about the use of the information obtained.” Giving this principle a name, “voluntarism,” the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, in its Declaration of Inuyama, announced that “voluntarism should be the guiding principle in the provision of genetic services.

: The European patent system allows for the introduction of moral issues into decisions about the granting of patents. This feature has greatly impacted European debates about the patenting of biotechnology. This essay explores the European experience, in both the European Union and the European Patent Organization. It argues that there has been great confusion surrounding these issues primarily because the Europeans have not developed a general theory about when exclusion from patentability is the best social mechanism for dealing with morally offensive technologies.

One of the founding principles of research ethics is that subjects should be treated equally. In the words of the Belmont Report, “equals ought to be treated equally.” This principle does not imply that all subjects should be treated exactly the same. Rather, subjects who are similar in relevant respects should receive similar treatment. Clinical status is clearly relevant to determining how subjects should be treated. Greater resources should be devoted to subjects who have worse diseases. In contrast, fame is irrelevant. Subjects should not receive greater resources simply because they are famous. A more challenging question, one that pervades clinical research yet has received almost no attention in the literature, is whether subjects' level of scientific importance is relevant to determining how much support they should receive.