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13922 Ethics makes strange bedfellows: intuitions and quasi-realismIn Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. pp. 416. 2013.You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified beliefs. Details as…Read more
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480Might All Normativity be Queer?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1): 41-58. 2010.Here I discuss the conceptual structure and core semantic commitments of reason-involving thought and discourse needed to underwrite the claim that ethical normativity is not uniquely queer. This deflates a primary source of ethical scepticism and it vindicates so-called partner in crime arguments. When it comes to queerness objections, all reason-implicating normative claims—including those concerning Humean reasons to pursue one's ends, and epistemic reasons to form true beliefs—stand or fall …Read more
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149A new theory of Humean reasons? A critical note on Schroeder's hypotheticalismJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3): 1-5. 2007.No abstract.
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191The Iffiest Oughts: A Guise of Reasons Account of End‐Given ConditionalsEthics 119 (4): 672-698. 2009.It often seems that what one ought to do depends on what contingent ends one has adopted and the means to pursuing them. Imagine, for example, that you are applying for jobs, and a particularly attractive one comes your way. It offers excellent colleagues in a desirable location, the pay is good, and acquiring a job like this is one of your ends. If practicing your job talk is a means to getting the job, the following seems true: (1) If you want1 to get the job, then you ought to practice your j…Read more
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441Intuitional Epistemology in EthicsPhilosophy Compass 5 (12): 1069-1083. 2010.Here I examine the major theories of ethical intuitions, focusing on the epistemic status of this class of intuitions. We cover self-evidence theory, seeming-state theory, and some of the recent contributions from experimental philosophy.
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Epistemic Normativity |
Moral Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
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