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William J. Rapaport

University at Buffalo
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    67
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    49

 More details
  • University at Buffalo
    Computer Science & Engineering
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Indiana University, Bloomington
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1976
CV
Homepage
Buffalo, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Computation, Misc
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Language
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Computation, Misc
Philosophy of Computing and Information
Cognitive Sciences
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Language
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mathematics
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Metaphysics
Philosophy, Introductions and Anthologies
6 more
  • All publications (67)
  •  197
    Computer processes and virtual persons: Comments on Cole's "artificial intelligence and personal identity"
    This is a draft of the written version of comments on a paper by David Cole, presented orally at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meeting in New Orleans, 27 April 1990. Following the written comments are 2 appendices: One contains a letter to Cole updating these comments. The other is the handout from the oral presentation
    Artificial Minds, MiscPersonal Identity, Misc
  •  233
    An adverbial meinongian theory
    Analysis 39 (March): 75-81. 1979.
    A fundamental assumption of Alexius Meinong's 1904 Theory of Objects is the act-content-object analysis of psychological experiences. I suggest that Meinong's theory need not be based on this analysis, but that an adverbial theory might suffice. I then defend the adverbial alternative against an objection raised by Roderick Chisholm, and conclude by presenting an apparently more serious objection based on a paradox discovered by Romane Clark.
    Adverbialism and Qualia TheoriesAlexius Meinong
  •  125
    To be and not to be
    Noûs 19 (2): 255-271. 1985.
    Terence Parsons's informal theory of intentional objects, their properties, and modes of predication does not adequately reflect ordinary ways of speaking and thinking. Meinongian theories recognizing two modes of predication are defended against Parsons's theory of two kinds of properties. Against Parsons's theory of fictional objects, I argue that no existing entities appear in works of fiction. A formal version of Parsons's theory is presented, and a curious consequence about modes of predica…Read more
    Terence Parsons's informal theory of intentional objects, their properties, and modes of predication does not adequately reflect ordinary ways of speaking and thinking. Meinongian theories recognizing two modes of predication are defended against Parsons's theory of two kinds of properties. Against Parsons's theory of fictional objects, I argue that no existing entities appear in works of fiction. A formal version of Parsons's theory is presented, and a curious consequence about modes of predication is indicated.
    Representation, Misc
  •  2912
    Philosophy of Computer Science
    Teaching Philosophy 28 (4): 319-341. 2005.
    There are many branches of philosophy called “the philosophy of X,” where X = disciplines ranging from history to physics. The philosophy of artificial intelligence has a long history, and there are many courses and texts with that title. Surprisingly, the philosophy of computer science is not nearly as well-developed. This article proposes topics that might constitute the philosophy of computer science and describes a course covering those topics, along with suggested readings and assignments.
    Philosophy of EducationPhilosophy of Computation, Misc
  •  1362
    Lambert Karel. Meinong and the principle of independence. Its place in Meinong's theory of objects and its significance in contemporary philosophical logic. Modern European philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge etc. 1983, xvi + 175 pp
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (1): 248-252. 1986.
    Review of Karel Lambert, Meinong and the Principle of Independence: Its Place in Meinong's Theory of Objects and Its Significance in Contemporary Philosophical Logic
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicPhilosophy of Mind, Misc
  •  1610
    A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in Narrative
    with Janyce M. Wiebe
    In Janyce M. Wiebe & William J. Rapaport (eds.), A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in Narrative, Association For Computational Linguistics. pp. 131-138. 1988.
    Narrative passages told from a character's perspective convey the character's thoughts and perceptions. We present a discourse process that recognizes characters'.
    Perceptual ReportsComputational LinguisticsKnowledge, MiscReference, MiscLogic and Philosophy of Log…Read more
    Perceptual ReportsComputational LinguisticsKnowledge, MiscReference, MiscLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc
  •  982
    God, the Demon, and the Cogito
    The purpose of this essay is to exhibit in detail the setting for the version of the Cogito Argument that appears in Descartes’s Meditations. I believe that a close reading of the text can shed new light on the nature and role of the “evil demon”, on the nature of God as he appears in the first few Meditations, and on the place of the Cogito Argument in Descartes’s overall scheme.
    René Descartes
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