Garrath Williams

Kant’s philosophy focuses on the power and limits of reason. Two questions are central. In his theoretical philosophy, Kant asks whether reasoning can give us metaphysical knowledge. In particular, can reason ground insights that go “beyond” (meta) the physical world, as “rationalist” philosophers such as Leibniz and Descartes claimed? In his practical philosophy, Kant asks whether reason can guide action and justify moral principles. “Empiricist” philosophers claimed that only feelings can motivate us to act; reason cannot. In Hume’s famous words: “Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals”. Against rationalist metaphysics, Kant claims that reasoning faces strict limits. Reason cannot give us knowledge of God or a world beyond the senses; reasoning falls into contradiction and confusion if it does not respect these boundaries. Against the empiricist account of motivation and morality, Kant argues that reason has a vital power. Reason enables us to act on principles that we can share with other rational beings. In a world of limits, reason reveals human freedom. This entry has the following structure. The first section sets out the role that reason plays in Kant’s account of knowledge and metaphysics. This focuses on the Critique of Pure Reason or “first Critique” (1781, second edition 1787). The second section examines his moral philosophy. This focuses on his Critique of Practical Reason or “second Critique” (1788). Reflecting Kant’s own works and most of the secondary literature, these two sections are relatively independent. The third section therefore considers the relations between theoretical and practical reason. Since Kant rarely discusses reason as a whole, his general view is a matter of interpretation: Onora O’Neill has given the most prominent account. The concluding remarks stress the philosophical interest of her unified interpretation.

This chapter examines the philosophical grounds for linking responsibility with capacities to reason and to judge in the light of moral considerations. It discusses five different accounts that connect responsibility and rationality, the work of: Susan Wolf, R Jay Wallace, the jointly authored work of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Angela M Smith, and Pamela Hieronymi. Through these authors’ contributions, the chapter argues that the notion of rational ability is central to understanding and justifying practices of responsibility. Although there has been clear progress in debates about this connection, however, understanding the notion of rational or moral ability still poses profound challenges. One reason for this is suggested: such abilities may have constitutive connections with practices of holding responsible and of taking responsibility – connections that have yet to be fully explored in the literature.

This chapter focuses on one way to conceptualize philosophy – as the search for rational principles that, because they are valid for all persons, should replace attempts to resolve questions of human co-existence by chance or violence. It is through its contributions to political ideas that philosophy has been most important to European Studies and, arguably, to European culture and history. This chapter examines Plato and Kant’s concern with how reason might decide political questions. However, Kant is more radical in exploring the thought that war and domination arise only where reason fails. For him, the very concept of philosophy necessarily leads to the idea of a peace which upholds all people’s rights.

The fat activist Marilyn Wann has said, ‘The only thing that anyone can diagnose, with any certainty, by looking at a fat person, is their own level of stereotype and prejudice toward fat people.’ In this chapter I argue that even if – as popular prejudice suggests – it were possible to draw other inferences from the amount of body fat a person carries, this would do nothing to justify discrimination. In the first section, I briefly indicate the evidence for widespread discrimination against obese people in modern developed societies, and note some debates about appropriate language. In the second section, I highlight some distinctive features of obesity as a ground of discrimination. Most importantly, weight bias is still widely acceptable, and its justifications find institutional support insofar as medicine stresses that obesity is bad and, perhaps, remediable. This brings us to some facts about health and obesity, which are too often simplified in public discussions. I then turn to the wrong of obesity-based discrimination. I argue that the standard rationalisations are untenable, and not only because their factual premises are so dubious. Philosophically, they rest on illiberal confusions about the appropriate place for personal judgments. In our private lives, we may well respond to others on the basis of their body shape or our personal estimates of their virtues or abilities. (Just as they may respond to us in their turn!) When we engage in different forms of civil association, however, anti-discrimination provisions remind us what is, and what is not, ‘our business.’ They thereby help to uphold norms of equality, freedom and respect.

Kant conceptualises right in terms of an authorisation to use coercion. This has foundational significance for his whole practical philosophy. Yet he scarcely argues for this conceptualisation. "Quid juris?" – what title do we have to such a concept? This paper contrasts Kant’s quite distinct treatment of “lying from philanthropy” – or better, lying for the sake of right. If I cannot lie to uphold right, then how may I coerce? As Kant notes, lying is not usually a juridical wrong; we may choose whether to believe someone. By contrast, coercion represents a direct denial of freedom. Tamar Schapiro has interpreted Kant’s theory of action to provide a persuasive account of defensive lying. I suggest that defensive coercion be analysed on the same model, sharply distinguishing it from aggressive attempts. I also suggest that defensive acts invoke public right, just as private coercion opposes it, and highlight how this coheres with the principle that no person be a mere means for another.

