Robert E. Allinson

The thesis I should like to advance in this essay is that Plato cannot and, in fact, does not adhere consistently to the doctrine that to know the good is to do the good. First, in order to display the paradoxes in the Platonic ethical system, I shall discuss the concept of the homogeneity of the good which Plato explicitly endorses. Second, by referring to Plato's practice, I shall endeavor to demonstrate that he treats the good as heterogeneous although this treatment is inconsistent with his equation of knowledge with virtue. I shall use the descriptive phrase 'homogeneity of the good' to stand for that conception of the good which identifies the good exclusively with the moral good. I shall use the descriptive phrase 'heterogeneity of the good' to stand for that conception of the good which includes in the definition of good mixed pleasures or the natural good. Our understanding of the good as heterogeneous allows us to clarify many of the paradoxes present in Platonic ethics and affords us a deeper understanding of Plato.

This volume is intended for professional philosophers and laymen with an interest in East-West studies and comparative philosophy and religion. The central focus is the concept of comparing perspectives from both the Eastern and the Western philosophical traditions on harmony and strife. The unique and happy result is an East-West anthology which is directed at analyzing a single philosophical problem which is of importance to both traditions. Unlike many anthologies which tend to be collections of isolated and unrelated essays, the Editors' focus on a single theme has resulted in a unified volume which maintains a high continuity of interest throughout. The Editors have carefully culled and organized essays from a select group of philosophers from the United States, West Germany, Japan, Australia, Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong. Harmony and strife are analyzed as systematic concepts in Western philosophy, as parts of classical Chinese thought, as central concepts in Buddhism, as metaphysical concepts, as dialectical concepts and even as null concepts. The Editors have taken great care so that a continuity and a coherence of presentation is achieved despite the striking variety of perspectives from which harmony and strife are analyzed. It is both unusual and important to have such a systematic and thorough investigation of a topic of paramount social and philosophical significance by some of the leading minds of the day. Besides, the essays included are eminently readable. The volume is likely to become a standard work in this area for some years to come.

Paul A. Vatter, Lawrence E. Fouraker Professor of Business Administration, Harvard University, writing of Global Disasters: Inquiries into Management Ethics, ‘In my view one of the most important things that can be done to improve ethics in management is, through cases, to sensitize managers to ethical issues in situations in which they did not perceive themselves as being involved. His well-documented and detailed cases stimulate great interest. His diagnosis of the process through which ethical behavior could have prevented each disaster is provocative and sensitising.’ A. L. Minkes, Fellow, Royal Society of Arts, Emeritus Professor of Business Organization, University of Birmingham, in writing of Global Disasters: Inquiries into Management Ethics, ‘Dr. Allinson has very substantially enlarged the whole nature of the discussion of crisis, disaster and safety. The powerful and highly apposite phrase that he has coined, ‘The Buck Stops Here and It Stops Everywhere Else As Well’, illustrates the significant contribution of his philosophical analyses to a wide range of applied managerial problems in organizations. S. Prakash Sethi, Director, Center for Management Development and Organization Research, Baruch College, City University of New York, writing of Global Disasters: Inquiries into Management Ethics, ‘Global Disasters is a thought-provoking book and provides excellent insights into how management systems can be built that would prevent hitherto “unpreventable” disasters. Professor Allinson makes a convincing argument and an intriguing suggestion that, notwithstanding commonly held beliefs, most industrial crises are preventable through sound management structures and decision-making processes only when they are rooted in ethical values and beliefs on the part of top management.’ This book, by a professor of philosophy at Soka University of America, former professor of philosophy at The Chinese University of Hong Kong and former Visiting Fellow of Business Ethics at the University of Oxford argues that major disasters can be prevented. He shows how corporate management must accept its moral responsibility to create a corporate ethos that recognizes the basic principle that people matter most.

