Ciro De Florio

Some scholars have considered the fact that we make assertions about the future as an argument in favor of certain semantics of future tense sentences. In particular, the debate has focused on the assertion of future contingents. Besson and Hattiangadi (Philos Stud 167:251–271, 2014) and Besson and Hattiangadi (in: Goldberg, The Oxford handbook of assertion, Oxford University Press, New York, 2020) argue that the fact that we assert future contingents is a point in favor of all semantics of the future tense sentences according to which future contingents are true or false, while it is a reason to reject all semantics of the future for which future contingents either lack truth values or are all false. In this paper, we propose a theory about the correctness of assertions about the future flexibly enough to be compatible with any semantics of future tense sentences. If this theory is on the right track, our judgments about the correctness of assertions of future tense sentences do not favor or disfavor one semantic theory over another, and therefore, pace Besson and Hattiangadi, do not constitute a point in favor of theories that consider at least some future contingents to be true.

Recent logic and linguistic literature suggest that certain forms of denial cannot be reduced to a simple assertion of negation. In particular, the existence of mathematical and empirical conjectures offers a basis for refuting Frege’s thesis of equivalence between denial and assertion of negation. Following this line of thought we develop a formal framework with two primitive illocutionary operators for assertion and denial, where denial is not a simple negation of assertion. We introduce a semantics for the operators mentioned above. Finally, we discuss the relations between asserted and denied contents.

Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola (1995, Erkenntnis, 43, 81–109) by outlining a pragmatic logic for assertions and hypotheses. On the basis of this extension we analyse the standard logical opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses. We formulate a pragmatic square of oppositions for assertions and a hexagon of oppositions for hypotheses. Finally, we give a mixed hexagon of oppositions to point out the opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses.

I In this paper, we investigate the nature of empirical hypotheses used in scientific reasoning and the act of formulating hypotheses. This is achieved through a novel logical framework in which we provide specific semantics for two types of hypotheses: a strong and a weak sense of hypothesis, each characterized by different logical structures. This framework enables us to better characterize certain aspects of hypothetical reasoning in scientific practice, especially when we attempt to rationally deny the content of an empirical hypothesis.

This textbook is an accessible, readable, and comprehensive introduction to contemporary analytic metaphysics. It covers all the main topics, including those that are at the forefront of the most recent research. It begins by explaining what metaphysics is and introduces the most important conceptual devices needed to understand and appreciate the ongoing debates. The text follows with core metaphysical questions, such as properties, time, identity, mereology, and modality. It concludes with more specific domains of application, in which the previously introduced concepts are put to work. The contents are organized in self-contained chapters, each of which starts with a stimulating short story, which is further articulated and closes with a summary of the main points, questions for further reflection, and reading suggestions. This textbook is perfect for teaching a basic but comprehensive course in metaphysics for undergraduate students.

Published in honor of Sergio Galvan, this collection concentrates on the application of logical and mathematical methods for the study of central issues in formal philosophy. The volume is subdivided into four sections, dedicated to logic and philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, metaphysics and philosophy of religion. The contributions adress, from a logical point of view, some of the main topics in these areas. The first two sections include formal treatments of: truth and paradoxes; definitions by abstraction; the status of abstract objects, such as mathematical objects and universal concepts; and the structure of explicit knowledge. The last two sections include papers on classical problems in philosophy of science, such as the status of subjective probability, the notion of verisimilitude, the notion of approximation, and the theory of mind and mental causation, and specific issues in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, such as the ontology of species, actions, and intelligible worlds, and the logic of religious belonging.

This chapter is a presentation of the metaphysics and logic of time. We analyse the metaphysics of time according to three dimensions: the ontology of time (which parts of the temporal reality exist?), the dynamics of time (does time actually flow?) and the topology of time (is there just one possible course of events or does time branch off?). In the second part, we present some semantic frameworks of temporal logic, emphasizing the various interpretations of the future (indeterminist, Peircean, Thin Red Line). All the notions presented in this chapter will be employed in the subsequent analysis.

In this last chapter, we consider the timeless solutions to the dilemma of foreknowledge. In particular, in the first part, we present the Timeless Eternalist view, in which a timeless God eternally sees a world as it is described by a B-theory of time. In the second part, we develop an original account, which we call Perspectival Fragmentalism: this view adopts a particular perspectival framework for the interpretation of the propositions, and it assumes a robust, dynamic, conception of time. The background metaphysics is inspired by Kit Fine’s Fragmentalism.

Todd and Rabern have argued that assuming future contingents are untrue, together with accepting the principle of the retrogradation of truth (p→PF(p)), implies that it is metaphysically impossible that an omniscient entity exists. Since the possibility of an omniscient being is a metaphyisical and theological thesis that should not depend on assumed temporal semantics, Todd and Rabern conclude that, if one wishes to maintain the untruth of future contingents, one must reject the principle of the retrogradation of truth. This paper aims to show that Todd and Rabern’s argument fails. We present a temporal semantics in which future contingents are untrue, the principle of the retrogradation of truth is valid, and the potential existence of an omniscient and temporal being is preserved.

