James Mahon

In this review of two books, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, by Stephen Gaukroger, and Descartes and his Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies, edited by Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene, I consider arguments about the motivation of Descartes for writing the Meditations on First Philosophy. According to Gaukroger, Descartes wrote the Meditations simply to legitimate his natural philosophy, which he had already worked out, for an audience of theologians and Scholastic philosophers, whom he feared would condemn it (as Galileo had been condemned by the Inquisition in 1633). If Gaukroger is right, it would explain something that is not mentioned in the collection edited by Ariew and Grene, namely, that five of the seven sets of objections are from theologians, and that the strong objections made by philosophers Gassendi and Hobbes are given relatively short shrift, whereas, the weak objections made by the Jesuit theologian Pierre Bourdin are responded to at great length. Gaukroger, however, has an extremely implausible interpretation of Descartes's position on animals, according to which Descartes held that animals had thoughts and experiences, just not thoughts and experiences like ours, and hence, that he did not think of animals as machines (the "bete machine" hypothesis).

In this chapter I argue that the traditional interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is incorrect. On the standard interpretation of the commonly accepted view, lies are prima facie or pro tango morally wrong, whereas secrets are morally permissible. I argue that, when secrets are distinguished from mere acts of reticence and non-acknowledgement, as well as from acts of deception, so that they are defined as acts of not sharing believed-information while believing that the believed-information is relevant, the correct interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is that secrets are also prima facie or pro tango morally wrong, albeit less morally wrong than lies.

In this book review I argue that, broadly speaking, there are three rival accounts of the relationship between having a normative reason to act and being motivated to act. Neo-Humeans argue that an agent has a normative reason to act if and only if so doing would satisfy some desire of the agent; consequently, their task is to show that there is an internal relation between an agent’s having a normative reason to act and an agent’s having a desire to act. Kantians argue that any agent who has a normative reason to act, and who is practically rational (i.e., not suffering from some debilitating form of practical irrationality, such as weakness of will or depression), will act; consequently, their task is to show that normative reasons always have overriding authority and that it is always irrational not to act upon them. Neo-Aristotelians argue that normative reasons for action are derived from facts about human well-being, and that an agent will be motivated to act provided that she has been habituated into having desires, guided by reason, to act for her own well-being; consequently, their task is to show how normative reasons can be derived from facts about human well-being and whether it is always in an agent’s best interest to act morally.

In this book chapter I argue that an examination of Aristotle's writings on metaphor (The Poetics and The Rhetoric) reveals that, far from believing that metaphor is an ornamental extra in language, and that one had to be a genius in order to use a metaphor properly, Aristotle believes that metaphor is ubiquitous in conversation and writing. He believes that people learn and understand things better through metaphors. He distinguishes between the coinage of a metaphor and the usage of a metaphor, which allows him to claim both that metaphors are ubiquitous and that talent is required for the creation of new metaphors. Finally, he was first philosopher to argue for an entirely natural origin of literary talent.

In this essay I argue that Shelley's "A Defense of Poetry" is best understood as a defense of poetic language, which is in turn best understood as a defense of metaphorical language. According to Shelley, the metaphors of the poets reveal (extra-linguistic) reality, and have a truth value – they are true insofar as they capture reality. The literal language of "mere reasoners" of science and philosophy, by contrast, only reveals relations between ideas already known, and their statements are true in virtue of the meanings of the words. Shelley's essays has been misunderstood because writers on metaphor such as David Cooper and Richard Rorty have assumed that metaphors are neither true nor false, and that defenders of metaphorical language such as Shelley are defending non-truth-apt language. Even those writers on metaphor who believe that metaphors are truth-apt, such as Raymond Gibbs, fail to understand that Shelley should be included in their number.

In this review I examine Cuneo's comparison of the non-normative, perlocutionary-intention theory of speech acts (Grice) with the normative theory of speech acts (Searle and Alston) and the moral theory of speech acts (Wolterstorff, Cuneo) in his transcendental argument for moral realism (since moral facts are among the necessary conditions for the possibility of speech acts, and since there are speech acts (asserting, promising, asking questions, issuing commands, etc.), it follows that moral facts exist). I argue that Cuneo does not establish that moral facts are among the necessary conditions for the possibility of speech acts. I also argue that the moral realism he defends is less moral than most, since he denies that moral reasons must be categorical or necessarily motivating.

In this review of Thomas Carson's book on lying and deception I take issue with his claim that there is only a moral presumption against harmful lying, as opposed to a presumption against all lying, as well as the claim that not providing information – when there is an expectation that information be provided – all by itself constitutes intentional deception. I also worry about what Carson means when he talks about "warranting&quot a statement to be true, and whether he is correct that it is possible to invite an audience to believe one's statement but not intend them to believe it. Finally, I reject his repeated claim that moral philosophers such as W. D. Ross and Brad Hooker do not believe that deception is prima facie wrong, because they only discuss the wrongfulness of lying, and do not discuss the wrongfulness of deception.

In this review I argue that there are three 'tests' for maxims in Kant: the Categorical Imperative test; what I call the 'Esteem' test; and what I call the 'Temptation' test. The first test is a test for what Kant calls "legality", but what we may call the moral permissibility of acting on a maxim. The second test is a test for what Kant calls "morality", but what we may call the presence of a "good will," or the motive of duty, which is the only motive that elicits our esteem. The third test - which is the subject of this book - is a test for the presence of "virtue," or a lack of conflict between my sensible inclinations and the motive of duty. If there is a conflict and I nevertheless act from the motive of duty, I have strength of will (enkrateia). If there is no conflict, and I act from the motive of duty, then I have virtue. God, who has an "infinite holy will" and who is not subject to sensible inclinations, and Jesus Christ, embodied angels, and possibly other rational finite beings in the universe, who have a "finite holy will" and who lack the propensity to subordinate respect for humanity to sensible inclinations, do not have virtue.

In this paper I argue that, contrary to both H. L. A Hart and Patrick Devlin, and in sympathy with D. G. Brown, it is possible to read Mill as arguing in On Liberty that morality should be enforced, by public moral disapprobation by society, and by fines, imprisonment, execution, etc., by the state, when it will promote the general welfare. The difference between Mill and his predecessors is that they had no standard for morality other than the subjective standard of what society liked and disliked, whereas Mill has an objective standard: it is immoral to harm others (without their consent). Harm to oneself can never be immoral: "A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit—who cannot live within moderate means—who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences—who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect… [these] self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness." Harm to others (without their consent) is immoral and is prima facie publicly criticizable and criminalizable: "When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term."

The comic‐book superheroine Wonder Woman, who debuted in All Star Comics #8 in December 1941, was created by psychologist Dr. William Moulton Marston. Most of all, Marston was known for his work on lie detection. Because of the extensive work done on lie detection by her character's creator, it is commonly believed that Wonder Woman's lasso is a magic lie detector. As Matthew Brown says in his article "Love Slaves and Wonder Women: Radical Feminism and Social Reform in the Psychology of Marston", according to Marston there were four basic emotions: inducement, submission, dominance, and compliance. Wonder Woman displays the strong quality of submission by wearing the bracelets of submission. She has an inducement/submission relationship with Aphrodite, which enables her to experience love. Both the bracelets of submission and the magic lasso of Aphrodite have been dropped from contemporary Wonder Woman comic books.

For the Sons of Anarchy Motorcycle Club, Redwood Original (SAMCRO), loyalty to the club's other members is the most important quality in a member. Tig's attempt on Laroy's life is a case of misplaced loyalty, in aid of a murderer and inspired by a lie. Some philosophers are highly suspicious of loyalty, because they see it as focused on something higher than another person or group. Loyalty to fellow members is what the club is and disloyalty to fellow members is a serious threat to its existence. While SAMCRO's punishment for disloyalty is severe, some kind of sanction for disloyalty is required for any club or group to survive. Since loyalty itself does not require any particular act, it does not require an act of wrongdoing. But we can be fairly certain that Tig would agree that loyal brothers are good to have if you ever need an escort home.

If it is true that an agent who has a moral reason for acting has a reason for acting independently of whether or not she has a desire to so act , then it cannot also be true both that moral reasons are necessarily motivating and that an agent who is motivated to act is motivated in virtue of a desire to so act . This dissertation argues that the arguments given against Motivational Internalism about Moral Reasons are stronger than the arguments given against either Moral Reasons Authoritativeness or Desire Motivationalism. ;Chapter 1 outlines two types of motivational internalism: Motivational Internalism about Moral Judgments , and Motivational Internalism about Moral Reasons . It also outlines six other sub-positions on the nature of moral reasons, moral judgments and moral obligations, and on the nature of the connection between desires and motivation. Two of these sub-positions are Moral Reasons Authoritativeness and Desire Motivationalism . ;Chapter 2 argues that deontological intuitionists, such as H. A. Prichard, rejected MIMR in order to defend both MRA and DM. Here I defend Prichard's motivational externalist account of moral motivation, in terms of a desire to do one's duty, from a selection of criticisms. ;Chapter 3 argues that W. D. Falk, who coined the terms "internalism" and "externalism", rejected DM in order to defend both MIMR and MRA. Here I argue that Falk's motivational internalist account of moral motivation, in terms of an impulse to act that is not a desire and that has a sui generis sense of necessity attached to it, fails. Since Falk has not refuted DM, he cannot successfully defend MRA. ;Chapter 4 argues that moral noncognitivists, such as A. J. Ayer, rejected MRA in order to defend both MIMR and DM. Here I argue that Ayer's account of moral reasons, according to which some fact about a situation is moral reason for acting if and only if awareness of this fact evokes a moral feeling in an agent, fails. Since Ayer has not refuted MRA, he cannot successfully defend MIMR