Juan Rodriguez

In the context of solving large distributed constraint optimization problems, belief-propagation and incomplete inference algorithms are candidates of choice. However, in general, when the problem structure is very cyclic, these solution methods suffer from bad performance, due to non-convergence and many exchanged messages. As to improve performances of the MaxSum inference algorithm when solving cyclic constraint optimization problems, we propose here to take inspiration from the belief-propagation-guided decimation used to solve sparse random graphs. We propose the novel DeciMaxSum method, which is parameterized in terms of policies to decide when to trigger decimation, which variables to decimate and which values to assign to decimated variables. Based on an empirical evaluation on a classical constraint optimization benchmarks, some of these combinations of policies, using periodic decimation, cycle detection-based decimation, parallel and non parallel decimation, random or deterministic variable selection and deterministic or random sampling for value selection, outperform state-of-the-art competitors in many settings.

La figura de Alfred Russel Wallace dentro de la antropología ha sido escasamente reconocida dentro de la historia de la disciplina. Un punto importante es ubicar al autor dentro de las discusiones antropológicas de la época victoriana, desde su interés temprano como naturalista por historizar a los seres humanos, hasta su labor institucional como el primer presidente de un departamento de antropología en Inglaterra. En ese contexto, el objetivo del trabajo es presentar la visión de Wallace respecto a la antropología física, a partir de su obra antropológica, que incluye referencias al origen de las razas humanas en términos naturalistas, al desarrollo de características físicas distintivas de los seres humanos o a la relación evolutiva entre primates. Con esto, se amplía la perspectiva sobre el desarrollo de la antropología física en el siglo XIX, al abrir el abanico a autores que contribuyeron de manera importante a su desarrollo.

This chapter introduces relevant concepts about stability issues in microgrids. First, general aspects related to microgrids, distributed generation, and stability are introduced. Stability classification in conventional power grids and the challenges emerging concerning stability in microgrids are discussed. Then, a brief literature review focusing on studies on stability impacts on MGs is presented. After this, some control strategies to improve the stability characteristics of the MGs are discussed. Then, microgrids hierarchical control and its design characteristics from a stability approach are presented. The chapter concludes with key findings and remarks.

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic (ctl) by extending the language with path quantifiers E δ and A δ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a ctl axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for ctl to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for ctl. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional ctl logic.

The following essay tries to explore from the third of the Kant's Critiques, the ethical-political implications of the aesthetical judgments. Standing on the aesthetical horizon of the transcendental philosophy, I'll try to discover, starting with the cognitively character of the taste judgment, the different ways in which intuitivist and ludic nature participates in the redefinition of the concept of "politics" as in its symbolical reference to the moral goods. Finding communicative vessels between aesthetical judgment and the need of comprehension claimed by the definition of "politics" and of symbolic mediation between the moral goods and beauty, I try to integrate ethics and politics starting from aesthetical judgments. This "third" moment, opens new possibilities for philosophical reflection on politics and values from a methodological, discursive and symbolic wider scope.

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic (ctl) by extending the language with path quantifiers E δ and A δ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a ctl axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for ctl to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for ctl. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional ctl logic

Being located in the horizon of the philosophical outrage, our article purpose is to show the phenomenological basis of Max Scheler’s anthropological proposal, whose immediate antecedents were Husserl’s researches regarding to the correlation man-world, the debate held between phenomenology and the incursion of psychology within the field of the objectives sciences, the develop of a growing up discipline such as physiology, and in general the gradual consolidation of evolutionary theories, which were taking from the philosophical anthropology his conceit of prevailing discipline in the explanation of human phenomena. In the midst this theoretical chaos Scheler in The man’s place in the cosmos radicalize the thesis of I – world correlation of life, guiding the study of man closer to the eidetic transcendental pretention, and beyond the purely empirical description. According to this we understand that Scheler develops an anthropological proposal with a phenomenological nature