Todd and Rabern (2021) have argued that if we assume that future contingents are untrue and if we accept the Retro-closure principle (???? → PF(????)), then the existence of a temporal omniscient entity becomes metaphysically impossible. Since the truth of a metaphysical and theological theory should not be dependent on questions of temporal semantics, Todd and Rabern conclude that, if one wishes to maintain that future contingents are untrue, one must abandon the Retro-closure principle. The aim of this paper is to propose a temporal semantics system in which future contingents are untrue, the Retro-closure principle is valid, and the possibility of the existence of an omniscient and temporal being is guaranteed.

In this essay, we discuss the relationship between God and the modal profile of the states of affairs. There is a well-known dilemma about this relationship: both the view that the necessity and the possibility of the states of affairs are dependent on God and the view that they are not dependent have unpalatable consequences. If the necessity of the states of affairs depends on God, then those states of affairs do not really seem necessary. By contrast, if the necessity of the states of affairs does not depend on God, then God is not the fundamental entity. However, the fundamentality of God is a cornerstone of classical theism. We present a bi-modal framework that solves the dilemma, by distinguishing between global and local necessities. This framework also proves useful for solving other dilemmas such as the problem whether God can or cannot do evil actions.

Fragmentalism allows incompatible facts to constitute reality in an absolute manner, provided that they fail to obtain together. In recent years, the view has been extensively discussed, with a focus on its formalisation in model-theoretic terms. This paper focuses on three formalisations: Lipman’s approach, the subvaluationist interpretation, and a novel view that has been so far overlooked. The aim of the paper is to explore the application of these formalisations to the alethic modal case. This logical exploration will allow us to study (i) cases of metaphysical incompatibility between modal facts and (ii) cases of modal dialetheias. In turn, this will enrich our understanding of the role of impossibility in the fragmentalist framework.

The idea of omnipotence plays a crucial role within the framework of classical theism. God is typically considered omnipotent, that is, able to perform any action. Sometimes, it is said that for God there is no difference between will and action; everything he wishes happens. However, as one reflects on the concept of omnipotence, some rather complex questions arise; the range of God’s possible “actions” is not clear. What are the boundaries of the power of an omnipotent being, if these boundaries exist at all? In this paper, we will examine an interesting question: is it possible that two omnipotent beings exist? Or, does the property of omnipotence necessarily imply the uniqueness of its instantiation? Intuitively, the existence of more than one omnipotent being seems to be contradictory. However, we will demonstrate that under some conditions the existence of two omnipotent beings is possible.

In this paper, we will defend a particular version of the timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Our strategy is grounded on a particular temporal framework, which models the flow of time and a libertarian understanding of freedom. The propositions describing a certain act by an agent have an indeterminate truth value until the agent makes her choice; therefore, they become true or false when a decision is made. In order to account for this change of truth value, a multiple frame structure is introduced in which every frame presents a privileged time, with its past and the possible alternative futures, which are still open. God atemporally knows all the frames and the truth values of propositions with respect to each one. Since divine knowledge of what an agent decides in a certain temporal frame depends on the agent’s act itself, divine knowledge does not conflict with the agent’s free will.

The timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom has many advantages. Still, the relationship between a timeless God and temporal beings is problematic in a number of ways. In this paper, we focus on the specific problems the timeless view has to deal with when certain assumptions on the metaphysics of time are taken on board. It is shown that on static conception of time God’s omniscience is easily accounted for, but human freedom is threatened, while a dynamic conception has no problems with human freedom, but, on this view, some truths seem not to be knowable by a timeless God. We propose Fragmentalism as a metaphysics of time in which the divine timeless knowledge of temporal events and human freedom can be reconciled.

Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola by outlining a pragmatic logic for assertions and hypotheses. On the basis of this extension we analyse the standard logical opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses. We formulate a pragmatic square of oppositions for assertions and a hexagon of oppositions for hypotheses. Finally, we give a mixed hexagon of oppositions to point out the opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses.

The concept of autonomy is crucial for the theoretical characterization of robots and, more in general, complex technological artifacts. The aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual and logical framework in which it is possible to define two concepts of autonomy: autonomy of performance and autonomy of process. The analysis is carried out exploiting the logical resources of the counterfactual semantics-developed by Lewis' and Stalnaker's seminal works-and branching structures of the possible courses of actions. It allows to differentiate the autonomy of a robotic arm from the autonomy of a highly complex machine-like rovers for the explorations of the planets. The clarification of the concept of autonomy is, moreover, an essential precondition for the investigation concerning the ethics of artificial agents.

Supervaluationism is one of the most discussed approaches to the semantics of future tense sentences in a branching time. In this paper, we consider the criticism advanced by Malpass against Supervaluationism. This criticism relies on the fact that supervaluationists must accept as supertrue disjunctions whose disjuncts are not only supertrue—which supervaluationists are ready to acknowledge—but also not satisfiable. In order to show this, Malpass proposes a formula, F F 1, which shows the existence of a satisfiable disjunction with unsatisfiable disjuncts in supervaluationist models. In reply, we show that formula F F 1 cannot be expressed within a model (whether Ockhamist or supervaluationist) because it quantifies on models. It can be correctly characterised only within a meta-model that has the resources to quantify on various models. However, once that is done, F F 1 is, for the advocates of Supervaluationism, no more demanding than other disjunctions because it just generalises at the meta-theoretical level what supervaluationists already acknowledge at the theoretical level.