Laurent Cesalli

The later Anton Marty describes intentionality as a mental assimilation (ideelle Verähnlichung). This paper aims to clarify that notion, in particular with respect to its possible sources and antecedents. Section 1 presents mental similarity (MS) as a relational property of which there are two kinds: correlation and relative determination; section 2 explores the relationship between MS, which is a sui generis similarity, and standard similarity; section 3 considers the possible sources of Marty’s theory, first with respect to terminology, and second with respect to the philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Aquinas, Gabriel Biel, Suárez, Hermann Schwarz, Hugo Bergmann); section 4 argues for a possible analysis of MS in terms of structure-isomorphism and considers possible antecedents in Descartes, Leibniz, and Twardowski; section 5 is an attempt to defend Marty’s position against Goodman’s ‘symmetry objection’.

Il De universalibus di Riccardo Brinkley è la seconda delle sette parti che costituiscono la Summa logicae. L'A., prima di fornire l'edizione del testo, conduce un'analisi dottrinale e comparativa. Perciò ne illustra struttura e contenuto, esplicitando il concetto di universale metafisico, la critica della concezione puramente semantica dell'universale, la natura dell'intentio universale, l'universale logico, la sua divisione. Brinkley esprime la sua contrarietà rispetto al concetto dell'universale logico come intentio in anima. La sezione successiva riguarda invece i cinque predicabili di Porfirio, il genere, la specie, la differenza, il proprio e l'accidente. L'ultima parte del saggio è incentrata su alcune osservazioni comparative tra Brinkley e alcuni suoi contemporanei, come Guglielmo d'Ockham, Walter Burley, Giovanni Wyclif. L'A. conclude proponendo di considerare il De universalibus di Brinkley un testimone precoce dell'opposizione tardo medievale tra antiqui e moderni. In Brinkley l'universale metafisico ha il primato rispetto all'universale logico. Il Tractatus de universalibus è edito sulla base dei mss.: P = Praha, Narodní Knihovna, 396 8, ff. 53rb-58va e L = Leipzig, UB, 1360, ff. 29vb-36va. Si fa riferimento, con la sigla GW all'edizione del primo capitolo del De universalibus.

The philosophical problem of the correspondence between what we think, what we say and 'what there is' is a perennial one. At the beginning of the Sophistical Refutations (1, 165a7-9), for example, Aristotle gives a synthetic formulation of it: since 'it is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed: we use their names as symbols instead of them; and we suppose that what follows in the names, follows in the things as well' (Aristotle 1984, I, 278). But whereas this diffi culty pertains to language (or thought) in general, it becomes remarkably acute when the linguistic expressions at stake are not simple names, but bearers of truth and falsity, namely, statements or, to use the medieval word for it, propositions. Th is chapter addresses the following question: did medieval authors consider that just as names signify things, propositions, too, are semantically related to special objects-- and if so, what kind of things did they think those special objects are? I shall begin with two short introductory remarks about the notion of state of aff airs (SOA) as well as the identifi cation criteria for the theories describing them before the technical category of SOA was coined (Sections 1 and 2); I shall then give a survey of the fi ve main types of medieval answers given to the question of the nature of SOAs (Section 3); fi nally, I shall briefl y compare the medieval conceptions with (some) later, that is late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, as well as contemporary theories of SOAs (Section 4).

The puzzle sketched in this short introduction pinpoints the difficulty experienced by historians of medieval logic to define the very discipline that they are studying. Thus, in spite of all the work done during the last 60 years, the question: “What is medieval logic after all?” remains actual. A general perspective of investigation is suggested, namely the farreaching consequences of the attempt to cope with what one could call the formal and material constraints of medieval logic (i.e., aiming at the elaboration of a scientific language as distinct from dealing with natural language).

Which are the philosophical consequences for one’s theory of objects and relations if one posits that every intentional act is correlated with an intentional object? In what follows, I tackle that question in examining the case of Franciscus de Mayronis (d. c. 1326). After suggesting a typology of theories of intentionality distinguishing monadic, relational, and correlational theories, I go on to expose Franciscus’ ontology and his conception of relations. It turns out that Franciscus’ theory of intentionality exemplifies a pattern (also found in the Brentano of 1874) according to which certain epistemic-psychological constraints (to know or to believe x always amounts to stand in a certain relation to an object distinct from the mental act) have serious consequences on the ontology.

