David Shaw

In this Current Controversy article, I describe and analyse the imminent move to a system of deemed consent for deceased organ donation in England and similar planned changes in Scotland, in light of evidence from Wales, where the system changed in 2015. Although the media has tended to focus on the potential benefits and ethical issues relating to the main change from an opt-in default to an opt-out one, other defaults will also change, while some will remain the same. Interaction of these other defaults with the principal one raise several ethical issues that may complicate efforts to use deemed consent to increase donation rates. Most significantly, changing the main default will have the effect of changing the default for patients' families, who play a vital role in the consent process.

Many ethical issues are posed by public health interventions. Although abstract theorizing about these issues can be useful, it is the application of ethical theory to real cases which will ultimately be of benefit in decision-making. To this end, this paper will analyse the ethical issues involved in Childsmile, a national oral health demonstration programme in Scotland that aims to improve the oral health of the nation's children and reduce dental inequalities through a combination of targeted and universal interventions. With Scotland's level of dental caries among the worst in Europe, Childsmile represents one of the largest programmes of work aimed at combating oral health inequalities in the UK. The areas of ethical interest include several contrasting themes: reducing health inequalities and improving health; universal and targeted interventions; political values and evidence base; prevention and treatment; and underlying all of these, justice and utility.

Researchers often refer to “research integrity”, “scientific integrity”, “research misconduct”, “scientific misconduct” and “research ethics”. However, they may use some of these terms interchangeably despite conceptual distinctions. The aim of this paper is to clarify what is signified by several key terms related to research integrity, and to suggest clearer conceptual delineation between them. To accomplish this task, it provides a conceptual analysis based upon definitions and general usage of these phrases and categorization of integrity-breaching behaviours in literature and guidelines, including clarification of the different domains and agents involved. In the first part of the analysis, following some initial clarifications, I explore the distinction between internal and external rules of integrity. In the second part, I explore the distinction between integrity and lack of misconduct, before suggesting a recategorisation of different types of integrity breach. I conclude that greater clarity is needed in the debate on research integrity. Distinguishing between scientific and research integrity, reassessing the relative gravity of different misbehaviours in light of this distinction, and recognising all intentional breaches of integrity as misconduct may help to improve guidelines and education.

In this paper, we discuss the largely neglected topic of semantics in medicine and the associated ethical issues. We analyse several key medical terms from the informed perspective of the healthcare professional, the lay perspective of the patient and the patient’s family, and the descriptive perspective of what the term actually signifies objectively. The choice of a particular medical term may deliver different meanings when viewed from these differing perspectives. Consequently, several ethical issues may arise. Technical terms that are not commonly understood by lay people may be used by physicians, consciously or not, and may obscure the understanding of the situation by lay people. The choice of particular medical terms may be accidental use of jargon, an attempt to ease the communication of psychologically difficult information, or an attempt to justify a preferred course of action and/or to manipulate the decision-making process.

Much of the ethical discourse concerning the coronavirus pandemic has focused on the allocation of scarce resources, be it potentially beneficial new treatments, ventilators, intensive care beds, or oxygen. Somewhat ironically, the more important ethical issues may lie elsewhere, just as the more important medical issues do not concern intensive care or treatment for COVID‐19 patients, but rather the diversion towards these modes of care at the expense of non‐Covid patients and treatment. In this article I explore how ethicists can and should prioritize which ethical issues to deal with, and develop a method of triage for identification and prioritization of ethical issues both in the next public health emergency and in bioethics more widely.

We all now know that the novel coronavirus is anything but a common cold. The pandemic has created many new obligations for all of us, several of which come with serious costs to our quality of life. But in some cases, the guidance and the law are open to a degree of interpretation, leaving us to decide what is the ethical course of action. Because of the high cost of some of the obligations, a conflict of interest can arise between what we want to do and what it is right to do. And so, some people choose to respect only the letter of the law, but not the spirit, or not to respect even the spirit of the guidelines. This paper identifies and describes the new obligations imposed on us all by the pandemic, considers their costs in terms of the good life, and provides an ethical analysis of two personal and two public cases in terms of the letter and spirit of the guidance and legislation.

In this article I argue that vagueness concerning consent to post-mortem organ donation causes considerable harm in several ways. First, the information provided to most people registering as organ donors is very vague in terms of what is actually involved in donation. Second, the vagueness regarding consent to donation increases the distress of families of patients who are potential organ donors, both during and following the discussion about donation. Third, vagueness also increases the chances that the patient's intention to donate will not be fulfilled due to the family's distress. Fourth, the consequent reduction in the number of donated organs leads to avoidable deaths and increased suffering among potential recipients, and distresses them and their families. There are three strategies which could be used to reduce the harmful effects of this vagueness. First, recategorizing the reasons given by families who refuse donation from registered donors would bring greater clarity to donation discussions. Second, people who wish to donate their organs should be encouraged to discuss their wishes in detail with their families, and to consider recording their wishes in other ways. Finally, the consent system for organ donation could be made more detailed, ensuring both that more information is provided to potential donors and that they have more flexibility in how their intentions are indicated; this last strategy, however, could have the disadvantage of discouraging some potential donors from registering.

It is widely accepted in clinical ethics that removing a patient from a ventilator at the patient’s request is ethically permissible. This constitutes voluntary passive euthanasia. However, voluntary active euthanasia, such as giving a patient a lethal overdose with the intention of ending that patient’s life, is ethically proscribed, as is assisted suicide, such as providing a patient with lethal pills or a lethal infusion. Proponents of voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide have argued that the distinction between killing and letting die is flawed and that there is no real difference between actively ending someone’s life and "merely" allowing them to die. This paper shows that, although this view is correct, there is even less of a distinction than is commonly acknowledged in the literature. It does so by suggesting a new perspective that more accurately reflects the moral features of end-of-life situations: if a patient is mentally competent and wants to die, his body itself constitutes unwarranted life support unfairly prolonging his or her mental life.

In this chapter I consider the narrow and wider benefits of permitting assisted dying in the specific context of organ donation and transplantation. In addition to the commonly used arguments, there are two other neglected reasons for permitting assisted suicide and/or euthanasia: assisted dying enables those who do not wish to remain alive to prolong the lives of those who do, and also allows many more people to fulfill their wish to donate organs after death. In the first part of this chapter I explore the possibility of allowing those who die with assistance to donate their organs and the potential benefits of doing so in countries where some form of assisted dying is legal; in the second part I consider the added force that organ donation considerations bring to the argument in favour of legalizing assisted dying in countries where such practices remain forbidden.

In this article we summarise some previously described proposals for ethical governance of autonomous vehicles, critique them, and offer an alternative solution. Rather than programming cars to react to crash situations in the same way as humans, having humans program pre-set responses for a wide range of different potential scenarios, or applying particular ethical theories, we suggest that decisions should be made jointly between humans and cars. Given that humans lack the requisite processing capacity, and computers lack the necessary ethical capacity, the medical paradigm of advance care planning can be retooled for this new context. Advance car-crash planning provides a way to combine humans’ ethical preferences with the advanced data processing capacities of computers to enable shared decision making in collision situations.