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1Neither scientists, nor moralists: We are counterfactually reasoning animalsBehavioral and Brain Sciences. 2010.We are neither scientists nor moralists. Our mental capacities (like attributing intentionality) are neither akin to the scientist’s exact reasoning, nor are they “suffused through and through with moral considerations”. They are more similar to all those simple capacities that humans and animals are equally capable of, but with enhanced sensitivity to counterfactual situations: of what could have been.
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Everyday aesthetic injusticeIn Dominic Lopes, Samantha Matherne, Mohan Matthen & Bence Nanay (eds.), The Geography of Taste, Oxford University Press. 2024.
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Multimodal mental imagery and perceptual justificationIn Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception, Oxford University Press. 2020.There has been a lot of discussion about how the cognitive penetrability of perception may or may not have important implications for understanding perceptual justification. The aim of this paper is to argue that a different set of findings in perceptual psychology poses an even more serious challenge to the very idea of perceptual justification. These findings are about the importance of perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality…Read more
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Perceptual representation/perceptual contentIn Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
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Properties in perceptionIn A. R. J. Fisher & Anna-Sofia Maurin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Properties, Routledge. 2024.
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Filosofia como biologia evolutivaIn Havi Carel & David Gamez (eds.), Filosofia Contemporanea em Açao, Artmed. 2008.
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Precis of Aesthetics as Philosophy of PerceptionEstetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 56 91-94. 2019.Precis of Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception
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