Walter Burley (1275-c.1344) and John Wyclif (1328-1384) follow two clearly stated doctrinal options: on the one hand, they are realists and, on the other, they defend a correspondence theory of truth that involves specific correlates for true propositions, in short: truth-makers. Both characteristics are interdependent: such a conception of truth requires a certain kind of ontology. This study shows that a) in their explanation of what it means for a proposition to be true, Burley and Wyclif both develop what we could call a theory of intentionality in order to explain the relation that must obtain between the human mind and the truth-makers, and b) that their explanations reach back to Augustine, more precisely to his theory of ocular vision as exposed in the De trinitate IX as well as to his conception of ideas found in the Quaestio de ideis.

This study comments on six notabilia found in the general observations with which Brinkley begins his treatise on supposition in his Summa logicae: i) the logico-metaphysical explanation of the distinction between significatio and suppositio, ii) the ontic division principle of supposition, iii) the relationship between supposita and truth-makers, iv) what seems to be a late resurgence of natural supposition, v) a pragmatic suspension of the regula appellationum and vi) Brinkley’s apparently incompatible claims that there are communicable things and that there are only singular things, a position that is a medieval form of immanent realism. Based on the two manuscripts that contain the treatise on supposition, an appendix offers a provisional edition of part of Brinkley’s Summa, a collaboration between the author and Joël Lonfat.

Le présent article propose une étude « génétique » de la théorie de la proposition de Walter Burley. La notion de propositio in re y est considérée d’un point de vue interne, en relation avec la théorie augustinienne de la visio et en comparaison avec le Sachverhalt de la philosophie moderne. Il en résulte que l’expression ‘propositio in re’ ne renvoie à aucune entité clairement définissable. Elle est plutôt le symptôme de l’intention fondamentale de Burley : doter toute proposition vraie d’un corrélat objectif.

Regarding marriage, John Wyclif defends the following position: strictly speaking, no words or any kind of sensory signs would be needed, since the consensus of the spouses together with God's approbation would suffice for the accomplishment of marriage. But if words do have to be pronounced, then the appropriate formula should not be in the present, but in the future. In the following, I shall discuss Wyclif's arguments by comparing them with some other medieval positions, as well as with some elements of contemporary theories of speech acts. It will appear that in his analysis of the only sacrament which is a “social act“ in the literal sense of the expression, Wyclif (i) clearly acknowledges the central role of individual intentions behind (linguistic) conventions, and (ii) carefully distinguishes between the different, chronologically disparate acts involved in marriage and their respective (semantic, psychological and factual) felicity conditions.

To the question “What is medieval logic after all?”, this postscript suggests the following answer: medieval logic is Sprachphilosophie, that is, philosophy of language as it developed in the early twentieth century in the Austro-German tradition. This claim is based on the fact that: (1) medieval logic textbooks often deal with topics which would not qualify as belonging to logic (e.g., questions pertaining to grammar, semantics, philosophy of mind and metaphysics); and (2) this location at the crossroads of those philosophical domains is precisely a characteristic feature of Sprachphilosophie. In addition, one of the first attempts to grasp the specificity of medieval linguistic theogy (Grabmann’s Sprachlogik, 1920) explicitly derives from the Sprachphilosophie of the Austro-German tradition.

This paper shows how Wyclif is able at the same time to claim that whatever is is a proposition and to develop a nontrivial theory of propositional truth and falsity. The study has two parts: 1) Starting from Wyclif's fivefold propositional typology – including a propositio realis and asic esse sicut propositio significat – we will analyse the three different kinds of real predication, the distinction between primary and secondary signification of propositions and the status of logical truth as opposed to metaphysical truth. Furthermore, the notion of ens logicum will be compared to Walter Burley's propositio in re of which it appears to be a close analogon. 2) The second part deals with two semantic and metaphysical implications of the "pan-propositionalism": the extended notion of being called upon to explain the truth of so-called non-standard propositions and the relation between contents of the divine mind as "arch-truth-makers" and eternal as well as contingent truths.

La Summa logicae de Brinkley est l’un des grands manuels de logique réaliste qui fleurissent en Angleterre, à partir de 1320-1330. Dans le De propositione, le Doctor antiquus, avant d’aborder la question du significatum propositionis, s’interroge sur la nature, les lieux et les divisions des propositions. Sa théorie de la proposition mentale comme résultat d’une composition, non de concepts, mais des choses qu’ils signifient, rappelle celle de Gauthier Burley, mais Brinkley n’étend pas la notion de proposition hors de la sphère des signes linguistiques.