Robert C. Neville, Dean of Theology and Professor of Philosophy, Boston University, in his comments on Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation for the State University of New York press: ‘The present outstanding volume by Robert Allinson... initiates a new direction... His new direction for understanding Chuang-Tzu is his comprehensive and detailed argument that Chuang Tzu was advocating an ideal of sageliness. Whereas many interpreters have claimed that Chuang Tzu used his metaphorical language to defend a relativism, Allinson shows with convincing mastery that Chuang Tzu had a position, namely, the importance of achieving the ideal of sageliness... he brings the discussion of Chuang Tzu into the heart of contemporary Western philosophy. Professor Allinson’s book, like his many articles, contributes to the growing body of literature that is creating an effective dialogue between Chinese and Western philosophy. The sophistication of this book demonstrates that the dialogue has worked and that we are in a new era of substantive comparative philosophy... he also makes a substantial contribution to the philosophy of religion. Currently in its 8th impression, "Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters" has been translated into Chinese and Korean. This book offers a fundamentally new interpretation of the philosophy of the Chuang-Tzu. It is the first full-length work of its kind which argues that a deep level cognitive structure exists beneath an otherwise random collection of literary anecdotes, cryptic sayings, and dark allusions. The author carefully analyzes myths, legends, monstrous characters, paradoxes, parables and linguistic puzzles as strategically placed techniques for systematically tapping and channeling the spiritual dimensions of the mind. Allinson takes issue with commentators who have treated the Chuang-Tzu as a minor foray into relativism. Chapter titles are re-translated, textual fragments are relocated, and inauthentic, outer miscellaneous chapters are carefully separated from the transformatory message of the authentic, inner chapters. Each of the inner chapters is shown to be a building block to the next so that they can only be understood as forming a developmental sequence. In the end, the reader is presented with a clear, consistent and coherent view of the Chuang-Tzu that is more in accord with its stature as a major philosophical work.

S. Prakash Sethi, President, International Center for Corporate Accountability, Inc., University Distinguished Professor, Baruch College, City University of New York, writes: "Saving Human Lives gives a step by step account of how management systems can be built that can prevent hitherto "unpreventable" disasters. Professor Allinson weaves convincing arguments from original linguistic, literary and ethical analyses and shows how these arguments apply to highly detailed and well documented case studies. Those of us in the field of business ethics are grateful for this creative combination of philosophical argumentation and the marshalling of widespread, empirical evidence that persuades us that, notwithstanding commonly held beliefs, most industrial crises are preventable through sound management structures and decision-making processes only when they are rooted in ethical values and beliefs on the part of top management." This is a pioneering work. Recent disasters such as the tsunami disaster continue to demonstrate Professor Allinson’s thesis that valuing human lives is the core of ethical management. His unique comparison of the ideas of the power of Fate and High Technology, his penetrating analysis of the very concept of an "accident", demonstrate how concepts rule our lives. His wide-ranging investigation of court cases and government documents from the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries, and from places as diverse as the USA, UK and New Zealand provide ample supporting evidence for the universality and the power of explanation of his thesis. Saving Human Lives will have an impact beyond measurement on the field of management ethics.

Lewis Hahn, Editor of Library of Living Philosophers, including Quine, Gadamer, Davidson, Ricoeur, writes: "Professor Allinson’s work [A Metaphysics for the Future] is impressive. I do not remember when in recent years I have read a more exciting systematic study. With a new phenomenology, a distinctive method and unique modes of validation for philosophy, and an extraordinary command of both Eastern and Western philosophy, Professor Allinson develops his own bold, imaginative and challenging system of philosophy". This title was first published in 2001. This work is intended to serve not only as an expression of a new idea of a philosophy, but as an "apologia" for philosophy as a legitimate and independent discipline in its own right. It argues that in the 20th century, truth has not been abandoned, but merely modified. The text proposes a return to truth and suggests that it is only after apprehending the truths of consciousness that the philosopher's mirror may become a kaleidoscope through which reality may be contemplated. First order truth lies in the realm of discovery, and discovery takes place only within the moment of subjective re-enactment.