This paper examines the creation of independent agencies within the EU, such as the European Environment Agency and the European Central Bank. Majone and others have argued the case for European regulatory agencies. Such agencies can provide for continuity, expertise, accountability and effective authority – in short, an institutionalisation of responsibility. Against this optimism, I argue that a dilemma of institutional design naturally arises from the agencies’ situation in the EU. On the one side, we risk creating powerful agencies that institutionalise monomania– that is, agencies that single-mindedly and all-too-effectively pursue narrow agendas, inadequately checked by other bodies. On the other, we are also likely to encounter relatively impotent agencies which institutionalise schizophrenia– that is, agencies that must scout around for audience and support, and hence are unable to act effectively.

Introduction: As considered in the rest of this volume, the effects of the IDEFICS intervention on obesity rates were not encouraging. This paper considers how far findings from the IDEFICS study and similar intervention studies are relevant to the policy process and political decision-making. Methods: The paper offers theoretical and policy-level arguments concerning the evaluation of evidence and its implications for policymaking. The paper is divided into three parts. The first considers problems in the nature and applicability of evidence gained from school- and community-level obesity interventions. The second part considers whether such interventions present a model that policymakers could implement. The third part considers how we should think about policy measures given the limited evidence we can obtain and the many different goals that public policy must take account of. Results: The paper argues that (1) there are clear reasons why we are not obtaining good evidence for effective school- and community-level interventions; (2) public policy is not in a good position to mandate larger-scale, long-term versions of these interventions; and (3) there are serious problems in obtaining ‘evidence’ for most public policy options, but this should not deter us from pursuing options that tackle systemic problems and have a good likelihood of delivering benefits on several dimensions. Conclusions: Research on school- and community-level obesity interventions has not produced much evidence that is directly relevant to policymaking. Instead, it shows how difficult it is to affect obesity rates without changing wider social and economic factors. Public policy should focus on these.

Many attempts have been made to formalize ethical requirements for research. Among the most prominent mechanisms are informed consent requirements and data protection regimes. These mechanisms, however, sometimes appear as obstacles to research. In this opinion paper, we critically discuss conventional approaches to research ethics that emphasize consent and data protection. Several recent debates have highlighted other important ethical issues and underlined the need for greater openness in order to uphold the integrity of health-related research. Some of these measures, such as the sharing of individual-level data, pose problems for standard understandings of consent and privacy. Here, we argue that these interpretations tend to be overdemanding: They do not really protect research subjects and they hinder the research process. Accordingly, we suggest another way of framing these requirements. Individual consent must be situated alongside the wider distribution of knowledge created when the actions, commitments, and procedures of researchers and their institutions are opened to scrutiny. And instead of simply emphasizing privacy or data protection, we should understand confidentiality as a principle that facilitates the sharing of information while upholding important safeguards. Consent and confidentiality belong to a broader set of safeguards and procedures to uphold the integrity of the research process.

erson-centered healthcare requires providers to appreciate the knowledge and perspectives of patients. Effective and appropriate care depends on such knowledge. Medical institutions can only function well when they acknowledge patients’ own experiences. Yet a range of evidence shows that professionals and organisations often ignore patients’ own knowledge about their condition and treatment. This article aims to explain why this epistemic injustice occurs and persists. (Epistemic: to do with knowledge. Justice, because professionals and organisations do wrong when they bypass or deny patients’ own knowledge.) The explanation focuses on problems of power and accountability. Illness is a disempowering experience, partly for bodily and psychological reasons, partly because the ill person depends on others for help, partly because professionals and organisations are specially empowered in order that they may help. Occupying a lesser power position, patients often walk a tightrope between conflicting demands and may be caught in double binds: situations where every possibility for action risks bad outcomes. By contrast, professionals need not notice their greater power position and how this opens up paths of least resistance, whereby it is easy to ignore or belittle patients’ knowledge. When it is hard for patients to voice their “complaints” (the details of their illness, their sense of being badly treated), accountability falters. Healthcare providers may see themselves as expert and responsible, even as they fail many persons they are meant to help.

Corporations are legal bodies with duties and powers distinct from those of individual people. Kant discusses them in many places. He endorses universities and churches; he criticises feudal orders and some charitable foundations; he condemns early business corporations’ overseas activities. This Element argues that Kant’s practical philosophy offers a systematic basis for understanding these bodies. Corporations bridge the central distinctions of his practical philosophy: ethics versus right, public versus private right. Corporations can extend freedom, structure moral activity, and aid progress towards more rightful conditions. Kant’s thought also highlights a fundamental threat. In every corporation, some people exercise the corporation’s legal powers, without the same liabilities as private individuals. This threatens Kant’s principle of innate equality: no citizen should have greater legal rights than any other. This Element explores the justifications and safeguards needed to deal with this threat.

Barnhill and Bonotti [Healthy eating policy and political philosophy: A public reason approach, 2022] ask how liberals might justify public policies to promote healthier diets. Milburn [Food, justice, and animals: Feeding the world respectfully, 2023] asks how a decent food system would involve other animals, and considers why liberal states should foster such a system. I welcome these attempts to imagine ways to feed people better and treat other animals with humanity, and to relate these to liberal ideals. My comments offer some reservations, however. Barnhill, Bonotti and Milburn suggest compelling grounds for states to intervene. I would prefer to say: there are compelling grounds for states to intervene differently. These books set aside the structure of existing food systems. But to explain why the world’s more liberal states have ignored similar arguments over many decades, we need to take some view of these systems. In fact, these systems rest on interventions by liberal-democratic states. These interventions show little regard for liberal reasoning. Their results are bad for human health, and disastrous for animal and planetary well-being. These points support the authors’ calls for more rational, liberal and humane food policies, with one caveat. Democratic debate can only make headway if we appreciate how many policies carry us in the wrong directions. When we consider how ideals support state intervention, we should be realistic about how states currently intervene.

This article responds to Jordan Pascoe’s Kant’s Theory of Labour, with its twin focus on labour and intersecting forms of injustice. I open with some admiring remarks as to why her focus proves so fruitful and insightful. In the following sections, I offer a friendly amendment to Pascoe’s account, focussing on paid work in democratic states. Like Pascoe, I believe that employment relations stand in basic tension with Kantian innate equality. However, I also believe that her account underplays this tension. To make this case, I offer two reservations about the typology of paid work which Pascoe draws from Kant’s work. First, this typology does not accommodate professional work, although Kant considers this in several places. Second, it ignores the distinctive legal form of employment, which is hierarchical. This brings employment closer to Kant’s account of domestic right than to his account of contract. Assuming that employment hierarchies are essential to organising people’s social contributions, I suggest this hierarchy requires formal counterbalancing measures. From an intersectional perspective, such measures are especially important, as labour organisers everywhere have shown.

Childhood obesity has become a central concern in many countries and a range of policies have been implemented or proposed to address it. This co-authored book is the first to focus on the ethical and policy questions raised by childhood obesity and its prevention. Throughout the book, the authors emphasize that childhood obesity is a multi-faceted phenomenon, and just one of many issues that parents, schools and societies face. They argue that it is important to acknowledge the resulting complexities and not to think in terms "single-issue" policies. After first reviewing some of the factual uncertainties about childhood obesity, the authors explore central ethical questions. What priority should be given to preventing obesity? To what extent are parents responsible? How should we think about questions of stigma and inequality? In the second part of the book, the authors consider key policy issues, including the concept of the 'obesogenic environment,' debates about taxation and marketing, and the role that schools can play in obesity prevention. The authors argue that political debate is needed to decide the importance given to childhood obesity and how to divide responsibilities for action. These debates have no simple answers. Nonetheless, the authors argue that there are reasons for hope. There are a wide range of opportunities for action. Many of these options also promise wider social benefits.

My discussion will focus on Simester’s overall analysis of the “general part” of criminal law theory, setting aside the book’s rich and careful analyses of many specific topics. Quite rightly, in my view, Simester wishes to emphasize criminal law’s prohibitions, and their moral as well as legal importance. My criticism is that Simester runs together moral and legal categories in a way that distorts both. Simester grounds lawful punishment in a specific notion of moral culpability. In my view, this moralized interpretation of the general part places the wrong sort of focus on defendants and edges victims from view. We make better sense of criminal responsibility if we focus on the state’s duty to uphold rights and to insist that no one get their way by force or fraud. This implies a more indirect concern with the moral failings that lead people to violate others’ rights. It also reminds us of an inherent danger of criminal law, one that has unfortunate echoes in the theoretical framing of the “general part”: how often it fails to do justice to victims.