Este texto surge de un intercambio epistolar mantenido con David Armstrong a propósito de su libro Universals. An Opinionated lntroduction. Se presenta en forma de diálogo y ha sido dividido en seis temas. El primero trata el problema de si las diferentes teorías ontológicas, al postular diferentes relaciones básicas, se hallan también en diferentes condiciones para afrontar el argumento del regreso infinito planteado por Bradley. El segundo presenta una duda. Los universales que postula Armstrong, tales como masa, carga electromagnética, etc., son "agregativos": admiten la categoría de cantidad. Pero se supone que los universales no admiten dicha categoría. Pareciera, pues, que los "universales" postulados por Armstrong no constituyen auténticos universales. El tercer tema concierne a la relación entre la teoría del haz y el Principio de identidad de los indiscernibles. El cuarto trata la opinión de Armstrong según la cual la teoría del haz se vería obligada a postular el carácter autosubsistente de los universales. El quinto consiste en la discusión acerca de si la teoría del haz debe admitir la existencia de hechos. Finalmente, el sexto concierne a la naturaleza de los tropos. This text originates in an exchange of letters I held with David Armstrong when his book Universals. An Opinionated Introduction was published. It is offered as a dialogue and has been divided into six topics. The first one deals with the problem of whether different ontological theories, which posit different basic relations, are also differently prepared to deal with Bradley's infinito regress argument. The second one raises a doubt. Those universals posited by Armstrong, such as mass, electric charge, etc., are "aggregative", which means they are subject to the category of quantity. But universals are not supposed to differ quantitatively. Thus, those "universals" favored by Armstrong become suspect of not being real universals. The third one addresses the relation between the Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles. The fourth one deals with Armstrong's opinion according to which the bundle theorist is forced to conceive of universals as self subsistant entities. The fifth one discusses whether the Bundle Theory has to accept the existence of facts. Finally, the sixth one deals with tropes

En What Emotions Really Are y en otros artículos, Griffiths afirma que las clases naturales de los organismos vivos en Biología son cladistas. La afirmación está inmersa en una nueva teoría acerca de las clases naturales. En este trabajo examinaré los argumentos esgrimidos por Griffiths para sostener el estatus privilegiado de las clasificaciones cladistas frente a otras clasificaciones. No se discutirá la teoría de las clases naturales ofrecida, de cuyos méritos no dudo, sino su capacidad para ofrecer una solución en la cuestión particular de qué sistema de clasificación de organismos debería utilizarse en Biología. In What emotions really are and in other papers Griffiths states that in Biology, natural classes ofliving organisms are clades. This assertion is made within the bounds of a new theory of natural classes. In this paper I wiIl consider the arguments employed by Griffiths to support the privileged status of the cladistic classification over other classifications. It is not Griffith's theory of natural classes what will be discussed, but his ability to offer a solution to the particular issue ofwhich classification system of organisms should be used in Biology

En What Emotions Really Are y en otros artículos, Griffiths afirma que las clases naturales de los organismos vivos en Biología son cladistas. La afirmación está inmersa en una nueva teoría acerca de las clases naturales. En este trabajo examinaré los argumentos esgrimidos por Griffiths para sostener el estatus privilegiado de las clasificaciones cladistas frente a otras clasificaciones. No se discutirá la teoría de las clases naturales ofrecida, de cuyos méritos no dudo, sino su capacidad para ofrecer una solución en la cuestión particular de qué sistema de clasificación de organismos debería utilizarse en Biología. In What emotions really are and in other papers Griffiths states that in Biology, natural classes ofliving organisms are clades. This assertion is made within the bounds of a new theory of natural classes. In this paper I wiIl consider the arguments employed by Griffiths to support the privileged status of the cladistic classification over other classifications. It is not Griffith's theory of natural classes what will be discussed, but his ability to offer a solution to the particular issue ofwhich classification system of organisms should be used in Biology

En What Emotions Really Are y en otros artículos, Griffiths afirma que las clases naturales de los organismos vivos en Biología son cladistas. La afirmación está inmersa en una nueva teoría acerca de las clases naturales. En este trabajo examinaré los argumentos esgrimidos por Griffiths para sostener el estatus privilegiado de las clasificaciones cladistas frente a otras clasificaciones. No se discutirá la teoría de las clases naturales ofrecida, de cuyos méritos no dudo, sino su capacidad para ofrecer una solución en la cuestión particular de qué sistema de clasificación de organismos debería utilizarse en Biología. In What emotions really are and in other papers Griffiths states that in Biology, natural classes ofliving organisms are clades. This assertion is made within the bounds of a new theory of natural classes. In this paper I wiIl consider the arguments employed by Griffiths to support the privileged status of the cladistic classification over other classifications. It is not Griffith's theory of natural classes what will be discussed, but his ability to offer a solution to the particular issue ofwhich classification system of organisms should be used in Biology

