Sy-David Friedman

There have been numerous results showing that a measurable cardinal κ can carry exactly α normal measures in a model of GCH, where a is a cardinal at most κ⁺⁺. Starting with just one measurable cardinal, we have [9] (for α = 1), [10] (for α = κ⁺⁺, the maximum possible) and [1] (for α = κ⁺, after collapsing κ⁺⁺) . In addition, under stronger large cardinal hypotheses, one can handle the remaining cases: [12] (starting with a measurable cardinal of Mitchell order α ) , [2] (as in [12], but where κ is the least measurable cardinal and α is less than κ, starting with a measurable of high Mitchell order) and [11] (as in [12], but where κ is the least measurable cardinal, starting with an assumption weaker than a measurable cardinal of Mitchell order 2). In this article we treat all cases by a uniform argument, starting with only one measurable cardinal and applying a cofinality-preserving forcing. The proof uses κ-Sacks forcing and the "tuning fork" technique of [8]. In addition, we explore the possibilities for the number of normal measures on a cardinal at which the GCH fails

The Infinite Time Turing Machine model [8] of Hamkins and Kidder is, in an essential sense, a "Σ₂-machine" in that it uses a Σ₂ Liminf Rule to determine cell values at limit stages of time. We give a generalisation of these machines with an appropriate Σ n rule. Such machines either halt or enter an infinite loop by stage ζ(n) = df μζ(n)[∃Σ(n) > ζ(n) L ζ(n) ≺ Σn L Σ(n) ], again generalising precisely the ITTM case. The collection of such machines taken together computes precisely those reals of the least model of analysis

We present a new partial order for directly forcing morasses to exist that enjoys a significant homogeneity property. We then use this forcing in a reverse Easton iteration to obtain an extension universe with morasses at every regular uncountable cardinal, while preserving all n-superstrong, hyperstrong and 1-extendible cardinals. In the latter case, a preliminary forcing to make the GCH hold is required. Our forcing yields morasses that satisfy an extra property related to the homogeneity of the partial order; we refer to them as mangroves and prove that their existence is equivalent to the existence of morasses. Finally, we exhibit a partial order that forces universal morasses to exist at every regular uncountable cardinal, and use this to show that universal morasses are consistent with n-superstrong, hyperstrong, and 1-extendible cardinals. This all contributes to the second author’s outer model programme, the aim of which is to show that L-like principles can hold in outer models which nevertheless contain large cardinals.

The fact that “natural” theories, i.e. theories which have something like an “idea” to them, are almost always linearly ordered with regard to logical strength has been called one of the great mysteries of the foundation of mathematics. However, one easily establishes the existence of theories with incomparable logical strengths using self-reference . As a result, PA+Con is not the least theory whose strength is greater than that of PA. But still we can ask: is there a sense in which PA+Con is the least “natural” theory whose strength is greater than that of PA? In this paper we exhibit natural theories in strength strictly between PA and PA+Con by introducing a notion of slow consistency

For sentences $\phi$ of $L_{\omega_{1},\omega}$, we investigate the question of absoluteness of $\phi$ having models in uncountable cardinalities. We first observe that having a model in $\aleph_{1}$ is an absolute property, but having a model in $\aleph_{2}$ is not as it may depend on the validity of the continuum hypothesis. We then consider the generalized continuum hypothesis context and provide sentences for any $\alpha\in\omega_{1}\setminus\{0,1,\omega\}$ for which the existence of a model in $\aleph_{\alpha}$ is nonabsolute . Finally, we present a complete sentence for which model existence in $\aleph_{3}$ is nonabsolute

The results herein form part of a larger project to characterize the classification properties of the class of submodels of a homogeneous stable diagram in terms of the solvability (in the sense of [1]) of the potential isomorphism problem for this class of submodels. We restrict ourselves to locally saturated submodels of the monster model m of some power π. We assume that in Gödel's constructible universe , π is a regular cardinal at least the successor of the first cardinal in which is stable. We show that the collection of pairs of submodels in as above which are potentially isomorphic with respect to certain cardinal-preserving extensions of is equiconstructible with 0 # . As 0 # is highly "transcendental" over , this provides a very strong statement to the effect that potential isomorphism for this class of models not only fails to be set-theoretically absolute, but is of high (indeed of the highest possible) complexity. The proof uses a novel method that does away with the need for a linear order on the skeleton

There are two standard ways to establish consistency in set theory. One is to prove consistency using inner models, in the way that Gödel proved the consistency of GCH using the inner model L. The other is to prove consistency using outer models, in the way that Cohen proved the consistency of the negation of CH by enlarging L to a forcing extension L[G].But we can demand more from the outer model method, and we illustrate this by examining Easton's strengthening of Cohen's result:Theorem 1. There is a forcing extensionL[G] of L in which GCH fails at every regular cardinal.Assume that the universe V of all sets is rich in the sense that it contains inner models with large cardinals. Then what is the relationship between Easton's model L[G] and V? In particular, are these models compatible, in the sense that they are inner models of a common third model? If not, then the failure of GCH at every regular cardinal is consistent only in a weak sense, as it can only hold in universes which are incompatible with the universe of all sets. Ideally, we would like L[G] to not only be compatible with V, but to be an inner model of V.We say that a statement is internally consistent iff it holds in some inner model, under the assumption that there are innermodels with large cardinals.