David Gordon

When libertarian political philosophy attracted wide public notice in the 1970s, a common view was that the distinctive individual rights advocated in libertarian theory required grounding in a theory of ethics. Recently, this view has come under challenge. It has been argued that resort to such grounding in ethical theory is unneeded. An appeal to common sense intuitions suffices to justify libertarianism. First, a brief account of libertarianism will be presented. Then, some examples of the older, pro-grounding position will be discussed. Then, the principal defense of the newer view, Michael Huemer’s The Problem of Political Authority, will be examined. This discussion constitutes the substance of the present paper. The principal contention of the present article will be that the argument to libertarianism from intuitions does not succeed. In conclusion, it will be suggested that a return to the earlier, grounding view is indicated for philosophers who wish to defend libertarianism.

N. M. L. Nathan's argument that IDP utilitarianism, if universally adopted, is inconsistent, does not succeed. The argument requires that if an IDP utilitarian has only self-regarding desires, then none of these desires can be informed. This rests on a partial misuse of the expression satisfaction of desire. For an individual attempting to realize his self-regarding desires, the satisfaction of the satisfaction of a desire is unmeaning. The naming of an object of the desire is an intrinsic part of the phrase satisfaction of desire. Further, contrary to Nathan's claim, this suggestion does not trivialize IDP utilitarianism.

In an ingenious argument, Ng and Singer claim to show that it is possible to derive the general principle of utility from another principle, Weak Majority Preference, which many who are not utilitarians would be prepared to accept. WMP does indeed sound acceptable: ‘For a community of N individuals choosing between two possibilities, X and Y, if no individual prefers Y to X, and at least individuals prefer X to Y, then X increases social welfare and is preferable’. But from this seemingly innocuous rule, Ng and Singer maintain, quite substantial results follow if one takes account the well-established fact of intransitive indifference owing to the existence of finite sensibility.

The Morals of Markets offers a philosophically and historically informed defense of a market-based form of social organization. Acton discusses the profit motive, competition, monopoly, the supposed impersonality of the marketplace, the assumed chaos of markets, self-interest, egalitarianism, central planning, and distributive justice. For all their high moral tone, Acton concludes the criticisms leveled and the political platforms proffered against free markets are full of contradictions and unanalyzed assumptions. A particular strength of Acton's book is that he is himself something of a moral traditionalist.