Este trabajo contiene tres diferentes tipos de objeciones al famoso "argumento del lenguaje privado" de Wittgenstein. Primero ofrezco una reconstrucción posible del argumento. Luego, como primera objeción, e inspirándome en H. N. Castañeda, presento casos donde, contra la opinión de Wittgenstein, el sujeto corrige sus propios errores basándose en distintos criterios subjetivos A continuación, como una segunda objeción, presento situaciones hipotéticas destinadas a mostrar que las experiencias subjetivas, aún si fuesen privadas, podrían en principio ser intersubjetivamente testeadas, si bien en forma indirecta, tal como lo son las entidades inobservables de la ciencia. Finalmente, como tercera objeción, pongo en duda un supuesto básico del cartesianismo sobre el cual descansa el argumento del lenguaje privado. Este supuesto es la conocida tesis de la privacidad de la experiencia subjetiva. Mi argumento contra esta tesis se basa en los casos de bisección cerebral estudiados por T. Nagel, M. Lockwood y otros. This paper contains three different kinds of objections to Wittgenstein's famous "private language argument". First I offer a possible reconstruction of the argument. Then, as a first objection, drawing my ideas from H.N Castañeda, I present cases where, against Wittgenstein's opinion, the subject corrects his own errors based on different subjective criteria. Afterwards, as a second objection, I offer hypothetical examples in order to show that subjective experiences, even is they were private, could in principle be intersubjectively tested, although in a indirect way, as the unobservable entities of science are. Finally, as a third point, I challenge a basic presupposition of Cartesianism on which the private language argument rests. This presupposition is the well known thesis of the essential privacy of subjective experience. My argument against this thesis is based on the split-brain cases, studied by T. Nagel, M. Lockwood and others

A partir del horizonte!losó!co de la tercera crítica kantiana, se propone hacer un acercamiento a la ‘teoría semiótica’ del símbolo que enlazaría dos ámbitos estructurales: el semiótico y el cultural o estético. Acompañado de las observaciones del!lósofo y escritor italiano Humberto Eco, pretendemos igualmente actualizar las posturas kantianas sobre el símbolo dentro de los nuevos derroteros de la teoría semiótica general. Ubicados en el contexto teórico de la ‘semiótica general’, proponemos asumir una de!nición de lo humano a partir de la categoría!losó!ca del símbolo, tal y como la propone Ernst Cassirer en su Antropología!losó!ca, explorando, al mismo tiempo, las posibilidades metodológicas para una ‘antropología del símbolo’, propicia en el mundo actual en el que predomina, paradójicamente la seducción de la retórica de la imagen con la constitución ontológica de los mundos virtuales. Finalmente, mostraremos las incidencias de la propuesta de una ‘antropología simbólica’ en lo que se ha dado llamar bajo el título de antropología educativa. One to depart from the philosophical horizon of the third Kantian critique, proposes him to make one an approximation ‘ theory semiótica ‘ of the symbol that would connect two structural areas: the semiotic and cultural or aesthetic. Accompanied of the observations of the philosopher and Italian writer Humberto Eco, we try to update equally the Kantian positions on the symbol inside the new courses of the general semiotic theory. Located in the theoretical context of ‘ general semiotics ‘, we propose to assume a de!nition of the human thing from the philosophical category of the symbol, as Ernst Cassirer proposes it in his philosophical Anthropology, exploring, at the same time, the methodological possibilities for a ‘ anthropology of the symbol ‘, propitiates in the current world in the one that prevails, paradoxically the seduction of the rhetoric of the image with the ontological constitution of the virtual worlds. Finally, we will show the incidents of the o"er of a ‘ symbolic anthropology ‘ in what it has been given to call under the title of educational anthropology.

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic (CTL) by extending the language with path quantifiers $E^\delta $ and $E^\delta $ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a CTL axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for CTL to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for CTL. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional CTL logic.

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic ( ctl ) by extending the language with path quantifiers E δ and A δ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a ctl axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for ctl to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for ctl. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional ctl logic.