In this chapter we argue that poverty should be seen as a violation of dignity, drawing on two of Kant’s formulations of the Categorical Imperative – the formula of humanity and the formula of the kingdom of ends. In our view, poverty should not be seen primarily in terms of exploitation, nor of failures to help people in need. A Kantian perspective should give proper weight to the actual and potential agency of those who suffer poverty. This is a question about power, not just the distribution of material resources. Theoretically, we will place particular emphasis on the rarely remarked reference to “ends and means” in the formula of the kingdom of ends. People are sometimes treated merely as means, which is one sort of disrespect for their equal moral status. Another form of disrespect, deeper and more general in form, is the denial of decent opportunities to act as means for others. The resulting powerlessness, we suggest, should be central to an adequate understanding of poverty and its violations of dignity.

This article offers a Kantian account of dignity violations in the context of contemporary migration to western states. It considers three major issues: “modern slavery,” statutory detention, and lack of rights to engage in economic activity. While most Kantian accounts emphasize the dignity violations of treating people as “mere means,” we point out that this does not capture the central issue: the “hostile environment” that so many migrants face. The first part of the article briefly sets out a Kantian account of dignity violations. The second part highlights two key differences between modern slavery and its historical forebears. It emphasizes the interpersonal rather than institutional character of modern slavery, and distinguishes trafficking from smuggling. The third part argues that migrants who lack formal rights to remain and work face institutional exclusions that violate human dignity. Policies that aim to discourage and restrict immigration demean people’s status as ends in themselves. Moreover, they do so by actively denying opportunities to act as means for others. As such, the article draws a link between Kant’s well-known cosmopolitan right not to be treated with hostility and his less well-known ethical duty, “to be a useful member of the world.” Dignity can be found in acting as a means for others; hostility and exclusion can violate dignity just as much as instrumentalization.

This paper explores some ways in which Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory can be brought to bear on professional and health care ethics. Health care professionals are not mere individuals acting upon their own ends. Rather, their principles of action must be defined in terms of participation in a cooperative endeavor. This generates complex questions as to how well their roles mesh with one another and whether they comprise a well-formed collective agent. We argue that Kant’s ethics therefore, and perhaps surprisingly, requires us to consider the institutions, procedures, and politics that decide who should play what part in a complex collective enterprise. Likewise, professional responsibility involves – alongside a readiness to play one’s individual part – a concern for these collective aspects of healthcare

Negligence reminds us that we often do and cause things unawares, occasionally with grave results. Given the lack of foresight and intention, some authors argue that people should not be judged culpable for negligence. This paper offers a contrasting view. It argues that gaining control is itself a fundamental responsibility, with both collective and individual elements. The paper underlines both sides, focussing on how they relate as we ascribe responsibility or culpability. Following the introduction, Section 2 argues that conscious awareness is neither necessary nor sufficient for control. Control is not a property of deliberate choice, so much as a practical achievement. Section 3 stresses the collective aspects of non-negligence: creating knowledge about risks, structuring environments to guard against them, and developing standards of care. Failings in the collective task, rather than lack of individual control, mean it can often be unfair to pin culpability on a single individual. Section 4 suggests that a basic duty of a responsible person is to acknowledge the ways in which we may do more or less than we mean to, often in ways that create risks. It then sketches an approach to culpability as part of a collective exercise: as we take responsibility for standards of care, and for our own and others’ agency.

This article considers the charge that citizens of developed societies are complicit in large-scale harms, using climate destabilisation as its central example. It contends that we have yet to create a lived morality – a fabric of practices and institutions – that is adequate to our situation. As a result, we participate in systematic injustice, despite all good efforts and intentions. To make this case, the article draws on recent discussions of Kant’s ethics and politics. Section 1 considers Tamar Schapiro’s account of how otherwise decent actions can be corrupted by others’ betrayals, and hence fall into complicity. Section 2 turns to discussions by Christine Korsgaard and Lucy Allais, which highlight how people can be left without innocent choices if shared frameworks of interaction do not instantiate core ideals. Section 3 brings these ideas together in order to make sense of the charge of complicity in grave collective harms, and addresses some worries that the idea of unavoidable complicity may raise.