Anthony C. Yu, Carl Buck Distinguished Professor in Humanities, Chairman, Division of East Asian Languages, University of Chicago, Divinity School, writes: "Robert Allinson's book represents tremendous thoughtfulness, originality, and erudition. Its wide-ranging and lucid discussions cover a huge terrain, from ancient metaphysics to quantum mechanics. The enlistment of certain classical Confucian concepts and themes at critical junctures to advance the book's argument also provides luminous comparison. His interpretation of the Confucian emphasis on life as social and self-preservation is both humane and interesting, much as his analysis of the Mencian notion of compassion deserves our attention." This title was first published in 2002: In Space, Time and the Ethical Foundations ideas about space and time are developed, unique to the history of philosophy, that match the new physics. A well grounded metaphysics is presented which offers a safe haven between stifling scepticism and wild imagination, and an original philosophical method is demonstrated which sharply demarcates philosophy from the empirical sciences. A new foundation is laid for ethics by grounding ethics on the author's psycho-biological deduction of the emotions that offers a progressive model to replace the Freudian paradigm. An originally designed trans-cultural ethics, doubly grounded on both Eastern and Western thought, presents an antidote to the contemporary retreat into relativism. Insights from biology, psychology, evolutionary theory and ethics are brought together in a unique and fruitful synthesis. At the same time, human barbarisms such as the Holocaust are pointed to as reminders that there are just limits to compassion. This book presents a sophisticated text for metaphysics, epistemology and systematic ethics.

Slavoj Žižek writes: "Today philosophy is approaching a double end. Physics and brain sciences offer answers to the big metaphysical questions (is the universe infinite? Do we have a free will?), while what remained of philosophy is mostly getting lost in historicist relativism, reducing truth to a discursive “truth-effect.” But more and more people are tired of this game: the need for a new beginning, for authentic metaphysics, is felt everywhere. And Allinson does something that we all secretly knew it has to be done, but nobody dared to actually do it so directly: he convincingly argues for the return to a philosophy that shamelessly addresses big questions. A great sigh of relief will be felt by the readers of Awakening Philosophy: The Loss of Truth: we are back home. If there is justice in our intellectual life, the book will become daily bread for thinking beings." Brian Klug, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, the University of Oxford writes: "Awakening Philosophy is as original as it is ambitious. Allinson holds up a mirror to academic philosophy and shows how it has become fragmented into an eclectic set of specialisms. He seeks to get philosophy to question itself, thus reviving the spirit of Socratic enquiry: self-examination. In the process, he sets out to recover “the Great Questions” that have exercised philosophers from Plato to such figures as Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant and Husserl. A timely and ground-breaking book." Michael Slote, UST Professor of Ethics, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Member, Royal Irish Academy, former Tanner Lecturer, Stanford University, writes: "An elegant and timely appeal for philosophers and the educated public to make use of philosophy's historic roots for purposes of present-day enlightenment." In this original book, Robert Elliott Allinson asserts that philosophers have been lulled into a dogmatic sleep by Immanuel Kant, the slayer of metaphysics, who has convinced them (and the rest of humanity) that we can never know Reality. Allinson awakens global philosophers from their sceptical slumbers by diagnosing the reason why they have abdicated their traditional calling as leaders of inquiry into truth and wisdom.

It is gratifying to learn that there are fellow humanist philosophers who pay homage to the Enlightenment and its legacy. Such a humanist philosopher is Michael Mitias. He has taken precious time and the labor of his active and synoptic thought to both read the trilogy I have had the privilege of guest editing and what is more, to write about it. Hence, I feel that he deserves a response. I shall address some of the key points that he has raised in the interest of dialogue, an activity which he has praised and which rightly forms the heart of our journal. I intend to respond to the following points: (i) that we do not need a new enlightenment, but a reinterpretation of the old; (ii) that the editorials are not consistent with the articles of the contributors; (iii) that the method I have utilized, to endeavor to invoke a new Enlightenment through self-conscious intention, via rallying philosophers together is at odds with the origin of the classical Enlightenment; (iv) that the viewpoint I have expressed suffers from its Eurocentrism.

Man essentially is a being who pursues meaning and love. How is it possible that today, the concept of man as the rational economic man dominates the current human stage of thought? Why and how has this concept of man taken precedence over the Platonic description? What has made for the triumph of Homo oeconomicus? What has happened to the human race since money has vanquished beauty as the defining essence of humanity? What does it mean that Plato’s ideas sound so alien to us now, so far-fetched, when to the Athenians, they made perfect sense? What does it mean that contemporary man would consider it to be absurd to define the motivating drive of the human being as being led by Eros to the pursuit of beauty when to the ancient Athenians it would be absurd to define the motivating drive of the human being as being led by the goal of the maximization of profit?

While theoretically, egoism may be considered one kind of ethics, generally speaking, egoism, defined as self-interest at the expense of others, is contrary to the central principles of ethics, which are, in the main, other-directed. While Adam Smith's economics is famously argued to serve both self and other, the core thesis of this chapter is that Adam Smith's position is seriously flawed. The chapter argues that self-interest economics is fundamentally flawed and needs to be replaced by an objective, value-based economics. It is shown that Adam Smith's notions of humans as simultaneously ethical beings and beings who pursue their self-interest are contradictory. Economics cannot exist for the sake of itself: it must exist for the sake of a higher end.

I argue that it is only on the condition of a preconceptual understanding that Zhuangzi's metaphors can be cognitive. Kim-chong Chong holds that the choice between metaphors as noncognitive and cognitive is a choice between Allinson and Davidson. Chong's view of metaphors possessing multivalence is reducible to Davidson's choice, because there is no built-in parameter between multivalence and limitless valence. If Zhuangzi's metaphors were multivalent, the text would be subject to infinite interpretive viewpoints and the logical consequence of relativism. It is only if metaphors are cognitive that the text of the Zhuangzi can convey the message of transcendent freedom.

It is commonly put forth that Aristotle’s ethics is a virtue ethics. This is contrasted with ethics that is orientated toward right actions. For Aristotle, this is a pseudo-distinction. One cannot build one’s virtues except through performing right actions. For Aristotle, one performs right actions for their own sake, not for the sake of building virtues or even building character. But the performance of noble deeds, which is the ultimate counsel to life that Aristotle gives, has as its natural consequence the building of virtue and the building of character. This, in turn, brings happiness. Since none of Aristotle’s writings is extant, it is not easy to ferret out Aristotle’s meaning. However, if one reads the lecture notes of Aristotle’s students with some care, it is clear that one should not act for the sake of building character or obtaining happiness. Indeed, the purpose of political society, for Aristotle, is to create a venue for the performance of noble actions. Noble acts, just acts, are the goal for mankind. Nothing else. That happiness flows from this is proof for Aristotle that this is the right path for humankind to take.

This paper is devoted to showing that a safety priority should be accorded the highest priority in decision-making and that such a prioritisation is an ethical responsibility. The connection between a safety-first priority and ethics is that an ultimate concern for safety is an integral feature of respect for human life. This paper exposes the illogic behind the misleading phrase "risky technology" and the fallacies which underlie the seemingly morally neutral phrase "risk assessment". It is argued that human beings ultimately possess the responsibility of the choice to employ one technological system as over another and hence the decision to employ unsafe technology is a case of "risky assessment" rather than "risky technology". The phrase "risky technology" implies that the risk factor is inherent to the technology when the risk factor is inherent to the choice of which technology to employ. Risk assessment has been portrayed as amoral numerical calculation without clarifying the basis of the assessment. It is argued here that risk assessment must include the basis of its figures and that, to be epistemologically sound, the basis should be past engineering performance and not "subjective engineering judgement". To be ethically sound, risk assessment must take into account not only probabilities of occurrence but consequences of occurrence, such as life or death risks to risk takers and all those on whom the risk taken will ultimately make an impact. It is argued that risk takers possess a right to know of the specific risks to which they are exposing themselves and that risk makers possess the corresponding duty to inform risk takers. The Challenger case is utilised as a lesson in unsound and unethical risk assessment. It is also utilised as a case in which the right of the astronauts and civilian passengers to know of the risk they were taking was not respected and the ethical duty to inform the astronauts and civilian passengers of the risk they were taking was not observed. Distinctions are drawn between general and unknown risks of space travel and the specifically foreknown risks of a design deficient O-ring which malfunctioned below specific temperature readings. The belief that progress requires risk taking is exposed as an oversimplification since progress can be made as in the case of the development of commercial air travel without taking reckless risks. Passenger aircraft must meet certain criteria of safety to be operable but this is not an obstacle to progress. The observance of the right to know and the duty to inform is an asset to business. In the case of Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines, the decision to notify the public of bomb threats may have given business a boost since passengers have deduced in absence of such a threat that their flight was a safe one as they trusted these airlines.

Man essentially is a being who pursues meaning and love. Socrates’ speech in the Symposium well characterizes man as driven by Eros, or Love. Socrates, expounding Diotema’s Ladder of Love, explains that man is driven by the erotic impulse. Nowhere in her teachings does Diotema mention the concept of self-interest or maximizing profit as the essential nature of man. Despite this, the concept of man as the rational economic man dominates the human stage of thought. Why and how has this concept of man taken precedence over the Platonic description? What has made for the triumph of Homo economicus?

One reason Aristotle is distinguished as a philosopher is that he thought the philosopher investigated the causes of things. This paper raises the question: What are the causes of racial prejudice and racial discrimination. All ethical beings know that racial prejudice and racial discrimination are morally wrong, deplorable and should be completely eradicated. Deanna Jacobsen Koepke refers to Holt’s definitions in distinguishing racism from prejudice: “Racism is defined as hostility toward a group of people based on alleged inferiorities. Racism is a system of power and privilege that is at the foundation of society’s structures rather than prejudice, which is a hostile attitude toward a person based on trait he or she is assumed to have due to group membership.” This concept squarely places racism as the culprit to be extinguished. In this article, it is to be argued that to define racism as the target is only to observe the manifest phenomenon. The argument of the article is that racial prejudice and discrimination rest upon four pillars: political, economic, social and cultural. For simplicity of explanation, the social and cultural pillars shall be considered under the category of the political pillar, although the distinction between these pillars shall be noted. This article argues that these four pillars themselves, rest upon a foundation. The foundation is the deep psychological fear of the current, existing dominant economic group that the current existing dominated minority group will eventually usurp the power of the dominant economic group. The manifest form that this type of fear assumes is racial prejudice and discrimination. In its most extreme forms it then manifests as hate speech, hate action, hate brutality and hate murder. These manifestations provide the fuel that maintains the power imbalance and provides a camouflage for the four pillars that lie beneath the racist exterior. In this article, the political and economic pillars that underlie color racism will be examined first. The underlying deep psychological foundation shall be treated separately. In the end, the argument of this article is that color racism cannot be fully extinguished until its role as providing a mask for the underlying four pillars that consistently support inequality between different groups or classes are uprooted and the deep psychological fear that underlies them is eliminated. The masked function of color racism is its enormous power in perpetuating inequality; hence, the title of this paper, Unmasking Color Racism.

This book review outlines and critiques Robert Allinson's book _Global Disasters: Inquiries into Management Ethics_ (New York: Prentice Hall, 1993). The reviewer first outlines the structure of the book and then moves on to discussing the main arguments of the book, including but not limited to the distinctions between "monocausality" and "multi-causality" and "scapegoating" and "multiple responsibility" that Allinson highlights. Central to Allinson's argument is the thesis that problems in management (and the disasters that often result from them) are conceptual problems first of all. The review concludes by praising the bold and timely contribution of this volume.

Nyansa nye sika na w'akyekyere asie. (‘Wisdom, unlike money, cannot be kept in a safe’) (Appiagyei-Atua 2000).One critical factor that has contributed to the spread of the virus COVID-19 and resulting illnesses and deaths is both the conceptual and the ethical confusion between the prioritization of individual rights over social duties. The adherence to the belief in the priority of rights over duties has motivated some individuals to refrain from social distancing and, as a result, has placed themselves and other individuals at serious risk to health and life. My argument is that the ethical enjoinder of social duty possesses priority over the ethical value of individual rights especially in times of global crisis. I demonstrate this point by arguing that the concept of individual right is derivative from the concept of social duty and through the argument that the concept of social duty is more efficacious in addressing global threats to human life than is the concept of individual rights. What is needed is an in-depth revision of the moral ordering of rights and duties and a vision of the human being as inherently other directed with duties toward others. I shall examine two specific ethical systems, that of Confucian and African, Akan moral philosophy that exemplify such a revision of the moral order.

