-
32The sensorimotor theory of cognitionPragmatics and Cognition 1 (2): 267-305. 1993.The sensorimotor theory of cognition holds that human cognition, along with that of other animals, is determined by sensorimotor structures rather than by uniquely human linguistic structures. The theory has been offered to explain the use of bodily terminology in nonphysical contexts, and to recognize the role of experienced embodiment in cognition. This paper defends a version of the theory which specifies that reasoning makes use of mental models constructed by means of action-planning mechan…Read more
-
11Privileged Access and Merleau-PontyIn Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), The visible and the invisible in the interplay between philosophy, literature, and reality, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 71--78. 2002.
-
33Humphreys solutionJournal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4): 62-66. 2000.[opening paragraph]: It is easy to conceptualize a problem in a way that prevents a solution. If the conceptualization is entrenched in one's culture or profession, it may appear unalterable. But there is so much precedent for the discovery of fruitful reconceptualizations that in the case of most philosophical and scientific puzzles it is probably irrational ever to give up trying. The notion of qualia, understood as phenomenal properties of sensations that can exist as objects of experience fo…Read more
-
30Consciousness, qualia, and re-entrant signalingBehavior and Philosophy 19 (1): 21-41. 1991.There is a distinction between phenomenal properties and the "phenomenality" of those properties: e.g. between what red is like and what it is like to experience red. To date, reductive accounts explain the former, but not the latter: Nagel is right that they leave something out. This paper attempts a reductive account of what it is like to have a perceptual experience. Four features of such experience are distinguished: the externality, unity, and self-awareness belonging to the content of cons…Read more
-
11Acting and Perceiving in Body and MindPhilosophy Research Archives 11 407-429. 1985.In this paper I sketch an account of (a) the origin of the terms and concepts of folk psychology, and (b) the true nature of mental states. I argue that folk psychology is built on metaphors for the functioning physical body, and that mental states are neurological traces which serve as schematic ‘mental images’ of those same functions. Special attention is paid to the folk psychology of self-consciousness. In particular, I argue that the notion of introspection is mistaken, and I criticize rece…Read more
-
66The art of representation: Support for an enactive approachBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3): 411-411. 2004.Grush makes an important contribution to a promising way of viewing mental representation: as a component activity in sensorimotor processes. Grush shows that there need be no entities in our heads that would count as representations, but that, nevertheless, the process of representation can be defined so as to include both natural and artificial (e.g., linguistic or pictorial) representing.
-
94Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective PerceptionJohn Benjamins. 2005.The papers in this volume of Consciousness & Emotion Book Series are organized around the theme of "enaction.
-
60Machine understanding and the chinese roomPhilosophical Psychology 2 (2): 207-15. 1989.John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the inten…Read more
-
74Emergence and the uniqueness of consciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10): 47-59. 2001.This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness arises from the forced blending of components that are incompatible, or even logically contradictory, when combined by direct methods available to the subject; and that it is, as a result, analytically, ostensively and comparatively indefinable. First, I examine a variety of cases in which unpredictable novelties arise from the forced merging of contradictory elements, or at least elements that are unable in human experience to co-occur. The point …Read more
-
1Conscious emotion in a dynamic system: How I can know how I feelIn Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect, and Self-organization : an Anthology, John Benjamins. 2000.
-
2The unity of consciousness: An enactivist approachJournal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4): 225-280. 2005.The enactivist account of consciousness posits that motivated activation of sensorimotor action imagery anticipates possible action affordances of environmental situations, resulting in representation of the environment with a conscious “feel” associated with the valences motivating the anticipations. This approach makes the mind–body problem and the problem of mental causation easier to resolve, and offers promise for understanding how consciousness results from natural processes. Given a proce…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |