Sy-David Friedman

A classic result of Baumgartner-Harrington-Kleinberg [1] implies that assuming CH a stationary subset of ω1 has a CUB subset in a cardinal-perserving generic extension of V, via a forcing of cardinality ω1. Therefore, assuming that $\omega_2^L$ is countable: { $X \in L \mid X \subseteq \omega_1^L$ and X has a CUB subset in a cardinal -preserving extension of L} is constructible, as it equals the set of constructible subsets of $\omega_1^L$ which in L are stationary. Is there a similar such result for subsets of $\ omega_2^L$ ? Building on work of M. Stanley [9], we show that there is not. We shall also consider a number of related problems, examining the extent to which they are "solvable" in the above sense, as well as defining a notion of reduction between them

We present here an approach to the fine structure of L based solely on elementary model theoretic ideas, and illustrate its use in a proof of Global Square in L. We thereby avoid the Lévy hierarchy of formulas and the subtleties of master codes and projecta, introduced by Jensen [3] in the original form of the theory. Our theory could appropriately be called ”Hyperfine Structure Theory”, as we make use of a hierarchy of structures and hull operations which refines the traditional Lα -or Jα-sequences with their Σn-hull operations.§1. Introduction. In 1938, K. Gödel defined the model L of set theory to show the relative consistency of Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis. L is defined as a unionof initial segments which satisfy: L0 = ∅, Lλ = ∪α

The Hyperuniverse Programme, introduced in Arrigoni and Friedman (2013), fosters the search for new set-theoretic axioms. In this paper, we present the procedure envisaged by the programme to find new axioms and the conceptual framework behind it. The procedure comes in several steps. Intrinsically motivated axioms are those statements which are suggested by the standard concept of set, i.e. the `maximal iterative concept', and the programme identifies higher-order statements motivated by the maximal iterative concept. The satisfaction of these statements (H-axioms) in countable transitive models, the collection of which constitutes the `hyperuniverse' (H), has remarkable 1st-order consequences, some of which we review in section 5.

We give the first systematic study of strong isomorphism reductions, a notion of reduction more appropriate than polynomial time reduction when, for example, comparing the computational complexity of the isomorphim problem for different classes of structures. We show that the partial ordering of its degrees is quite rich. We analyze its relationship to a further type of reduction between classes of structures based on purely comparing for every n the number of nonisomorphic structures of cardinality at most n in both classes. Furthermore, in a more general setting we address the question of the existence of a maximal element in the partial ordering of the degrees

The fact that “natural” theories, i.e. theories which have something like an “idea” to them, are almost always linearly ordered with regard to logical strength has been called one of the great mysteries of the foundation of mathematics. However, one easily establishes the existence of theories with incomparable logical strengths using self-reference . As a result, PA+Con is not the least theory whose strength is greater than that of PA. But still we can ask: is there a sense in which PA+Con is the least “natural” theory whose strength is greater than that of PA? In this paper we exhibit natural theories in strength strictly between PA and PA+Con by introducing a notion of slow consistency

For sentences $\phi$ of $L_{\omega_{1},\omega}$, we investigate the question of absoluteness of $\phi$ having models in uncountable cardinalities. We first observe that having a model in $\aleph_{1}$ is an absolute property, but having a model in $\aleph_{2}$ is not as it may depend on the validity of the continuum hypothesis. We then consider the generalized continuum hypothesis context and provide sentences for any $\alpha\in\omega_{1}\setminus\{0,1,\omega\}$ for which the existence of a model in $\aleph_{\alpha}$ is nonabsolute . Finally, we present a complete sentence for which model existence in $\aleph_{3}$ is nonabsolute

The results herein form part of a larger project to characterize the classification properties of the class of submodels of a homogeneous stable diagram in terms of the solvability (in the sense of [1]) of the potential isomorphism problem for this class of submodels. We restrict ourselves to locally saturated submodels of the monster model m of some power π. We assume that in Gödel's constructible universe , π is a regular cardinal at least the successor of the first cardinal in which is stable. We show that the collection of pairs of submodels in as above which are potentially isomorphic with respect to certain cardinal-preserving extensions of is equiconstructible with 0 # . As 0 # is highly "transcendental" over , this provides a very strong statement to the effect that potential isomorphism for this class of models not only fails to be set-theoretically absolute, but is of high (indeed of the highest possible) complexity. The proof uses a novel method that does away with the need for a linear order on the skeleton

There are two standard ways to establish consistency in set theory. One is to prove consistency using inner models, in the way that Gödel proved the consistency of GCH using the inner model L. The other is to prove consistency using outer models, in the way that Cohen proved the consistency of the negation of CH by enlarging L to a forcing extension L[G].But we can demand more from the outer model method, and we illustrate this by examining Easton's strengthening of Cohen's result:Theorem 1. There is a forcing extensionL[G] of L in which GCH fails at every regular cardinal.Assume that the universe V of all sets is rich in the sense that it contains inner models with large cardinals. Then what is the relationship between Easton's model L[G] and V? In particular, are these models compatible, in the sense that they are inner models of a common third model? If not, then the failure of GCH at every regular cardinal is consistent only in a weak sense, as it can only hold in universes which are incompatible with the universe of all sets. Ideally, we would like L[G] to not only be compatible with V, but to be an inner model of V.We say that a statement is internally consistent iff it holds in some inner model, under the assumption that there are innermodels with large cardinals.

This paper investigates when it is possible for a partial ordering P to force Pκ(λ) \ V to be stationary in VP. It follows from a result of Gitik that whenever P adds a new real, then Pκ(λ) \ V is stationary in VP for each regular uncountable cardinal κ in VP and all cardinals λ &gt κ in VP [4]. However, a covering theorem of Magidor implies that when no new ω-sequences are added, large cardinals become necessary [7]. The following is equiconsistent with a proper class of ω₁-Erdős cardinals: If P is N₁-Cohen forcing, then Pκ(λ) \ V is stationary in VP, for all regular κ ≥ N₂ and all λ &gt κ. The following is equiconsistent with an ω₁-Erdős cardinal: If P is N₁-Cohen forcing, then PN₂ (N₃) \ V is stationary in VP. The following is equiconsistent with κ measurable cardinals: If P is κ-Cohen forcing, then Pκ + (Nκ \ V is stationary in VP

If the bounded proper forcing axiom BPFA holds and ω 1 = ${\mathrm{\omega }}_{1}^{\mathrm{L}}$ , then there is a lightface ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{1}$ well-ordering of the reals. The argument combines a well-ordering due to Caicedo-Veličković with an absoluteness result for models of MA in the spirit of "David's trick." We also present a general coding scheme that allows us to show that BPFA is equiconsistent with R being lightface ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{4}^{1}$ , for many "consistently locally certified" relations R on $\mathrm{\mathbb{R}}$ . This is accomplished through a use of David's trick and a coding through the ∑ 2 stable ordinals of L