The need to prove the existence of the external world has been a subject that has concerned the rationalist philosophers, particularly Descartes and the empiricist philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Taking the epoché as the key mark of the phenomenologist—the suspension of the question of the existence of the external world—the issue of the external world should not come under the domain of the phenomenologist. Ironically, however, I would like to suggest that it could be argued that the founder of the phenomenological school of thought, Edmund Husserl, also did not avoid the question of the existence of the external world. What I would like to suggest further is that Immanuel Kant grants himself illicit access to the external world and thus illustrates that the question of the external world is vital to the argument structure of the first Critique.

For the purpose of this analysis, risk assessment becomes the primary term and risk management the secondary term. The concept of risk management as a primary term is based upon a false ontology. Risk management implies that risk is already there, not created by the decision, but lies already inherent in the situation that the decision sets into motion. The risk that already exists in the objective situation simply needs to be “managed”. By considering risk assessment as the primary term, the ethics of responsibility for risking the lives of others, the environment and future generations in the first place comes into the forefront. The issue of risk heeding is especially important as it highlights the need to pay attention to warnings of danger and to take action to redress problems before disasters occur. In this paper, the decision making that led to the choice of technology utilized and the implementation of such technology in the case of the space shuttle Challenger disaster will be used as a model to illustrate the need to take ethical factors into account when making decisions regarding the safety of technological systems and the heeding of danger warnings. While twenty-five years separates the decision to launch the Challenger and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster, the lessons of the Challenger disaster are still to be learned.

In this Editorial Introduction to the 31st volume of _Dialogue and Universalism_ (3rd issue), Dr. Allinson comments on the current anti-intellectual currents that plague many, if not most, nations worldwide. He reminds that, despite its incendiary history, the Enlightened Age of the 18th century remains an age that, in its intent, wanted to throw off the shackles of medieval thinking and promote the flowering of human inquiry and the actualization of the human ability to realize the capacities of reason to its very fullest extent. Dr. Allinson then proceeds to outline the contents of the issue, ranging from Female Emancipation, Non-European Enlightenment, Reason and Religion, and the Metaphysics of Enlightenment. The Editorial ends with a call to broaden the horizons of the Enlightenment to fashion a New Enlightenment for the 21st century, which builds its foundations from philosophies worldwide, a task whose beginning can be seen in this issue.

The Platform Sutra, which dates back to the seventh century C.E., is one of the classic documents of Chinese philosophy and is the intellectual autobiography of Hui Neng, the Sixth Patriarch of Ch’an Buddhism. In the Platform Sutra, the Sixth Patriarch demonstrates that the spiritual and intellectual problems of consciousness stem from a false adherence to the dualistic standpoint. The Sixth Patriarch utilizes ingenious arguments to demonstrate how one can escape the problems of dualism. An example of a constructive engagement between Chinese philosophy and Searle is to compare and contrast the arguments of Hui Neng with those of Searle. The Sixth Patriarch and Searle both reach a rather similar solution to the problem of dualism—to stop counting. In the case of the Sixth Patriarch, his solution possesses the goal of enabling the reader to achieve a spiritual liberation. Searle, in contrast, addresses the troubling epistemological problems of dualism. Searle proposes a causal monism: he claims consciousness is a state of the brain, that it is caused by processes in the brain, that it is a feature of the brain, and that it is all these at the same time. This article aims to highlight Searle’s arguments and impressive insights; it also aims to show the connection between Searle’s master insight concerning the non-duality of consciousness and the Sixth Patriarch’s realization that the difficulties of understanding consciousness stem from the formulation of the description itself.

This review confirms Herman’s work as a praiseworthy contribution to East-West and comparative philosophical literature. Due credit is given to Herman for providing English readers with access to Buber’s commentary on, a personal translation of, the Chuang-Tzu; Herman’s insight into the later influence of I and Thou on Buber’s understanding of Chuang-Tzu and Taoism is also appropriately commended. In latter half of this review, constructive criticisms of Herman’s work are put forward, such as formatting inconsistencies, a tendency toward verbosity and jargon, and a neglect of seemingly important hermeneutical issues. Such issues, seemingly substantive but neglected by Herman, are the influence of Buber’s prior familiarity with Hasidic teachings on his encounter with Chuang-Tzu, as well as the prevalence of Hasidic and Taoist thought in Buber’s conception of good and evil.