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500Against Normative NaturalismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1). 2012.This paper considers normative naturalism, understood as the view that (i) normative sentences are descriptive of the way things are, and (ii) their truth/falsity does not require ontology beyond the ontology of the natural world. Assuming (i) for the sake of argument, I here show that (ii) is false not only as applied to ethics, but more generally as applied to practical and epistemic normativity across the board. The argument is a descendant of Moore's Open Question Argument and Hume's Is-Ough…Read more
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285Rationalist restrictions and external reasonsPhilosophical Studies 151 (1). 2010.Historically, the most persuasive argument against external reasons proceeds through a rationalist restriction: For all agents A, and all actions Φ, there is a reason for A to Φ only if Φing is rationally accessible from A's actual motivational states. Here I distinguish conceptions of rationality, show which one the internalist must rely on to argue against external reasons, and argue that a rationalist restriction that features that conception of rationality is extremely implausible. Other con…Read more
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13822 Ethics makes strange bedfellows: intuitions and quasi-realismIn Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. pp. 416. 2013.You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified beliefs. Details as…Read more
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470Might All Normativity be Queer?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1): 41-58. 2010.Here I discuss the conceptual structure and core semantic commitments of reason-involving thought and discourse needed to underwrite the claim that ethical normativity is not uniquely queer. This deflates a primary source of ethical scepticism and it vindicates so-called partner in crime arguments. When it comes to queerness objections, all reason-implicating normative claims—including those concerning Humean reasons to pursue one's ends, and epistemic reasons to form true beliefs—stand or fall …Read more
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149A new theory of Humean reasons? A critical note on Schroeder's hypotheticalismJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3): 1-5. 2007.No abstract.
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Epistemic Normativity |
Moral Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
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