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19Review of David Fate Norton (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume (review)Philosophical Review 104 (2): 275-77. 1995.
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290Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume’s metaethicsSynthese 152 (3). 2006.Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that th…Read more
Williamsburg, Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
David Hume |
Emotion and Reason |
Moral Psychology |
Motivation |