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172Good and bad actionsPhilosophical Review 106 (1): 1-34. 1997.It is usually assumed to be possible, and sometimes even desirable, for consequentialists to make judgments about both the rightness and the goodness of actions. Whether a particular action is right or wrong is one question addressed by a consequentialist theory such as utilitarianism. Whether the action is good or bad, and how good or bad it is, are two others. I will argue in this paper that consequentialism cannot provide a satisfactory account of the goodness of actions, on the most natural …Read more
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116Consequentialism and commitmentPacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4). 1997.It is sometimes claimed that a consequentialist theory such as utilitarianism has problems accommodating the importance of personal commitments to other people. However, by emphasizing the distinction between criteria of rightness and decision procedures, a consequentialist can allow for non-consequentialist decision procedures, such as acting directly on the promptings of natural affection. Furthermore, such non-consequentialist motivational structures can co-exist happily with a commitment to …Read more
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92A Consequentialist Case for Rejecting the RightJournal of Philosophical Research 18 109-125. 1993.Satisficing and maximizing versions of consequentialism have both assumed that rightness is an alI-or-nothing property. We argue thal this is inimical to the spirit of consequentialism, and that, from the point of view of the consequentialist, actions should be evaluated purely in terms that admit of degree. We first consider the suggestion that rightness and wrongness are a matter of degree. If so, this raises the question of whether the claim that something is wrong says any more than that it …Read more
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35Peacemaking Philosophy or Appeasement? Sterba’s Argument for CompromiseInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 285-296. 2005.In The Triumph of Practice over Theory in Ethics James Sterba is not concerned merely to show that there is much convergence in the practical application of Utilitarianism, Kantianism, and Aristotelian virtue ethics. His project is the much more ambitious one of arguing that the theories do not really diverge very much at the theoretical level, and thus supplying an explanation for the apparent convergence at the practical level. Although I applaud him for the boldness, some might even say audac…Read more
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217Varieties of hedonism in Feldman's pleasure and the good lifeUtilitas 19 (3): 388-397. 2007.In these comments on Fred Feldman's Pleasure and the Good Life, I first challenge the dichotomy between sensory and attitudinal hedonisms as perhaps presenting a false dilemma. I suggest that there may be a form of hedonism that employs the concept of a that is not purely sensory. Next, I raise some problems for several of the versions of hedonism explored in the book
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6Rights Violations and Distributive Constraints: Three ScenariosPacific Philosophical Quarterly 76 (2): 159-167. 1995.
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273Off her trolley? Frances Kamm and the metaphysics of moralityUtilitas 20 (1): 65-80. 2008.Frances Kamm's aptly titled Intricate Ethics is a tour de force of what Peter Unger calls the ‘preservationist’ approach to ethical theory. Here is some of what she says about her methodology: Consider as many case-based judgments of yours as prove necessary. Do not ignore some case-based judgments, assuming they are errors, just because they conflict with simple or intuitively plausible principles that account for some subset of your case-based judgments. Work on the assumption that a different…Read more
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219Great Harms from small benefits grow: How death can be outweighed by headachesAnalysis 58 (2). 1998.Suppose that a very large number of people, say one billion, will suffer a moderately severe headache for the next twenty-four hours. For these billion people, the next twenty-four hours will be fairly unpleasant, though by no means unbearable. However, there will be no side-effects from these headaches; no drop in productivity in the work-place, no lapses in concentration leading to accidents, no unkind words spoken to loved ones that will later fester. Nonetheless, it is clearly desirable that…Read more
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234Killing and letting die (edited book)Fordham University Press. 1994.This collection contains twenty-one thought-provoking essays on the controversies surrounding the moral and legal distinctions between euthanasia and "letting die." Since public awareness of this issue has increased this second edition includes nine entirely new essays which bring the treatment of the subject up-to-date. The urgency of this issue can be gauged in recent developments such as the legalization of physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands, "how-to" manuals topping the bestseller…Read more
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112Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable FutureAnalysis 50 (4). 1990.If consequentialism is understood as claiming, at least, that the moral character of an action depends only on the consequences of the action, it might be thought that the difficulty of knowing what all the consequences of any action will be poses a problem for consequentialism. J. J. C. Smart writes that in most cases..
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311Two dogmas of deontology: Aggregation, rights, and the separateness of persons: Alastair NorcrossSocial Philosophy and Policy 26 (1): 76-95. 2009.One of the currently popular dogmata of anti-consequentialism is that consequentialism doesn't respect, recognize, or in some important way account for what is referred to as the The charge is often made, but rarely explained in any detail, much less argued for. In this paper I explain what I take to be the most plausible interpretation of the separateness of persons charge. I argue that the charge itself can be deconstructed into at least two further objections to consequentialist theories. The…Read more
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36A Consequentialist Case for Rejecting the RightJournal of Philosophical Research 18 109-125. 1993.Satisficing and maximizing versions of consequentialism have both assumed that rightness is an alI-or-nothing property. We argue thal this is inimical to the spirit of consequentialism, and that, from the point of view of the consequentialist, actions should be evaluated purely in terms that admit of degree. We first consider the suggestion that rightness and wrongness are a matter of degree. If so, this raises the question of whether the claim that something is wrong says any more than that it …Read more
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Pt. VII. Research ethics. Clinical equipoise: foundational requirement or fundamental error / Alex John London ; Research on cognitively impaired adults / Jason Karlawish ; Research in developing countries / Florencia Luna ; Animal experimentation (review)In Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), The Oxford handbook of bioethics, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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159Intransitivity and the person-affecting principlePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 769-776. 1999.Philosophy journals and conferences have recently seen several attempts to argue that 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey strict transitivity. This paper focuses on Larry Temkin's argument in "Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox." Although his argument is not aimed just at utilitarians or even consequentialists in general, it is of prticular significance to consequentialists. If 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey transitivity, there may be choice situations …Read more
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