Alastair Norcross

Satisficing and maximizing versions of consequentialism have both assumed that rightness is an alI-or-nothing property. We argue thal this is inimical to the spirit of consequentialism, and that, from the point of view of the consequentialist, actions should be evaluated purely in terms that admit of degree. We first consider the suggestion that rightness and wrongness are a matter of degree. If so, this raises the question of whether the claim that something is wrong says any more than that it is bad. We consider the possibility that a consequenlialist should simply equate wrongness with badness. We reject this on the grounds that there is not a satsifactory way for a consequentialist to account for the badness of actions, as opposed to states of affairs. We explore two concepts of wrongness: to do something wrong is to be blameworthy; and the fact that something is wrong creates a reason not to do it. We argue that the first of these is not available to the consequentialist because of her views on blame, and that the second is just as much a feature of badness as of wrongness. We conclude that the consequentialist can make no sense of the concept of wrongness.

In The Triumph of Practice over Theory in Ethics James Sterba is not concerned merely to show that there is much convergence in the practical application of Utilitarianism, Kantianism, and Aristotelian virtue ethics. His project is the much more ambitious one of arguing that the theories do not really diverge very much at the theoretical level, and thus supplying an explanation for the apparent convergence at the practical level. Although I applaud him for the boldness, some might even say audacity, of the attempt, I do not think he succeeds. I focus my critique on Sterba’s use of two principles that are crucial to his arguments, the principle of non-question-beggingness, and the “ought implies can” principle. I also criticize his arguments for a biocentric position in his disagreement with Singer over the status of nonsentient life.

This collection contains twenty-one thought-provoking essays on the controversies surrounding the moral and legal distinctions between euthanasia and "letting die." Since public awareness of this issue has increased this second edition includes nine entirely new essays which bring the treatment of the subject up-to-date. The urgency of this issue can be gauged in recent developments such as the legalization of physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands, "how-to" manuals topping the bestseller charts in the United States, and the many headlines devoted to Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who has assisted dozens of patients to die. The essays address the range of questions involved in this issue pertaining especially to the fields of medical ethics, public policymaking, and social philosophy. The discussions consider the decisions facing medical and public policymakers, how those decisions will affect the elderly and terminally ill, and the medical and legal ramifications for patients in a permanently vegetative state, as well as issues of parent/infant rights. The book is divided into two sections. The first, "Euthanasia and the Termination of Life-Prolonging Treatment" includes an examination of the 1976 Karen Quinlan Supreme Court decision and selections from the 1990 Supreme Court decision in the case of Nancy Cruzan. Featured are articles by law professor George Fletcher and philosophers Michael Tooley, James Rachels, and Bonnie Steinbock, with new articles by Rachels, and Thomas Sullivan. The second section, "Philosophical Considerations," probes more deeply into the theoretical issues raised by the killing/letting die controversy, illustrating exceptionally well the dispute between two rival theories of ethics, consequentialism and deontology. It also includes a corpus of the standard thought on the debate by Jonathan Bennet, Daniel Dinello, Jeffrie Murphy, John Harris, Philipa Foot, Richard Trammell, and N. Ann Davis, and adds articles new to this edition by Bennett, Foot, Warren Quinn, Jeff McMahan, and Judith Lichtenberg.

I examine several claims about the nature of values that have been made with respect to moral conflict, i.e., that the existence of moral conflict shows that values are incomparable; values are incommensurable but comparable; there are plural values. ;Strong moral conflicts involve an agent in a choice between two or more impermissible alternatives. They have been thought to pose serious problems for ethical theories, in particular for consequentialist theories. According to consequentialist ethical theories, every situation of choice has at least one permissible option. For an option to be permissible it must be at least as good as every other option. ;I explore and reject an attempt to make room for strong moral conflicts within a consequentialist framework. I also consider the claim that the principles of deontic logic are inconsistent with the possibility of strong moral conflicts. I conclude that the price of accepting strong moral conflicts is too high, given the possibility of plausible alternative explanations. ;I examine and reject the suggestion that strong moral conflicts are grounded in incomparability between values. I also examine the question of whether values might be incommensurable, but not incomparable. ;There are situations in which an agent has to choose between options, all undesirable, but at least one of which is morally preferable to or equal with any other. In some of these cases it is rational or appropriate for the agent to experience such emotions as regret or guilt, whichever option she chooses. Let us call such situations 'moral conflicts'. I examine and reject the claim that thesis of plural values is needed to explain the rationality of the regret. ;It is claimed that consequentialist theories cannot account for the rationality of regret at doing the best thing. I argue that this claim rests on two assumptions: they are maximizing theories, they are concerned only with the question of which action ought to be performed in situations of choice. I gave a consequentialist account of the rationality of regret of moral conflicts based on a form of consequentialism which denies both and