Both advocates of corporate regulation and its opponents tend to depict regulation as restrictive—a policy option that limits freedom in the name of welfare or other social goods. Against this framing, I suggest we can understand regulation in enabling terms. If well designed and properly enforced, regulation enables companies to operate in ways that are acceptable to society as a whole. This paper argues for this enabling character by considering some wider questions about responsibility and the sharing of responsibility. Agents who are less able or willing to act well are obviously more likely to face criticism, mistrust, and adverse responses. It will be more difficult to hold those agents responsible, especially so when there are many who fail in their responsibilities or where there are wide-reaching disagreements about those responsibilities. Regulatory standards, like other norms and ways of defining responsibilities, address these problems: by restricting, they also enable social cooperation. Like other forms of holding responsible, ways of enforcing those standards against recalcitrant agents, or encouraging conformity to them, may also seem restrictive. Again, however, these practices play an important role in enabling responsible agency. This is partly because they can bolster readiness to act well in agents who experience or witness such responses. It is also because they free other agents to exercise initiative and commitment in defining their individual responsibilities in line with higher standards.

Biobanks correspond to different situations: research and technological development, medical diagnosis or therapeutic activities. Their status is not clearly defined. We aimed to investigate human biobanking in Europe, particularly in relation to organisational, economic and ethical issues in various national contexts. Data from a survey in six EU countries were collected as part of a European Research Project examining human and non-human biobanking. A total of 147 institutions concerned with biobanking of human samples and data were investigated by questionnaires and interviews. Most institutions surveyed belong to the public or private non-profit-making sectors, which have a key role in biobanking. This activity is increasing in all countries because few samples are discarded and genetic research is proliferating. Collections vary in size, many being small and only a few very large. Their purpose is often research, or research and healthcare, mostly in the context of disease studies. A specific budget is very rarely allocated to biobanking and costs are not often evaluated. Samples are usually provided free of charge and gifts and exchanges are the common rule. Good practice guidelines are generally followed and quality controls are performed but quality procedures are not always clearly explained. Associated data are usually computerised. Biobankers generally favour centralisation of data rather than of samples. Legal and ethical harmonisation within Europe is considered likely to facilitate international collaboration. We propose a series of recommendations and suggestions arising from the EUROGENBANK project.

Definition of the problem:The frequency and scope of human genetic banking has increased significantly in recent years and is set to expand still further. Two of the major growth areas in medical research, pharmacogenomics and population genetics, rely on large DNA banks to provide extensive, centralised and standardised genetic information as well as clinical and personal data. This development raises ethical concerns. Arguments and conclusion: Our article focuses on the appropriateness of informed consent as a means to safeguard both research subjects’ rights and their good will. It will be argued that information requirements are extensive, with regard to non-therapeutic research, feedback, type of consent and possible breaches of confidentiality as well as possible implications for third parties. Given the demand of these requirements and the danger that research facilitated by these huge DNA banks may not reflect public priorities, it is argued that the research needs be steered by trustees to ensure that the altruistic act of sample donation contributes to the public good

This encyclopedia entry contrasts three influential philosophical accounts of our everyday practices of praise and blame, in terms of how they might be justified. On the one hand, a broadly Kantian approach sees responsibility for actions as relying on forms of self-control that point back to the idea of free will. On this account praise and blame are justified because a person freely chooses her actions. Praise and blame respond to the person as the chooser of her deed; they recognise her dignity as a rational agent, as Kantians tend to put it. This approach sharply contrasts with two further ways of thinking about the issues. One is utilitarian, where praise and blame are justified in terms of their social benefits. Another, more complex approach is roughly Aristotelian. This approach situates practices of praise and blame in terms of our on-going relationships with one another. This approach stresses the importance of mutual accountability, moral education, and assessments of character in terms of the many vices and virtues.

This paper looks at the attribution of moral responsibility in the light of Kant's claim that the maxims of our actions should be universalizable. Assuming that it is often difficult for us to judge which actions satisfy this test, it suggests one way of translating Kantian morality into practice. Suppose that it is possible to read each action, via its maxim, as a communication addressed to the world: as an attempt to set the terms on which we should interact with one another. The paper suggests that respect for the actor requires us to take this communication seriously. When we suppose that an action is wrong, we then have a powerful reason to dispute its message: to hold the actor responsible for her deed. Although we are often unreliable judges ‘in our own case’, our mutual attributions of responsibility show us judging together, what the moral law should mean in practice.

Arthur Ripstein's book Force and Freedom insists that, ‘Freedom, understood as independence of another person's choice, is [all] that matters’. In this paper I suggest that this premise leads Ripstein to an instrumentalization of democracy that neglects a properly public and collective notion of freedom. The paper first criticizes Ripstein's key argument against any extension of public purposes beyond the upholding of persons’ ‘independence of others’ choice’. More constructively, the paper then suggests that a space of public freedom is opened up when people deliberate in order to form and pursue democratic purposes. Citizens may act together to promote ends that they think are worthwhile, without dominating one another or restricting individual freedom